I don’t agree with all the doom saying about XZ incident.
You just know orgs are going to return after Easter and panic about it unnecessarily (they’re likely still on Redhat 6). It doesn’t impact them as it was caught super early.
Regarding the narrative that there’s nothing that can be done about these type of attacks - I also don’t agree. There’s already a change in the pipeline to systemd which would have prevented it.
The thing needs rational, calm reaction and response.
Before anybody points it out, I know I am in the wrong industry if I want rational calm response - LinkedIn in still full of people saying the boat got ‘cyber attacked’, and governments are busy trying to solve supply chain risks by banning HUAWEI.
The industry is basically powered by people running into a crowded theatre and shouting CYBER. Then when people point out there’s no cyber, they’re like ‘yes.. but there COULD be cyber’. Thanks, very helpful.
For those asking what systemd change, easy write up: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028
It was in train before the XZ issue was discovered, which may be why the threat actor sped up, started making mistakes and started begging distros to upgrade XZ - as what looks to be years of planning was about to be flushed down the pan.
@GossiTheDog The systemd change would have sealed off the ssh attacker vector. But liblzma is linked into plenty of other libraries. Just using rdepends even python,tor has a depend on it. So they could have still had value in alternate attack vectors, just not ssh which may have been more universal.
Heck libxml2 depends on liblzma5, so there are even more attack targets like postgres, ruby, php, etc
Kind of a waste to rush, but it may be why they added a plugin system for additional payloads.
Kevin Beaumont
Mark Roszko