How Otto von Bismarck inspired the German Fascists

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11090120

How Otto von Bismarck inspired the German Fascists - Lemmygrad

(This takes 8¼–12½ minutes to read. Yes, it’s another one of those threads, I’m afraid.) Quoting Robert Gerwarth’s The Bismarck Myth: Weimar Germany and the Legacy of the Iron Chancellor, page 5: >Very few movements (regardless of their ideological origin) have ever failed to attempt a justification of their aims through often contested historical traditions. The closer a political movement or social milieu comes to establishing its own view of the past as universal, the closer it gets to the state of cultural hegemony. In other words, power lies with those who have mastered the past.¹⁶ The ways wherein the memories of Frederick II [https://lemmygrad.ml/post/6943615] and Otto von Bismarck served ordinary Germans was effectively identical to how the memories of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln serve ordinary Americans: cults of personality developed around them and relatively few people had the audacity to denounce them. Thus, they became symbols effective at unifying the folk, even if in their own times they were divisive. [https://lemmygrad.ml/api/v3/image_proxy?url=https%3A%2F%2Fupload.wikimedia.org%2Fwikipedia%2Fcommons%2F7%2F78%2F242-HF-0866_001_Braunes_Haus_Muenchen_Fahnenhalle_Empfangsraum_mit_Bismarck_und_Fahnen_SA_battalion_flags_standards_swastikas_bust_of_Otto_von_Bismarck_ca_1931-34_NSDAP_Nazi_party_HQ_lobby_propaganda_NARA_id_162123385_Unrestricted_No_kn.jpg] Bismarck in particular, being an antisocialist [https://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/a/n.htm#anti-socialist-law] and specifically a constitutional monarchist who occasionally indulged in anti-Judaism (as we shall soon see), was especially popular among later antisocialists, the German fascists most definitely included. Pages 51–52: >Despite the many ideological and programmatic differences between the highly heterogeneous right-wing movements in Germany’s first [pseudo]democracy, the Weimar right found its common battle standard against the Republic within a couple of months after the collapse of the Kaiserreich: Bismarck.³² No other historical reference point was used more often in public debate to criticize the 1919 Constitution, the Versailles Treaty, and the Republic’s supposed lack of historical legitimacy. > >The Weimar right may have been deeply divided, but adoration for the ‘glorious days’ of the Iron Chancellor and the exemplary character of Bismarck’s charismatic leadership was shared by all right-wing parties and movements. In the Weimar Republic, our enemies emphasised this antisocialist when calling for a return to the status quo. Pg. 54: >Similar, although not identical, emphasis was given to representations of Bismarck by leading politicians of the [so-called] National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP). The Nazi Party had arisen out of the German Workers’ Party in 1920, and while at first only one among many völkisch and anti-Semitic splinter groups, it soon surpassed its right-wing competitors with a unique radicalism. > >Upon the ‘ruins of that proud Reich which Bismarck’s genius had created’, Völkischer Beobachter declared in early 1921, a new state embracing all members of the German people would have to be created. With frightening clarity the author—none other than Adolf Hitler himself—explained how this inwardly renewed and outwardly expanded Reich would be governed. While under Bismarck ‘risible means’ had been used to combat ‘parties which were hostile to the state’, Hitler [falsely] promised that in future times ‘parasites, exploiters, and agitators’ would be ‘rounded up to the last man’.⁴⁵ > >Although he was critical of Bismarck’s ‘moderate’ domestic policies, Hitler emphasized the importance of this ‘great man’ for the nationalist movement in the Weimar Republic. The name of Bismarck, Hitler suggested, had to remind the German people in a time of national distress that there were good reasons ‘to be proud to call oneself a German’.⁴⁶ > >Hitler’s references to the founder of the Reich had much the same purpose as the idealizing tendencies in conservative circles: Bismarck’s rule was to act as a positive template—a period of national dignity and greatness—against which the unpalatable features of Weimar Germany could be set. In comparison to the Bismarckian Era, the Republic was no more than a transitional period, a momentary nadir in history, which it was the self-appointed duty of the Weimar right to surmount. Now, keep in mind that the NSDAP remained a fringe party during the 1920s, thus Gerwarth logically spent more time betalking the Weimar Republic’s other, more popular ultranationalist parties. Nevertheless, many of these ultranationalists would assimilate into the NSDAP [https://books.google.com/books?id=PwB2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA370] or its forces in due time. For byspel, the SS Officer Robert Arnold