Unsurprisingly, Musk took to Twitter to state his displeasure with the term "recall" in the context of this action.

"Recall" is just a singular, high-level term that captures the existence of a safety-related defect that is *independent* of its corrective action.

It seems quite unnecessary (and with no clear public safety upside) to establish a host of terms that are dependent on the corrective action from a consumer confusion standpoint.

A "recall" in the context of a #NHTSA regulatory process is effectively a public notification that a defect exists or existed in a vehicle, a description of the defect and, potentially, a corrective action associated with the defect.

Automobile manufacturers in the US are allowed to offer a variety of corrective actions under a "recall" - some that do not include the customer to return the product to the manufacturer or a service center.

So, that is the high-level overview on that.

Ok, so moving on.

A fundamental, structural problem with the #NHTSA is that they have zero ability to independently scrutinize internal automaker development and validation *processes*.

Instead, the NHTSA takes the easy way out... focusing on observed defects in the field or "endpoints".

The trouble with that approach is once a product is on the roadway, it is extremely difficult to quickly and efficiently "catch" defects before there is actual (typically outsized) death and injury.

The #NHTSA also almost entirely ignores the role that Human Factors play in the overall systems safety of the vehicle - that is, the non-trivial dynamics between human limitations and the engineered system.

From the NHTSA's perspective, it is far easier to blame the human driver through assumptions than it is to use evolving, hard science to ensure safe vehicle design.

That was always an issue, but even more so now as partial automated driving systems are fundamentally a Human Factors issue.

Building on that, *the* structural systems safety issue with #FSDBeta is that it attempts to mesh the very real limitations of an enormous pool of possible human drivers with an opaque automated driving system that *appears* unlimited in its capabilities.

A hard mismatch therefore exists.

An extremely dangerous mismatch.

#Tesla does this in an effort to provide Tesla owners with a *sense* that their vehicle is capable of "driving itself".

But these concepts are foreign to the NHTSA...

The other core issue with the #FSDBeta program is that validation (which is very different from "QA") is not possible when the Operational Design Domain (ODD) of the automated vehicle is effectively unbounded.

Or, more accurately, Tesla has presented nothing in terms of what would undoubtedly be a revolutionary, ground-breaking safety case that describes such a validation process.

Instead, Tesla clumsily argues that "AI training" is equivalent to validation - which it is not.

Even internal #Tesla employees that reportedly "test" the FSD Beta product prior to release to external consumers are practically limited because the ODD of the system is so large (now encompassing the entire US and most of Canada).

The only testing that can occur is over an extremely small part of this enormous, highly-complex, highly-dynamic ODD.

Tesla is not performing validation, they are essentially performing a "QA" process similar to those that consumer electronics undergo.

Such "QA" processes are extremely cheap compared to safety-critical system validation - which is why #Tesla embraces it.

Ultimately, #Tesla operates under a "safety case" in the #FSDBeta program that mimics the default position of the #NHTSA - that is, why is there a need for Human Factors considerations and robust validation scrutiny when the human driver can just be blamed by everyone?

This is where this particular NHTSA recall action falls terminally short.