@glyph I’m curious what you think of Apple’s recovery processes. They have recovery contact and legacy contact (provide access upon death). They both use two key shares (one with Apple, one with the chosen contact).
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/account-recovery-contact-security-secafa525057/web
https://support.apple.com/guide/security/legacy-contact-security-secebf027fb8/web
@glyph These were actually added last year in iOS 15, although without much fanfare. I think they were in preparation of E2EE iCloud. You have to enabled a recovery contact or recovery key (28 alphanumeric code) for Advanced Data Protection.
A flow chart would be really nice though. And I don’t think they have warnings for if you don’t enable ADP, although I haven’t made a new Apple ID in a long time so not sure.
As for your earlier SMS 2FA vs YubiKey lockout, I’m less familiar with but that could still be an issue. My understanding is if you have a logged in device, you’ll get notified of login attempts by a prompt on your trusted devices asking for approval which will supply the 6-digit 2FA code. If you don’t have a device, you can request a code via SMS instead. Not sure how this works if you enabled FIDO keys instead; the documentation just says you can be locked out if you lose all keys and trusted devices.
Someone on Reddit tested various scenarios if you’re interested: https://www.reddit.com/r/apple/comments/10mgr5l/security_keys_2fa_account_recovery_testing/
@glyph I think there is an issue around differentiating threat models.
My great grandma has a low odds of a concentrated attack and fewer online accounts with less info, by two orders of magnitude than most people. SMS 1/2fa is probably most secure thing she can do, most effective, and appropriate for her circumstances.
So much of infosec, (1) focuses only on worst case scenarios and the highest threat models, (2) desires perfection, and (3) have access to systems that will be targeted.
@glyph yubikeys make sense for them, not for most people (usability matters!)
Re perfection: this is an engineering thing (guilty as charged), you want the things you create or are vested in to be flawless.
@glyph Sure. I've seen that too.
I just think the threat modeling is part of the gap. You can put in a middle ground between grandma and infosec.
@glyph See also:
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/paper1459-schechter.pdf
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/PasswordDoesNotWork.pdf
Sadly, none of the big email providers (to which password reset emails go to) or companies making password managers publish data on account loss or compromises due to recovery mechanisms.
So much of the research in the area gets ignored.
Having spent the last four years building out a new account recovery mechanism, it's frustratingly hard to get adoption because key players don't measure or publish account loss rates.
@glyph Agreed. Also, if I can run 2FA at home on my own Mastodon server, why not every single commercial entity that wants to keep my credit card on file for "future purchases"?
Knowing that they probably already have my number on file for the purchase in the first place, just they'd store it in an even less secure place.
Excellent point on the fire issue (or loss of keyring!). I do have a spare, but (preemptive facepalm) it's still in the box!
@glyph I've talked about this since 2018, and have acquired a lot of haters as a result.
https://stuartschechter.medium.com/before-you-turn-on-two-factor-authentication-27148cc5b9a1
@glyph case in point. My ocado was compromised a couple of years ago - only password is needed, and once logged in email address can be changed with NO confirmation to current email. At that point, you're locked out and Ocado won't change it back, reset it, or let you back into your account. You have to create a new one from scratch.
Hundreds of pounds of alcoholic drinks ordered on stolen credit card. No checks. 🙄
@glyph I refuse to use any 2FA system I'm not actively forced to that doesn't allow a redundant array of dissimilar authenticators. SMS is not one of the acceptable authenticators. Yes I'm looking at you Apple, I'm not buying an iPhone just for your 2FA.
It's really bad for the homeless because the really cheap subsidized cellphone services don't let you keep the number, and losing all your stuff including the contents of your pockets happens often enough to make recovery a regular exercise.
@glyph i was thrilled to install the latest macOS/iOS update to start using my yubikeys as a second factor, and immediately noped back out when i realized it requires disabling the old behavior.
and like, at some point i'll go back and turn it on anyway? but not until i have the energy to give two trusted friends each a backup key to cover the house fire scenario 🥲
@glyph @0xabad1dea I literally find myself at this juncture right now. Want to have something I trust, something hard-to-steal/bypass/subvert, something redundant (but where I control the redundancy/recoverability) and that I have reasonable odds of loved-ones embracing.
The genie joke comes to mind… https://www.jokeindex.com/joke.asp?Joke=3529