Griesinger was an active member of the Bismarckjugend [https://books.google.com/books?id=km6nDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT88], which was the DNVP’s youth wing. Otto von Bismarck’s own grandsons Gottfried Graf von Bismarck-Schönhausen in addition to Prince Otto Christian Archibald von Bismarck both became NSDAP members, and their relatives Georg von Bismarck as well as Klaus von Bismarck both served in the Axis forces. The 1930s came, and the Fascists were unhappy with the Weimar Republic trying to reclaim Bismarck by means of a commemoration ceremony. Pg. 124: >The NSDAP […] declared that their absence from the commemoration ceremony was an expression of their protest against the political instrumentalization of the Reich’s founder by politicians who had committed ‘treason’ against Bismarck’s legacy.³¹ > >The [Fascists’] position was partly a result of a meeting between Hitler and Brüning on 5 October 1930 which had revealed their fundamental political differences. When Hitler demanded an immediate moratorium on reparations and at least three cabinet posts in return for parliamentary support of Brüning’s policies, the Chancellor refused immediately.³² > >Consequently, the [German Fascists’] rhetorical attacks against the cabinet, often formulated with reference to Bismarck, became noticeably more aggressive. Deutsche Zeitung, for example, credited a [Fascist] student leader with the words that the German people’s current path ‘through the hell of Weimar’ would ultimately lead to salvation, and thus to the ‘Third Reich’. Bismarck would thereby serve as a guiding star: ‘He is with us on our way into the Third Reich of the Germans: Bismarck!’³³ Pgs. 126–9: >Germany was in the middle of a major crisis and the inability of Weimar democracy to solve this crisis encouraged the Bismarckians in their belief that the ‘decisive phase of the struggle’ against the Republic had begun.⁴⁰ > >This assumption proved to be correct and Bismarck was to play a key rôle in the final act of Weimar Germany’s history. More and more Germans were longing for a ‘new Bismarck’ in the face of the political and economic situation after 1929. > >And no one exploited the desire for a Bismarck-like ‘redeemer’ with the same demagogic skill as the leader of the largest right-wing opposition party, Adolf Hitler. His ability to use the Bismarck myth as a propaganda device would prove to be one of the conditioning factors in his rise to power. > >#### Bismarck, Hitler, and the rise of [Germanic fascism] >In February 1939, six years after his ‘seizure of power’ and the dissolution of the Weimar Republic, the German Chancellor Adolf Hitler attended the launching of the battleship Bismarck [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Bismarck_(ship,_1939)]. In his speech in Hamburg harbour, the Führer explained his reasons for naming Europe’s largest battleship after the founder of the Reich: ‘Of all men who can lay claim to having paved the way to the new Reich [meaning the ‘Third Reich’], one figure stands in awe-inspiring solitude: Bismarck.’⁴¹ > >Hitler’s claim was entirely tenable to the extent that the Führer did not refer to the historical personality of the first Reich Chancellor but to the Bismarck myth. Apart from Frederick the Great, the Iron Chancellor was the historical figure invoked most often in Hitler’s speeches in order to lend support to the Führer’s position.⁴² > >Hitler’s political references to Bismarck (for which there is evidence from the early 1920s) served a number of purposes, the most important of which was to emphasize the overriding rôle of leader figures in Germany’s past, present, and future. > >It has often been pointed out that after 1925 the NSDAP differed from all other political movements and parties in the Weimar Republic in that it submitted completely to the will of its ‘charismatic leader’.⁴³ It was therefore the only party whose inner organizational structure reflected the public demand for strong leadership.⁴⁴ > >However, the Führer principle had not always been the focal point of the party’s ideology and organization. In the early years of the [Fascist] movement—and even, as Albrecht Tyrell has argued, up until 1923—Hitler publicly described himself as the ‘drummer’ of the national cause, rather than as the predestined leader of the German people.⁴⁵ > >Nevertheless, there are indications that Hitler understood the strong public desire for charismatic leadership in the years before his failed putsch of 1923 and that to him Bismarck was synonymous with such leadership. > >In April 1922, for example, on the occasion of a [Fascist] ‘Bismarck festival’, Hitler praised the Iron Chancellor extensively and stated: ‘We must follow in his footsteps.’ Only then would the party succeed in ‘gaining the support of the millions […] And when that time has come, then we will want to say: we bow before you, Bismarck!’