Reading the tone of the back’n’forth in this #SnakeYaml #security issue thread is painful to read: https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in
When you see the resolution came about from a voice-to-voice call - and a smaller scoped, easier to implement solution, that was deemed acceptable to all involved presented itself - it’s good to remember that sometimes…. meetings are good.
Hopefully SnakeYaml 2.0 gets released sooner than the biannual February date.
When you see the resolution came about from a voice-to-voice call - and a smaller scoped, easier to implement solution, that was deemed acceptable to all involved presented itself - it’s good to remember that sometimes…. meetings are good.
Hopefully SnakeYaml 2.0 gets released sooner than the biannual February date.
CVE-2022-1471 (vulnerability in deserialization)
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471) CVE-2022-1471 was reported about a day ago and it says > SnakeYaml's Constructor\(\) class does not restrict types which can be instantiated during deserialization. Deserializing yaml content provided by an attacker can lead to remote code execution. We recommend using SnakeYaml's SafeConsturctor when parsing untrusted content to restrict deserialization.