@dangillmor One of the particularly logically tortured aspects of that op-ed is that the example he cites - Oath Keepers on January 6th - is, as he even acknowledges, a case where the FBI actually got the evidence it needed (almost certainly from either a seized phone or an informant/cooperating defendant). Signal protects against real-time communications intercepts, not being betrayed by co-conspirators.

@dangillmor And indeed, it's unlikely that the real-time communications intercepts that Signal protects against would have been available to the FBI in advance of January 6th, no matter the encryption involved. They would have needed a warrant on probable cause, and since they didn't yet even know about the January 6th conspiracy, they wouldn't have had one.

@dangillmor The op-ed's complaint seems to be that Signal doesn't gratuitously log everyone's communications content in case law enforcement wants it in the future. But neither does virtually any other real-time communications system - voice telephony, SMS, tin-can-and-string, or conversations in parks. Real-time communication is, by definition, ephemeral, whether encrypted or not.