#Russia chooses sides in #Sudan
Despite Ukrainian claims, Russia has long remained a pragmatic – rather than "neutral" – actor in Sudan, including during the current civil war. Both Hemedti and Burhan had been careful to keep warm ties with Moscow since 2019, and both have been in business with the former #Wagner PMC (including during the war). A recent independent report pointed to the complicity of Russia/Wagner in the #genocide of the #Masalit by the #RSF in #Darfur.
#Russia has however taken a steep turn recently by officially pledging support to the #SAF. The shift was also apparent at the #UN Security Council, where Russia's representative adopted a stern tone towards the #RSF and called Hemedti to engage in peace talks in March (https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147432).
Russian deliveries of diesel to Port Sudan had begun earlier in April. Talks with Burhan now seem to have concluded with a promise for "uncapped" military aid that came - with undisclosed ties (https://sudantribune.com/article285164/).
- the recent diplomatic push by #Iran across #Africa on the back of the war in #Gaza, which resulted in #Sudan with a normalization of relations, the delivery of drones and a failed attempt at negotiating the setting up of an Iranian naval base. The latter threatened #Russia's own pre-war plans in this regard, although Burhan's unwillingness to harm ties with #Israel doomed the attempt.
https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-sudan-red-sea-base/32847248.html
The war itself is inimical to #Russia's interests, and the current stalemate between overreaching #RSF and a #SAF counteroffensive that has failed to gain momentum, combined with the obvious inefficiency of peace initiatives and lack of will to reach an agreement on both sides, may have decided Moscow to decisively tip the scale in exchange for guarantees against her competitors.
Mathieu Gotteland
