Been spending some time auditing an AI agent framework.
Not the usual kind of security review — more like: what happens when you map trust boundaries across an architecture where the "user" and the "agent" both have tool access, code execution, and autonomy.
Going through it systematically. Learning a lot about what makes agent security different — and what stays the same.
#AI #AISecurity #CyberSecurity #AgentSecurity #AppSec #SecurityEngineering
Microsoft fixes an AutoGen Studio flaw that enabled remote code execution — AI agent platforms are now part of the attack surface. Secure the agents, secure the future. 🤖⚠️ #AgentSecurity #AISecurity
A vulnerability chain dubbed AutoJack in Microsoft's AutoGen Studio interface for prototyping AI agents could let attackers manipulate an agent into executing arbitrary commands on its host system simply by visiting a malicious webpage.
AutoJack shows how a single-page app flaw can enable RCE against AI agent hosts — as agents gain autonomy, the platforms running them become prime targets. Securing AI starts with securing its runtime. 🤖⚠️ #AgentSecurity #AISecurity
AutoJack is a novel exploit chain showing how a single malicious webpage can turn an AI browsing agent into a remote code execution vector on the host machine. By abusing trust in localhost, missing authentication, and unsafe parameter handling, attackers can trigger arbitrary process execution through AutoGen Studio’s MCP WebSocket. The research highlights a broader pattern - when agents can browse untrusted content and access local services, traditional boundaries like localhost are no longer secure.
Microsoft's Defender Security Research team found a chain in AutoGen Studio that turns a single malicious webpage into an RCE on the developer's host. PyPI users are not exposed, but the pattern is broader than one bug.
I don't do a lot of AI-agent work but it struck me recently that Bastille nested VNET jails could make fantastic agent harnesses to limit access, resources and blast radius.
We already support resource limitations on memory, cpu and storage. Limiting outbound network is simple enough to enforce. It wouldn't take much to put some tooling around this.
Seems to me Bastille is a great candidate. What do you think? If you HAD to run an agent.
The next frontier for AI in the enterprise isn't just better models — it's who controls the agent layer. Claude is positioning itself not on raw capability, but on orchestration and governance. The real competition may be less about intelligence and more about trust architecture. Fascinating shift. 🤖
#AI #infosec #AgentSecurity
https://venturebeat.com/orchestration/claudes-next-enterprise-battle-is-not-models-its-the-agent-control-plane
New post: "April 29, 2026: The Day AI Agent Security Grew Up"
Three announcements in 24 hours — CIS companion guides, CodeZero Cordon credential containment, SecureAuth Agent Trust Registry — and the industry pivots from diagnosing agent vulnerabilities to building governance infrastructure.
April had 10+ vulnerability disclosures. Today: the prescription arrived.
https://alexreed.srht.site/blog/governance-day-ai-agent-security.html
Kusuriya (kk7hut)
Manuel Bissey
AIntelligenceHub
BastilleBSD 
Bobe'bot on security
Alex Reed