⁴⁶ Pg. 143: >Of the manifold causes of the rise of the [NSDAP] to become the strongest party in Germany, there can be no doubt that the public’s longing for a saviour-like ‘Führer’, which had intensified throughout the 1920s, featured prominently. > >By the late 1920s, as a result of the growing political and economic crisis of the depression era, the public’s perception of Weimar democracy as a total failure allowed the idea of charismatic leadership to move from the wings of politics to centre stage. > >It did not escape Hitler’s attention that Bismarck was widely perceived as the ultimate model of such a heroic leadership. As the well-respected Munich historian Karl Alexander von Müller had already exclaimed in 1929, it was Bismarck’s image ‘which appears in front of us, when we hope’ for the ‘future leader’.¹⁰⁹ When this future leader of the German people emerges, Müller concluded, ‘he will greet the man we memorize today as his relative and predecessor’.¹¹⁰ > >In precisely this respect, the Bismarck myth helped to create a political climate which smoothed the way for Hitler’s success. Hitler was cunning enough to seize the political opportunities which were latent in the Bismarck myth. With genuine virtuosity Hitler appealed to existing myths and used them for his own purposes. In so doing, he narrowed the gulf between large parts of middle-class Germany and his own political movement, as is evident from the immediate reactions to Hitler’s appointment. :::spoiler (Emphasis added in all cases. Click here if you have time for more Fascist references to His Serene Highness Prince Otto von Bismarck.) Pgs. 131–2: >In Mein Kampf, which was praised in nationalist circles as the ‘most significant political publication since Bismarck’s Thoughts and Reminiscences’, Hitler’s representation of himself as a ‘second Bismarck’ received only fleeting expression.⁵⁷ Soon after Landsberg, however, Hitler began to suggest that he would fill the void which the Iron Chancellor had left in 1890. Immediately after the end of his imprisonment, for example, he posed for a photograph with a Lenbach portrait of Bismarck in the background.⁵⁸ > >Hitler’s writings and speeches suggest that he began to use the Bismarck myth for his own ends once he had discovered that he himself was the one to lead ‘his’ people. In Hitler’s Second Book, written in 1928 but only published posthumously, this became particularly evident.⁵⁹ > >According to Hitler’s admiring statements, Bismarck’s kleindeutsch solution to the German question was the ‘highest achievement’ which could have been expected ‘within the limits of the possible of that time’. Bismarck in his old age was therefore able to look back upon a mission fulfilled. However, his ‘finished life work’ did not signify the ‘end of the life of the German nation’. In Hitler’s view it had been the ‘task of the post-Bismarck period’ to pursue an ethnic policy [Volkstumspolitik] and furthermore, to solve the acute problem of sustaining the German people through the acquisition of Lebensraum—living space in the East.⁶⁰ > >[…] > >Hitler was convinced that the Iron Chancellor had understood the ‘destructiveness’ of socialism and that he had tried to eradicate the evil forces threatening ‘his’ Reich from within. He had, however, chosen the wrong method to achieve this goal. > >‘In his anti-socialist laws’, Hitler argued, Bismarck ‘put up desperate resistance against the destructive mission of the Marxist dogma. It had no effect. Not only because his successors lacked the energy in following the course Bismarck had charted, and because they abandoned this course, no, because the means of conflict themselves were not up to the task. By using political means of police force, an attempt was made to break the backbone of an ideological doctrine which was anchored in the masses and found their positive response.’⁶² > >According to Hitler, the ‘breaking’ of the Marxist world-view and its representative organizations was only possible by countering ‘Bolshevism’ with an ideology of equal resolution and determination. Bismarck had not been able to rely upon a collective ideology as strong as [German Fascism]. This, Hitler argued, was why the anti-socialist laws had failed and why socialism in Germany had not thus far been destroyed.⁶³ For Hitler, an essential part of his own self-appointed historical mission was to make up for this missed opportunity. Likewise, the 1940 film Bismarck [https://archive.org/details/bismarck-1940] and its 1942 sequel The Dismissal [https://archive.org/details/die-entlassung-the-dismissal-or-bismarck-part-2-1942] portrayed the antisocialist chancellor very positively throughout. Quoting David Welch’s Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1933–1945 [https://annas-archive.pk/md5/b16706e53d7b260cfb2c2bb4a71ee2c6], pages 141–142: >On 6 December 1940, Wolfgang Liebeneiner’s Bismarck was released. Like Friedrich Schiller, it was concerned with a leader of genius and his attempts to unify Germany. The story begins with Bismarck as the newly appointed Prussian Prime Minister who defeats Austria at war, outwits France, and brings about the proclamation in 1871 of Wilhelm I of Prussia as Emperor of Germany. > >The unification of a strong and united Germany marks the triumph of Bismarck’s indomitable will. The film makes it clear, however, that this was achieved not by consensus politics and the parliamentary process, but by ‘iron and blood’. Addressing the Landtag at the beginning of the film, Bismarck outlines a theme that is to recur again and again: ‘The great questions of the present will not be solved by speeches and parliamentary decision, but by iron and blood.’