There are a few other problems out there that have *some* of these difficult properties, but elections seem to be almost unique in having all of them.

Add to that the high stakes and sophisticated state actors that are part of the threat model, and it can get really exciting.

@mattblaze I get it. The one thing I want to see made standard is for every electronic voting machine to have a paper receipt that the voter can verify that is kept for a manual recount.

I know this doesn't, in and of itself, fix election security, but it's a hole in the system I think needs attention.

@sarahmaywalt Receipts of your vote would allow you to prove to a third party who you voted for, which opens the door to coercion and vote-buying.

The requirement for a secret ballot complicates things, but there are important reasons for it.

@mattblaze The receipt would be handed to the poll workers and kept by them, but it would be simple enough for the voter to be able to check it for accuracy before it was turned in.

It would not have to have any identifying information on it. The voter would be required to stuff it into a ballot box before exiting the booth.