Our position remains clear. We will not back down on providing private, safe communications. We join with other encrypted messengers pushing back on the UK's flawed Online Safety Bill.

@downey
Image 1:
To anyone who cares about safety
and privacy on the internet.

As end—to—end—encrypted communication services, we urge the UK
Government to address the risks that the Online Safety Bill poses
to everyone's privacy and safety. It is not too late to ensure that
the Bill aligns with the Government's stated intention to protect
end—to-end encryption and respect the human right to privacy.

Around the world, businesses, individuals and governments

face persistent threats from online fraud, scams and data theft.
Malicious actors and hostile states routinely challenge the security
of our critical infrastructure. End—to—end encryption is one of the
strongest possible defenses against these threats, and as vital
institutions become ever more dependent on internet technologies
to conduct core operations, the stakes have never been higher.

As currently drafted, the Bill could break end—to—end encryption,
opening the door to routine, general and indiscriminate surveillance
of personal messages of friends, family members, employees,
executives, journalists, human rights activists and even politicians
themselves, which would fundamentally undermine everyone’s
ability to communicate securely.

The Bill provides no explicit protection for encryption, and if
implemented as written, could empower OFCOM to try to force the
proactive scanning of private messages on end—to—end encrypted
communication services - nullifying the purpose of end-to-end
encryption as a result and compromising the privacy of all users.

In short, the Bill poses an unprecedented threat to the privacy,
safety and security of every UK citizen and the people with whom
they communicate around the world, while emboldening hostile
governments who may seek to draft copy—cat laws.

Image 2:
Proponents say that they appreciate the importance of encryption
and privacy while also claiming that it's possible to surveil
everyone's messages without undermining end-to-end encryption.
The truth is that this is not possible.

We aren’t the only ones who share concerns about the UK

Bill. The United Nations has warned that the UK Government’s
efforts to impose backdoor requirements constitute "a paradigm
shift that raises a host of serious problems with potentially dire
consequences".

Even the UK Government itself has acknowledged the privacy risks
that the text of the Bill poses, but has said its "intention" isn't for
the Bill to be interpreted this way.

Global providers of end-to-end encrypted products and services
cannot weaken the security of their products and services to suit
individual governments. There cannot be a "British internet," or a
version of end—to-end encryption that is specific to the UK.

The UK Government must urgently rethink the Bill, revising it

to encourage companies to offer more privacy and security

to its residents, not less. Weakening encryption, undermining
privacy, and introducing the mass surveillance of people's private
communications is not the way forward.

Signed by those who care about keeping our conversations secure:

Matthew Hodgson, CEO, Element

Alex Linton, Director, OPTF/Session
Meredith Whittaker, President, Signal
Martin Blatter, CEO, Threema

Ofir Eyal, CEO, Viber

Will Cathcart, Head of WhatsApp at Meta
Alan Duric, CTO, Wire

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