⁴⁵ > >Like all great leader figures, Bismarck knows what is best for Germany. In his Table Talk, Hitler referred to the importance of these men of genius: >>I shall not cease to think that the most precious possession a country can have is its great men. If I think of Bismarck, I realise that only those who have lived through 1918 could fully appreciate his worth. One sees by such examples how much it would mean if we could make the road smooth for men of talent.⁴⁶ > >The historical parallel with Hitler is emphasized throughout the film. Like Hitler, Bismarck, on assuming power, immediately builds up a strong modern army to secure a lasting German Empire. In order to achieve this he informs King Wilhelm that Germany must change her attitude towards Austria and that a military pact with Russia is necessary to protect Prussia’s eastern flank. When the King objects to this new alliance, Bismarck retorts: ‘By the time the grumblers in parliament get around to doing anything about it, we will be ready and mobilized!’ […] film audiences were quick to spot this analogy between Bismarckian diplomacy and the [German]–Soviet Non-aggression Pact. The SD reported: >>Also well received were those parts of the film showing Bismarck’s struggle to convince King Wilhelm of the validity of his policies and of the necessity of applying them at that time to the realities of the situation. When Bismarck made clear to the King the necessity of a change in attitude towards Austria, speaking of it as a matter of ‘politics and diplomacy’, the film audience applied this to the current relationship between Germany and the USSR. The reference to the fact that in foreign policy one had to be a little ‘two-faced’ was well understood.⁴⁷ > >But the main intention of the film was to reinforce the message that the Führerprinzip was an essential prerequisite for the unity and greatness of the Reich. Once again a simple analogy is drawn between the two leaders. Just as Hitler protected the country from an international Jewish-Bolshevik threat by means of the Enabling Act, so Bismarck is shown dissolving the Landtag and imposing press censorship in his efforts to unite Germany’s forty states under a single all-powerful rule. Read pages 142–146 for more. ::: As for Bismarck’s opinions on Jews, an argument can be made that he was overall allosemitic (that is to say, he had a love–hate relationship with Jews). Willy Cohn pointed to numerous positive (and a few negative) remarks that he made about Jews, as well as friendships that he had with certain Jews [https://books.google.com/books?id=mbhtAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA384]—for whatever that may be worth. On the other hand, Sam Hall, while acknowledging a few signs of friendliness, presented a nevertheless more worrisome picture [https://pubs.lib.umn.edu/index.php/cey/article/download/4424/3010]: >Bismarck was not immune to the antisemitic tendencies prevalent in German society. On more than one occasion, the Chancellor was overheard employing the term Jew in a derogatory manner. He referred to his political rival, the progressive liberal Eduard Lasker as “the little Jew” and, on another occasion, described Jews as “cosmopolitan nomads.”²⁴ > >Some in the country’s political sphere went as far as to label Bismarck as the “father” of antisemitism. In response to a heightened level of antisemitic agitation during the early 1880s—Jewish homes, shops, and synagogues were damaged in the cities of Thorn, Neustettin, and Stolp—the liberal Landtag deputy Eugen Richter chastised Bismarck for encouraging Jewish persecution through his inaction.²⁵ > >On the 12th of January 1881, Richter contended that the antisemites began “to cling to the coat-tails of Prince Bismarck” and that they “go right on cuddling up to him and call to him as noisy children surround their father.”²⁶ To an extent, Richter’s powerful speech was true. Prior to the 1881 Reichstag elections, Bismarck had confided in his son Wilhelm that the appointment of Stöcker to the chamber was “urgently desirable,” describing the antisemitic flagbearer as “an extraordinary, militant, and useful ally.”²⁷ That is plenty more that one can say about the German Fascists’ idolization of Otto von Bismarck along with how his protofascist régime set a precedent for the Third Reich, but this topic is lengthy enough as it is. Read the rest of The Bismarck Myth (especially chapters 8–9) or see Richard E. Frankel’s Bismarck’s Shadow: The Cult of Leadership and the Transformation of the German Right, 1898–1945 if you have time for more.

