The latest NYT op-ed attacking encryption deceitfully talks around the reality. Either you can make everyone able to communicate (and do legal business) securely, or you ensure that no one can. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/28/opinion/jack-dorseys-twitter-signal-privacy.html
Opinion | Jack Dorsey and the Dangers of Privacy At All Costs

The debate about dilemmas posed by the text messaging system.

The New York Times
@dangillmor One of the particularly logically tortured aspects of that op-ed is that the example he cites - Oath Keepers on January 6th - is, as he even acknowledges, a case where the FBI actually got the evidence it needed (almost certainly from either a seized phone or an informant/cooperating defendant). Signal protects against real-time communications intercepts, not being betrayed by co-conspirators.
@dangillmor And indeed, it's unlikely that the real-time communications intercepts that Signal protects against would have been available to the FBI in advance of January 6th, no matter the encryption involved. They would have needed a warrant on probable cause, and since they didn't yet even know about the January 6th conspiracy, they wouldn't have had one.
@dangillmor The op-ed's complaint seems to be that Signal doesn't gratuitously log everyone's communications content in case law enforcement wants it in the future. But neither does virtually any other real-time communications system - voice telephony, SMS, tin-can-and-string, or conversations in parks. Real-time communication is, by definition, ephemeral, whether encrypted or not.

@mattblaze @dangillmor My understanding is some cell carriers do log SMS but logging is inconsistent and retention is short. Then again, you may have better info and I am happy to be corrected.

(Not that it really undermines your core point which I absolutely agree with.)

@mkb @dangillmor Yes, short as in generally measured in hours (an artifact of how SMS delivery works).
@mattblaze @dangillmor Ah, good to know. I had thought it was weeks in some cases. Thanks for setting me straight.
@mkb @dangillmor There used to be a semi-major carrier that retained them for six months (I forget which one), but no one does that any more.
@mattblaze How are authorities getting texts from 2 years ago? @mkb
@dangillmor @mkb As I mentioned, almost certainly from either a cooperating witness or someone's seized handset.
@mattblaze Makes sense. I've been wondering how long carriers were keeping texts, and assumed (wrongly, it appears) that since they consider themselves part of the government they keep things as long as possible.
@dangillmor when people see text messages they naturally assume it’s from the telco, but remember that they’re stored (potentially indefinitely) on the handsets (and in any backups of the handsets) of all the parties. And it just takes one seized phone or cooperating recipient to reveal everything.
@dangillmor @mattblaze @mkb
Often from by capture from warrants on a phone and then getting additional warrants. Which is a bit sketchy and makes me want to use signal for all casual conversation.