Fox having to pay a substantial damages settlement to Dominion is a just outcome; their amplification of lies about malicious backdoors and rigged elections was contemptible and dangerous.
But we shouldn't conclude from this that US voting systems are perfectly or even adequately protected against attack. While great progress has been made, there's still a great deal of work left to do to make our elections truly secure and robust.
@mattblaze hand marked scantron is the only realistic solution. Allows quick results and a verifiable paper ballot for recounts.
Any *private* non-public source code counting our votes is absolutely undemocratic.
@apenguininspace @mattblaze that's the problem. We don't know.
A paper trail is better than nothing but there's just precious little benefit to having a software program do the voting part.
If they open source their code so it's reviewable, that would be ok...but still overkill for what's needed, simple scan n read.
Next up is the blatant security failure of these *private* machines. Sure they've been improved, but why incorporate the risk if you don't have to?
@pixelpusher220 @apenguininspace Here’s the problem: today’s elections in the US are incredibly complex compared with the rest of the world. We vote on a ton of different races, and it’s simply not feasible in most of the US to tally ballots without automation. But automation is inherently unreliable and insecure.
Risk limiting audits are an efficient way to get the benefits of automation while also assuring against errors or compromises of the tally system.
@mattblaze @apenguininspace yes, scantron is automation.
My issue is unaudited, untested machines running unaudited code. The examples of bad (or basically no) security are legion as any private actor will only do the minimum.
I still posit that the software voting machines provide no significant benefit, let alone when weighed against the increased risks.
Edit: *publicly audited
Agreed it adds layers of risk...that are almost entirely avoided by scantron counting.
Risk limiting audits can be done regardless of the counting method.
What measurable increase in reporting does software voting provide?
@mattblaze @apenguininspace you'd mentioned them in the context of software systems so I mistook which you were applying it too.
So yes both can be RLAd (and should be).
Still don't see any sizable benefit to software voting systems. Voter hand marked scantron seems the best of both worlds while limiting the risks.
But I guess we'll disagree on that.
Thx
Cool. To summarize
Both have *software*. (Won't argue soft vs firmware)
Both are RLA capable.
Both produce fast results.
One has VOTER HAND MARKED BALLOTS.
I'm going with that one, thx.
Matt Blaze
Pusher Of Pixels (old account)
Jess (short for Jessica)
sxpert
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