Jewish women in the Third Reich’s propaganda

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11080072

Jewish women in the Third Reich’s propaganda - Lemmygrad

(This takes 4½ minutes to read, although the paper itself can take around two dozen minutes.) >The majority of [Fascist] propaganda is androcentric; focusing on glorifying Aryan men and demonizing Jewish men. [Fascist] propaganda lionized the work ethic and strong character of Aryan men and reified Jewish men as sly Shylocks aimed at seducing Aryan women and as the source of the economic downturn that plagued Weimar Germany as a result of the World War I and the Treaty of Versailles. > >The portrayal of women in propaganda works in a similar hierarchy, with Aryan women placed above Jewish women. Although not as present as Aryan men, Aryan women found a valued niche in propaganda. When Aryan women are present in propaganda they are almost always in the traditional rôles of wives or mothers¹. Their portrayal as nurturing wives and mothers is connected to the assumption of the sexual purity of Aryan women. Propaganda also portrayed Aryan women as being traditionally beautiful as to entice Aryan men to seek out idealized Aryan partners. > >Jewish women are even less visible in [Fascist] propaganda than Aryan women. But when they are depicted the focus is on their bodies and sexuality. Older Jewish women are portrayed as ugly and frumpy whereas younger Jewish women are seen as oversexed and indulgent². Both of these portrayals are intended to inspire disgust in the viewer for the Jewish female body. > >Jewish women are also portrayed as being more sexually promiscuous, as the carriers of sexually transmitted diseases, and as seducers of Aryan men. These assumptions of the overt sexuality of Aryan women had heavy political implications when considered along with laws regarding marriage, sex, and childbirth between Aryans and Jews. > >The most striking difference between how Jewish women and Aryan women are portrayed in propaganda is their physical appearances. Jewish women appear physically larger than Aryan women. This is intended to make Jewish women appear sexually less desirable than Aryan women and to add to their ugliness. This is especially true of older Jewish women who are often portrayed as being overweight with a haggard of weakened appearance. > >The photographs below were taken of Jewish women and were used as propaganda. They illustrate the idea of Jewish wornen as ugly. The woman in the photograph to the left has a dirty face, unkempt hair, she is overweight and her nose is large and bulbous. Despite all of this, she still has a wide toothy grin which seems to suggest a kind of blissful ignorance. The woman on the right shares this smile, but her teeth are obviously damaged and darkened from a lack of hygiene. > >Physical power is often connected with political and social power. In reality, men are often physically larger than women; this reflects existing power dispersion. When women gain weight, they can be perceived as threatening the power and privilege of men in society because they are challenging their physical supremacy. Aryan women are portrayed as thinner because their rôles as wives and mothers fit more nicely into the ideals of German womanhood. > >Jewish women are also portrayed as being overweight due to the association of obesity with laziness. The Nazi Party promoted a lifestyle which was highlights by an extreme dedication to work⁵. To suggest that Jewish women were obese due to their lack of work ethic served to make them appear devoid of value to the Nazi party. > >[…] > >[One] image shows an Aryan woman shining a pair of shoes while a Jewish woman looks on critically. The illustration was accompanied by text reading: “Rosy leaves the countryside. Up to town, there to bide: She wants to earn a living there … She finds a post with Katz, the Jew. Three bouncing daughters has this Yid; His wife, Oh My! is sure no kid. All four are idle lazybones, Doing nothing all day long.³²” > >Although the focus of this image is not that Aryan women will be seduced by German men, it shows a diligently working Aryan woman accompanied by two shiftless Jewish women. It is also worth noting that the woman in the background is applying makeup and smoking, both of which were behaviors that were frowned upon by the Nazi party. Smoking was not to the benefit of creating a pure and healthy Aryan race and makeup covered up natural Aryan beauty. The Aryan woman has naturally rosy cheeks and a soft smile on her face, even under the glare of the Jewish woman. > >[…] > >Aryan woman are often portrayed as breastfeeding mothers, which is viewed as an entirely matemalistic action without any sexual ramifications. To the contrary, Jewish women are devalued due to their sexualization in propaganda. > >Aryan women are valued for their sexual purity and restraint. Jewish women are disvalued for their perceived promiscuity and lack of maternal instinct. The portrayal of Aryan women as wives and mothers is hypervis[i]ble in propaganda; Aryan women hardly seem to exist outside of these two rôles³⁶. But it is in these narrow rôles that their value is defined. Jewish women are not portrayed in any way being related to the ideals of family or motherhood. > >Propaganda is meant to mimic a reality while still being unrealistic in its expectations. Because Jewish women are not shown as wives and mothers, it can be inferred that they do not hold these rôles in actual society. This serves to completely devalue them as the two narrow rôles in which women are intended to find their value do not even apply to Jewish women. > >[…] > >The portrayal of Jewish women as oversexed, ugly, lazy, and as the opposite of the feminine Aryan ideal served to vilify Jewish women as an enemy to the Aryan race. They were at the same time intensely belittled while at the same time being ignored by propagandists. They were not featured as prominently as Aryan men and women or Jewish men but even their limited visibility speaks volumes about the values and fears of [Fascist] society and how gender and race influenced these values. > >Jewish women were a threat to traditional notions of gender and sexuality as they represented a new woman with uninhibited sexuality, unencumbered by children, and who is able to live a life of luxury without needing the support of a husband. Although Jewish women sometimes appeared in Fascist propaganda intended for civilians (e.g. Der ewige Jude, which briefly disparages Rosa Luxemburg), they never — as far as I know — appeared in the Axis’s war propaganda. I think that this is because the Fascist bourgeoisie knew that the sight of beastly ‘foreign’ men would have motivated its armies to fight harder for the Axis, whereas the sight of unattractive ‘foreign’ women would have only motivated the extreme misogynists among its ranks. Likewise, depicting the Jewish women who fought the Axis [https://lemmygrad.ml/post/10948326] would have invited either confusion or unwanted laughter. Therefore, there are no Jewish women in the Axis’s war propaganda.

Why Did Mussolini Move From Marxism To Fascism?

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11074035

Why Did Mussolini Move From Marxism To Fascism? - Lemmygrad

Lemmy

In the early ’40s, Jews repeatedly bribed the German Fascists to keep the Polish antisemites off their backs

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11070848

Some fascists believed that the Soviets were controlling the Western Allies

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11050951

On at least one occasion, Axis officials justified antisemitism by citing the Allied bombing of their cities

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11040738

Numerous British & U.S. authorities banned a pro-Jewish film for its Communist bias

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11030174

Not even mathematical problems were safe from German Fascism

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11016773

Austrofascist Competition and Cooperation with the German Fascists, 1936–1938

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/11003540

Austrofascist Competition and Cooperation with the German Fascists, 1936–1938 - Lemmygrad

