So, it looks like my assessment wasn't too far off the mark:

- The individual was approached by a "foreign intelligence agent" in Australia.

- He was targeted for his identity (operational convenience).

- Financial incentive made him vulnerable to recruitment (low-income).

Read: https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/malaysian-suspected-of-spying-in-norway-was-recruited-by-foreigner-in-australia-source

Read:

Malaysian suspected of spying in Norway was recruited by foreigner in Australia: Source

The man was studying in Australia, and he was approached by a foreign intelligence agent operating there. Read more at straitstimes.com.

The Straits Times

ICYMI: I wrote about the Malaysian individual who was arrested over charges of alleged espionage.

(The charge has since changed from espionage to "economic crime." But this is not at all unusual.)

Traditional spycraft has always relied on deception based on identity. In my latest, I explained how intelligence operations are using plausible deniability in espionage to recruit unsuspecting agents from unlikely third countries.

Neutrality is not a shield.

https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/no-neutrality-espionage-why-malaysia-tangled-spying-case-norway

No neutrality in espionage: Why is Malaysia tangled up in a spying case in Norway? | Lowy Institute

Asking the Kremlin would be a good start.