I love this preprint from Tzuhsuan Ma and Ann Hermundstad for its point that, as a theorist, you can't separate "optimal" sensory representations from "optimal" behavior. The optimal action depends the constraints upon a sensory system.(https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2022.08.10.503471v1)

For background, there's lots of theory about the optimal way an animal can update its beliefs about the world (a sensory problem) and, separately, the optimal way to act given one's beliefs (an action problem). This separation is fine as long as one has optimal beliefs. But biology is constrained. Sub-optimality means that the action problem is no longer disjoint from the sensory problem – evolution must tailor representations for action.

The analysis is beautiful. One sees first-hand how Bayesian-like behavior does not imply a truly Bayesian program.