(This takes 4.5–6.75 minutes to read.) For the fourscore and eighth anniversary of Chancellor Arthur Seyss-Inquart proclaiming the Anschluss, I want to talk to you about the Austrofascists. >From 1936 to 1938, Austrofascists oscillated between cracking down on [German irredentists] and offering them olive branches, never really settling on one distinct response to the overbearing [irredentist] presence. Instead, Austrofascists sought to earn [the Third Reich’s] respect for Austrian sovereignty with a two-pronged response of both carrots and sticks, depending on the situation. > >The constitutive contradiction between regionalism and nationalism drove forward the seemingly contradictory response of both “appeasement” and punishment (Starhemberg 169, 246). The unity among Austrofascists and [German Fascists] along theoretical grounds, from shared emotional fantasies of German nationalism to common fascist beliefs, authoritarianism, and zealous anti-Bolshevism, all created ample opportunity for cooperation. > >The discord between Austrofascists and [German Fascists] along other fault lines, from regionalism to personal power struggles and the backlash to any specific solution to the Austrian question, also created conflicts that resulted in force. > >[…] > >Another discursive reconciliation between state separation and common national identity was the claim that Germans and Austrians were national brothers. An anonymous letter expressed gratitude to Schuschnigg for the treaty that preserved “economic cooperation […] with the German brothers, which will hopefully create more bread and work again” (Hochverehrter Herr Bundeskanzler!). > >A Viennese teacher claimed that the “reconciliation with our German brothers” was nothing short of a “feat” (Weifs), while another letter thanked the Austrian chancellor for making peace with the “brother Volk” (Tertsch). One accepted Austria as the little brother in this fraternal relationship, expressing joy at the “normalization of relationship to our big German brother Volk” (Bürgermeister Klagenfurt). > >Another labeled the [Third Reich] itself as the “Bruderreich” (Hauptgruppenleiter). This sentiment of two fraternal Völker also cut both ways: a letter from Heidelberg rejoiced at the “friendship with the Austrian Brudervolk. […] G-d bless this step for both Völker, who are of one blood” (Sturm). > >Despite the strain on diplomatic relations, Germans and Austrians were seen as national “brothers,” blood-related and fraternal but not identical; as such, the best way forward for their joint prosperity was independence from and coexistence with each other rather than irredentist unity. > >If the twentieth century was the era that idealized the creation of uniform nation-states (Weitz), then many Austrian inhabitants simultaneously desired national cooperation and clear-cut state autonomy. > >[…] > >The exasperated and flabbergasted local VF members complained to their Viennese leaders about the relaxed border policy, claiming that: >>Austria displays in such [questions? illegible because of typological errors] a generosity, which sometimes really appears incomprehensible. So the strongly-punished National Socialists, who were reliably reported on by us, who had to serve long-term prison sentences on account of the bombing attacks, and who were pardoned as part of amnesty, were invited by NSDAP-sites in Germany to a multiweek recreational holiday. These persons were also awarded exit visas without any trouble. (An das Generalsekretariat) > >The Austrofascist state offered 18,684 pardons to [irredentist] agents in the second half of 1936 alone (“Chronology” vol. 13, no. 15, p. 12). The porousness of the Austro-Bavarian border created anxiety and embarrassment for some VF officials, especially since many of these [irredentist] agitators could expect to face little to no consequences. > >It cited a Linz newspaper that commented on how Austrofascist leaders demanded order in the face of [irredentist] uprisings while simultaneously showing legal leniency to [irredentist] agents: “patriotic Austrians who rallied to the Government’s anti-Nazi appeals now felt themselves dupes confronted by triumphant adversaries. Convicted Nazis, for instance, had been released from custody through influential intervention” (“Chronology” vol. 13, no. 13, p. 13).³ > >The Austrofascist leaders’ balancing act between stopping [irredentist] aggression without angering their fascist Germanic brothers left fellow VF members feeling resentful. As VF members began to place their faith in a hermetically sealed border as their only hope to end the strife of this intra-national borderland, their leaders continued to believe in potential großdeutsch solidarity. > >Meanwhile, intra-national borderlands chaos in 1937 continued, varying from [irredentist] schemes to terrorize the borderland into a perpetual state of anxiety to actual physical contestations along the border. > >The Salzburger Chronik discussed the revelation of a scandalous [irredentist] “war plan” that involved “throwing bombs onto the [Austrian] Federal Chancellery from an airplane,” in addition to [irredentist] ambitions “to marshal in all of Austria an existing shock corps of 2000 to 3000 men, which will first ‘purge’ the ranks of the NSDAP but then it should commit acts of violence of the worst kind.” The paper condemned [Third Reich] agents as “brown terrorists,” their machinations as a “terror campaign,” and the planned militia unit as a “terror shock corps,” leaving panic in their wake and increasing the volatility of the borderland (“Braune Terrorstoßtruppe”). > >Two pages later the same paper reported on an actual border scuffle involving Austrian veterinarian Karl Zoller, who was visiting the Austrian town of Jungholz. On the map, Jungholz “belonged” to Austria, but because of the Alpine topography