Zero-Day Siege: The Fortinet Flaw Exposing the Underbelly of Corporate Defenses

In a rather dramatic turn that might stir the pot more than a tempest in a teapot, the cyber sleuths have once again unearthed a vulnerability so potent that it threatens the sanctity of Fortinet’s…

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@InfosecHitchens No mention if Fortigate IDP on the inbound connection to a public-facing FortiClientEMS would stop the attack vector.

Or, what about the cloud-service for FortiClientEMS Cloud found at forticlient.forticloud[.]com/ems

Each customer should be an isolated instance. What does root get an attacker? A Windows box? A nerfed Linux VM? Nothing?

I think these instances must be upgraded by Fortinet in a maintenance window. A customer cannot un-publish the service from the internet.

@hal8999 Good feedback, I shall make some adjustments to my original post.
@hal8999 Your response was added to the original article and further clarification given, thank you for the valuable insight.

@InfosecHitchens I think you misunderstood. The cloud-based EMS is always published to the public internet. A customer cannot block access or un-publish it because they don't have control.

If you had on-prem Exchange, you could block internet access by a firewall rule until you patched. Or, filter inbound traffic through IDP and application filters.

With 'cloud', the customer no longer controls the firewall or the server on the back-end. So, their environment is always left exposed to the internet unless/until the provider patches the environment or performs some other sort of action to block access.

@hal8999 Thank you, I shall make another edit.
@hal8999 Thanks once more, I have made another edit to the article with your clarification and also added in additional details about how it could be exploited from the writeup done by @horizon3attack