Also, any serious discussion of election security has to grapple with two simultaneous realities:

- there's no evidence that any US election outcome has ever been altered by hacking

- there are real, exploitable vulnerabilities in many parts of our election infrastructure

I've written a bit on what these vulnerabilities are and how to fix them, See, e.g., this brief article:
https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/4.2-p505-522-Blaze.pdf

@mattblaze The thing I never got is why elections authorities are so drawn to touchscreen machines. Of all the imperfect solutions, it seems the most imperfect. What government agency willingly says "Please dump a convoluted IT hassle on me!"

Paper ballots have issues, but they do have the value of people understanding how the system works intuitively, which makes it a bit harder to sell a conspiracy.