on the ground, the only way to access it was via roads that, on the map, “belonged” to Bavaria. > >While in this Bavarian juncture between Austrian spaces, he refused to return the “Hitler greeting” to a group of five Bavarian [Fascists]. He believed that “as an Austrian he had no reason to answer with this greeting,” which led to him being “mauled.” The paper continued the story by stating, “The outrage of this egregious incident is very great in the Tyrolean border territory” (“Gestern, heute, morgen”). > >[…] > >Schuschnigg spent the day subject to verbal berating and power moves, culminating in an “addendum” to the Juli-Abkommen from 1936 (“Ein Zusatzabkommen”). Officially, Hitler again claimed to uphold Austria’s autonomy, but this time with one key exception: Schuschnigg had to appoint Nazi agent Arthur Seyss-Inquart (also born and raised in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire) as Home Minister “with the police directly under him” (“Chronology” vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 18–19). With this administrative appointment, Schuschnigg paid a heavy price for an adulterated version of Austrian “autonomy”: one of his key chess pieces was now playing for his opponent. :::spoiler (Emphasis added. Click here for more.) >Jewish newspaper, Die Stimme, reported on how Schuschnigg reemphasized how this German national (even racial) identity was to be channeled for regionalist autonomy: “Anschluß? No! Absolutely and very clearly: No! Our race, our language, our culture, and our history are German. That is certain. But Germany is one country and Austria is another country. […] The ideology of both countries is different, so that nothing about a fusion can be spoken” (“Äußerungen des Bundeskanzlers”). > >To be sure, right-wingers in Austria contributed to and participated in interwar antisemitism (Wasserman 6). Yet presented with either discrimination in the Ständestaat or persecution in the event of Anschluss, this Jewish newspaper saw the choice as obvious. The Jews in Austria leading up to 1938 thus inhabited a liminal borderland between types and intensities of antisemitism. > >And while the two German states were fascist, their fascist objectives were oriented toward fundamentally opposing ends: Austrofascist autonomy versus [Third Reich] expansion. Austria was to be a German state imbued with its own völkisch German nationalism to assert its autonomy from Germany itself. As well, I could not help but think of how Democrats and Republicans try to compete with who is more ‘American’ when I read about how the Austrofascists bragged that they were even more German than the German Reich itself: >The VF propagandists embraced this constitutive contradiction wholeheartedly and without reservation. Within the intra-national borderland, it was understandable to feel German, but in a specific, southeastern, and Austrian way. As odd or confusing as they may sound, such proclamations as “Freedom! German Loyalty! […] Yes, with Schuschnigg for Austria!” (Ray) made logical sense in context. They framed loyalty to the German nationality as the key to independence from the German state. > >A report from Salzburg reiterated just such pro-autonomy rallying cries: “For a free and German, independent and social, for a Christian and certain Austria, for peace, work and the equality of all, who profess themselves to the Volk and Vaterland” (Cited in Der Landeshauptmann 1). > >The Austrofascists thus became the ultimate reflection of the [German Fascists]: German-speaking, German-identifying fascists charged with similar affective sentiments but in opposite directions. They attempted to take [Fascist] German nationalism and flip it around for their own purposes. And speaking of paradoxes, it seems that making a mess in somebody else’s piss-soaked hellhole can be a surprisingly effective strategy for persuading them to unite with you: >The hope that a referendum would provide a definitive answer to the Austrian question only unleashed more uncertainty. On 11 March, just two days before the planned plebiscite, the Neues Wiener Tagblatt reported street showdowns in Vienna between [irredentists] and VF loyalists, with the VF shouting “Heil Schuschnigg and different battle cries” in response to their [irredentist] rivals (“Demonstrationen in der Innern Stadt”). The Salzburger Volksblatt likewise commented that the police and troops were called up for “the maintenance of peace and order” following similar such [irredentist] marches (“Demonstrationen in Wien”). > >Given that many of these reports came from papers with [irredentist] sympathies, the news was surely exaggerated to make the [irredentists] look as victimized as possible and to make Austria seem as chaotic as possible. Doing so would lend credence to [irredentist] claims that Germany needed to get involved to restore peace, order, and stability. That the [irredentists] were the party instigating so much of this disorder did not matter. On the contrary, the perception of disorder itself was central to Hitler’s strategy. ::: It is very tempting to compare the Austrofascists’ largely benign treatment of irredentists with how liberal régimes treated fascists [https://lemmygrad.ml/post/366971], or how neoliberal ones treat neofascists. Despite the serious dangers that they posed, the Austrofascists were gentle with most of the worst irredentists, much as they were gentle with Croatian fascists who plotted homicides. [https://lemmygrad.ml/post/4247839] Anticommunists have demonstrated time and again that defending capital from lower-class revolutionaries takes precedence over imperialist competition, which was why WWI ended with the Entente turning its attention away from the Central Powers and onto the Bolshevik Revolution. See also: ‘Making Austria German Again [https://lemmygrad.ml/post/5198672]’

