I wrote a post on the xz backdoor. No backdoor analysis, just considerations on what went wrong.

#cve20243094 #xz

https://appsec.space/posts/xz-backdoor

The xz backdoor from a Security Engineer persepective

As you probably already heard, the xz package got compromised. The package was used as entrypoint to inject malicious code in sshd, altering the authentication flow. This forged vulnerability is now known as CVE-2024-3094.

appsec.space

@himazawa

A few things:
- so far arch and derivates seems to not be affected. Only deb and rpm packages.
- source is still available, from the website
- we only found about the backdoor because it's open source. Corporate software is much more opaque.
- a useful timeline https://infosec.exchange/@fr0gger/112189232773640259

Thomas Roccia :verified: (@[email protected])

Attached: 1 image 🤯 The level of sophistication of the XZ attack is very impressive! I tried to make sense of the analysis in a single page (which was quite complicated)! I hope it helps to make sense of the information out there. Please treat the information "as is" while the analysis progresses! 🧐 #infosec #xz

Infosec Exchange

@portaloffreedom There are actual contraints to the exploit, so the real number of target is unclear unless the analysis is complete. Still, having a package built by a malicious attacker doesn't look too good, even Arch suggested to patch: https://archlinux.org/news/the-xz-package-has-been-backdoored/

> source is still available, from the website

Yes it is (https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=summary) , but the operations are mostly performed in GitHub (the original attacker had access only to it, so inspecting the repo could give additional info on the attacker OpSec but is now gone for good)

> we only found about the backdoor because it's open source. Corporate software is much more opaque.

Indeed this is good, I am not against open source at all, this backdoor was a big issue on the supply chain management

Arch Linux - News: The xz package has been backdoored