@HcInfosec @jeroen Yes, and every technical expert who has seriously studied online voting as come to the same conclusion about the risks, because there are fundamental problems and requirements that preclude building an Internet voting system sufficient for civil elections.
It's not that scientists don't think Internet voting would be nice. Just as physicists don't think perpetual motion machines wouldn't be terrific. It's just that they understand fundamental reasons we can't make them.
@HcInfosec @jeroen You want an Internet voting system? You have two choices. One is to relax some of the basic requirements and civil rights associated with voting (at least in the US), such as the secret ballot. The other option is to have elections where we can never be sure who actually won, and that are vulnerable to disruption by anyone connected to the Internet.
Neither option seems great.
@mattblaze @HcInfosec @jeroen there are cryptographically secure ways for a person to vote, where that person can go and validate the vote was counted, and nobody can see what this person voted, even if they see the proof that the person voted.
Here is one description of it: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/end-end-verifiablity/
This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transparent, evidencebased electronic elections. This work is part of the Overseas Vote Foundation’s End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting: Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study (E2E VIV Project), funded by the Democracy Fund. Opens in a new […]