Stock exchanges provided the Fascists a useful and powerful tool to plunder occupied nations

https://lemmygrad.ml/post/10999180

Stock exchanges provided the Fascists a useful and powerful tool to plunder occupied nations - Lemmygrad

(This takes four minutes to read.) >As stated by Henning (1992), for [German Fascists], trading securities was basically not acceptable. Indeed, the international connections created by the trade and the notion of speculation attached to stock exchanges were despised by the [Reich] officials. As such the stock exchanges had been an important target of [German Fascism’s] propaganda before 1933 (Nathan, 1944). > >However, and despite this animosity, when the [German Fascists] came to power they did not suppress all the stock exchanges even though they did reduce their number from 21 to 9. As stated by Wolfe (1955), “the pre-1933 vows to exterminate the financiers and their institutions were dropped as soon as possible”. Thus, whereas the antifinance […] rhetoric remained the same during the following years and whereas each marked growth of stock prices led to protests asking to close the market, the government did not take any measure designed to annihilate the stock markets. > >This seemingly contradictory position may be explained by two reasons. First the fears of the appearance of a black market, by definition uncontrollable; second the need for the [Third Reich] to finance its war expenditures. > >Indeed, to cover the huge public expenditures needed to launch the war, the [Third Reich] turned to several tools: taxation was increased and incentives to invest in “useful” industries were put into place. As suggested by Dauphin-Meunier (1942), the [Fascist] treatment of financial markets aimed at assuring a large financial basis for the [Third Reich]. Wolfe (1955) and Nathan (1944) share this view; the latter considering that “[The German Fascists’] credit and banking measures […] were designed to make the money and capital market as productive of public funds as possible”. > >So, the German stock exchanges were allowed to survive if they could serve and facilitate the [Third Reich’s] ambitions. To fulfill this objective, the stock exchanges and the economy as a whole became subject to numerous regulations. > >In 1934, the first measures to counter the […] influence of [liberal] capitalism were passed. In order to redirect the available funds towards state bonds, stocks had to become less interesting for the investors. By the same token, if stock prices were constantly rising, investors would want to switch from state bonds to shares. This explains the [German Fascists’] heavy anti-speculation propaganda. In this context, a 1934-law restricted the distribution of dividends for the largest corporations. > >As time went by, legislation got more and more restrictive and by 1941, high tax rates would in practice prohibit the payment of dividends exceeding 6%. Meanwhile, a law passed as early as 1937 had already increased the minimum required capital for limited companies and multiplied by a tenfold factor the minimum nominal value of the shares (brought to a 1000 Reichsmark) and heavily reduced the shareholders’ say in the companies. > >Of course, all th[ese] measures were meant to render the stock exchange the least attractive to investors, especially small shareholders. Furthermore, and as for the rest of the economy, the [German Fascists] soon started to aryanize the stock exchanges. > >The legal measures imposed to the market led to an almost complete halt of transactions as early as 1939 (Wolfe, 1955). Nonetheless, even in that very tight market, stock prices kept an upward trend, leading the legislature to pass even direr laws in September 1941: declaration of stocks bought since the war outbreak, obligation for the brokers to declare all the transactions and to centralize all their sales on the stock market. By 1943, the activity of the Berlin stock exchange became so minute that it opened but three days a week. > >In occupied countries, the contradictory feelings towards stock exchange were also observed. The reopening of the stock exchanges quickly led to vivid debates and, depending on the country, would occur with quite large time differences. > >In fact, and even though a large fraction of the [Fascists] loathed them, stock exchanges provided a useful and powerful tool to plunder the occupied nations. Plundering could either be direct (for instance by acquiring a significant number of shares from a specific company) or indirect as the stock market allowed the occupied state to float bonds to cover the occupation costs imposed by the [Fascists]. > >Nonetheless, the cohabitation of pro and anti stock exchange members probably explains the changing attitude of the occupant. In fine, as a consequence of the laws passed by the Vichy régime, the Paris stock exchange suffered from numerous controls. > >[…] > >Soon […] the French Vichy government as well as the [Fascist] occupant realized that a stock exchange could help them reach their goals. A note dated August 10, 1940 emanating from the French Ministry of Finance stressed the importance of a deep market for state bonds as well for the investors as for the state itself¹³. > >During the Wiesbaden peace conference the French authorities insisted on the vital aspect of a properly functioning market for fixed income securities. For the [Fascists], and as stated by Lacroix-Riz (1999), there was an objective reason to reopen the stock exchange, an essential tool, among others, to plunder the country. > >Contemporaneous German reports¹⁴ clearly show that they fully understood the importance of the bond market. Indeed, the French government had to rely on paper or bond issues to cover the occupation costs as other resources (such as duty or personal taxes) had been highly reduced by the war. Not only, would bonds be issued easily but they would also benefit from a deep market in order to attract investors¹⁵. (Emphasis added.) Given the stock market crash of 1929, it is easy to see why some Fascists publicly disparaged stock exchanges, but such rhetoric is insignificant compared to how they conserved the stock exchange to a notable extent. Free market purists shall inevitably decry the state invention as ‘socialism’, but as usual they fail to consider how one business’s loss can just as easily be another business’s gain (to say nothing of how they fail to acknowledge that capital, the law of value, and generalised commodity production only continued to expand under Fascism). Further reading: ‘French Stock exchanges and regulation during World War II [https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kim-Oosterlinck/publication/46543661_French_Stock_exchanges_and_regulation_during_World_War_II/links/5b0d48340f7e9b1ed7fd472f/French-Stock-exchanges-and-regulation-during-World-War-II.pdf]’