> All known P2P networks may be vulnerable to Sybil attack, because each node is discoverable, and the network operates as a whole. Known measures to mitigate it require either a centralized component or expensive proof of work.

I’m not going to call this one right or wrong. I’m tempted to because quite clearly the author is cherry picking their arguments in the interest of selling you their centralized chat server, but the strawman is weak, and here’s why…

A #Sybilattack is relevant for identity and reputation systems (This falls into the consensus bucket; the main P2P buckets are Network, Storage, Compute, or Consensus).

Not all #P2P protocols or applications need consensus, they may use modern, asynchronous cryptography like MLS to identify. So who cares about group consensus and who should be concerned with this attack vector?

If a known node in a network is used to provide canonical data or identity, it will become a target for a Sybil attack. But more broadly, this a bad design because it creates an asymmetrical network with specific points of weakness that can lead to overall network failure. Bottom line, stop designing asymmetrical protocols! I will probably become the Larry Tesler of "no asymmetry" 😂