@ekuber There’s a bit of nifty data structures thinking buried in the rubble. Maybe something there?
An analogy I used several times in the last year: it’s like the general public suddenly because weirdly obsessed with B* trees because they thought they’d get rich off them.
@ekuber Banks: plural. I meant across banks, not within a single bank; that wouldn't be very useful.
I'm sure there are other solutions; each with their up and downsides. A blockchain keeps a nice distributed ledger, and can scale outside of a single jurisdiction. Note that you don't need proof of work for this particular use case; use can have blockchains without it.
@ekuber the chromium platform being the defacto way to deliver applications to the user, I hope we get a more accountable way of delivering applications than "download the JS anew, hope the server didn't tamper with it and run it".
Mobile app stores disallow the developer to serve a different app per-user, so if you have a copy of the app you know security-researchers will also have access to it (unless you distrust the app store owner).
@ekuber though this is only tangentially related to cryptocurrency, but I believe the space has a need for such technology.
See also:
https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1121 ("ProtonMail Webmail Does Not Provide End-to-End Encryption", because the Webserver is trusted to deliver the correct code)
https://github.com/WICG/isolated-web-apps/blob/main/README.md
ProtonMail is an online email service that claims to offer end-to-end encryption such that "even [ProtonMail] cannot read and decrypt [user] emails." The service, based in Switzerland, offers email access via webmail and smartphone applications to over five million users as of November 2018. In this work, we provide the first independent analysis of ProtonMail's cryptographic architecture. We find that for the majority of ProtonMail users, no end-to-end encryption guarantees have ever been provided by the ProtonMail service and that the "Zero-Knowledge Password Proofs" are negated by the service itself. We also find and document weaknesses in ProtonMail's "Encrypt-to-Outside" feature. We justify our findings against well-defined security goals and conclude with recommendations.