Matt BlazeNov 21, 2022

Those who follow me on The Bad Place have heard me repeat this a thousand times, but once more won't hurt.

Election security is incredibly complex, full of seemingly impossible tradeoffs. But disinformation about supposed "rigged" elections is perhaps the most serious threat to election integrity today.

The best defense is to learn how elections actualy work! Becoming a poll worker is a great way to do that

Also, this National Academies study is a terrific resource:

https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy

Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy

Read online, download a free PDF, or order a copy in print or as an eBook.

The National Academies Press
Show threadMatt BlazeNov 21, 2022

Also, any serious discussion of election security has to grapple with two simultaneous realities:

- there's no evidence that any US election outcome has ever been altered by hacking

- there are real, exploitable vulnerabilities in many parts of our election infrastructure

I've written a bit on what these vulnerabilities are and how to fix them, See, e.g., this brief article:
https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/4.2-p505-522-Blaze.pdf

Show threadMyrNov 30, 2022
@mattblaze I scanned the article and don’t see this covered. Is there a difference beteeen voting machines companies’ equipment and systems vs types of voting machines? Ergo does one company introduce a greater risk than another?
Show threadMatt BlazeNov 30, 2022

@MirrorMirror Pretty much no. Almost all the major US vendors provide a range of election products, including bad ones (DREs that preclude effective election audits) and good ones (paper scanners, which allow it).

Focusing on the brand is misguided. All precinct equipment is vulnerable to malware and tampering. The question is whether it can be detected and mitigated, which is a function of architecture, not code.

Show threadSpaceLifeFormNov 30, 2022

@mattblaze @MirrorMirror

There must be hand marked paper ballots for safe voting. Human readable. No QR codes.

Show threadMyrDec 1, 2022
@SpaceLifeForm @mattblaze I agree that would stop this “rigged” nonsense better than the cyber ninja solution. 🤨
Show threadSpaceLifeForm

@MirrorMirror @mattblaze
@marcelias

You have to be able to do a random audit and verify the counting machines worked as designed.

Of course, how random is the random?

Do you only audit one polling place in a given county? Is that sufficient? No.

Should every county have to undergo the random audit? Yes.

Should the audits require at least 10% of polls in a given county to be audited? Yes.

Who controls the random?

Dec 1, 2022 at 12:32pmWeb