Attempts at ’banning E2EE’ are frustrating in their misguidedness and repeatedness.

My central observation is that means for secure communications have only been available for the masses since *way* less than 10 years ago. While we may have gotten used to rely on these tools, there are powers out there determined to turn back the clock.

A longer essay is on my LinkedIn feed:

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/ekoivune_why-banning-e2ee-is-such-a-bad-and-misguided-activity-7078740981247877120-yy2M

Erka Koivunen on LinkedIn: Why banning E2EE is such a bad and misguided idea? I have used this… | 11 comments

Why banning E2EE is such a bad and misguided idea? I have used this picture to emphasize the fact that us laypeople have only enjoyed secure end-to-end… | 11 comments on LinkedIn

Contrasting with this piece:

https://www.devever.net/~hl/webcrypto

The practical means to ’backdoor’ an E2EE tools (be it a comms tool or a secrets manager) is to manipulate the key exchange or to strongarm the service provider to taint the client-side components for a specific target group or for all.

EncroChat and Anom were perfect examples of how to get past by the E2EE problem and deserve an applaud. However, they were targeted to a select audience of likely offenders.

Dissenting voice from an ex-chief of GCHQ:

https://www.ft.com/content/96964279-8011-4d46-9b90-69e016d39e7f

The UK government has sparked an encryption row over powers it might never use

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