@mattblaze

The only good solution I know is to have a physical box, have everyone check that it's empty, have all the ballot papers put in the box by voters while everyone watches, then shuffle the papers, then take them out and count them while everyone watches.

@davidgerard @brainwagon @neroden What on earth makes you think ensuring the integrity of voting in Australia (or anywhere else) is simple or easy?

There's more to election integrity than the vote-casting technology, and most of the hard properties on my list have nothing to do with computers.

But you're the expert.

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

Again, I'm glad you recognize that I'm the expert and you're not. I only know what I know because I've worked with expert election integrity organizations.

I'm not sure why you're asking weird questions though -- of course it's difficult.

Most of the hard properties on your list have been analyzed for *centuries* and we know pretty solid solutions with the physical ballot box and precinct-level counting and election observers.

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

Look, I don't want to be rude, but you are being really weird.

I see you're one of the many, many advisors to Verified Voting, whose work I've always respected... and who keeps coming down in favor of in-precinct counting, physical ballot boxes (for the secret ballot), and precinct-level observers.

However, I have probably studied the *history* of elections at least as much as you have. I don't see much of a non-CS record for you.

@neroden
maybe you see something i don't, but when i web search his name i see a professor of law (https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/matt-blaze/ ), who's most cited work (https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=sv&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=matt+blaze&btnG= ) regards policymaking in the management of decentralised trust (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/502679 )

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

@troglodyt @mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

Fair enough, I mostly found his CS work, but he's apparently got a co-position in law (focused on CS stuff).

Election security is a hard problem, but he's unfortunately approaching it from a narrowly CS perspective. I'm an interdisciplinarian.

There is consensus on the solutions to the 4 problems he describes (namely physical ballot boxes, in-precinct counting).

There's a *next* layer of problems -- getting enough election observers & workers.

@neroden
this you?

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

@neroden
don't see your interdisciplinary work in google scholar, is your name here a pseudonym?

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

@troglodyt @mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

I have spent my time in activism rather than academia.

I honestly have a lot of respect for Matt Blaze's past work, but he's being really weird here.

Election security *is* difficult. His 4 stated problems have consensus solutions, *and he knows it* because orgs he works with have said so. There's >100 years of history working on those problems. There is a whole next layer of problems after that

@neroden
ok, don't see you listed as founder or member on organisation websites when i search for your name. how come? what orgs can vouch for your commitment to these issues?

@mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

@troglodyt @mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

I'm not particularly interested in credentialism, so I don't tend to want my name up on websites when I work with organizations.

I don't understand why Matt Blaze responded with such weird and content-free statements. I agree with him that election security is difficult, and I said so from my first comment.

He responded by saying that I was the expert. Well, you sure aren't saying anything expert here, Mr Blaze.

@troglodyt @mattblaze @davidgerard @brainwagon

I'm just saying stuff which is absolutely standard among election integrity experts, you don't need to take my word for it (and you shouldn't), just check their websites. Matt Blaze is saying... nothing at all, he's just acting rude.