I cavi sottomarini trasportano la quasi totalità del traffico Internet intercontinentale, ma molte rotte convergono in pochi corridoi e stretti: è lì che la fragilità diventa sistemica.
Dal Mar Rosso agli altri chokepoint globali, fino alla risposta dell’UE: NIS2, CER, Regional Cable Hubs e la call da 40 milioni di euro per la capacità di riparazione, con l’Italia alla guida dell’hub mediterraneo.
https://www.nicfab.eu/it/posts/submarine-cables-global-vulnerability-eu-response/
Submarine cables carry almost all intercontinental Internet traffic, yet many routes converge in a small number of corridors and straits — and that is where fragility becomes systemic.
From the Red Sea and other global chokepoints to the EU response: NIS2, CER, Regional Cable Hubs and the €40 million repair-capacity call, with Italy leading the Mediterranean hub.
https://www.nicfab.eu/en/posts/submarine-cables-global-vulnerability-eu-response/
The Red Sea fight could knock out your internet. It's already half-happened.
Feb 2024: three cables — AAE-1, SEACOM, EIG — got cut at once. Roughly a quarter of EU–Asia traffic went with them. Most likely culprit: the anchor of the MV Rubymar, dragging 70+ km after a Houthi missile hit.
A second round hit in Dec 2024 (AAE-1) and Mar 2025 (PEACE). Cables still aren't a declared target.
Turkey deployed a missile boat to stop a cable ship wiring Greek Islands to the Internet claiming its paperwork was wrong. We have PostgreSQL and Python scripts (#humblebrag).
The paperwork was not wrong. We pulled the paperwork. It's 76.96km long.
#osint #geopolitics #nato #maritimesecurity #submarinecables
https://www.keystone-collective.org/greece-is-building-its-own-internet-turkey-would-like-a-word/
A NATO ally's warships have now challenged civilian cable ships working in Greek waters three times in eighteen months. Each incident, taken alone, could be a misunderstanding. Together, they look like a policy. There is a concept in international relations called the fait accompli, the established fact, the thing that
Cable Retriever (GB) confirmed on dynamic positioning hold off Tamsui, Taiwan, 8h+ on station as of 5:34 UTC today.
Coordinating with Ile d'Aix (FR), reported on station since May 9, per open sources.
Both repairing the Taiwan-Matsu No.3 cable, damaged in April by a Chinese salvage barge.
This is what the infrastructure war looks like.
Of course, one can safely assume there is nothing strategically noteworthy about repeated disruptions to critical communications infrastructure in one of the world’s most contested theatres. Merely an unfortunate sequence of maritime coincidences.
#OSINT #Taiwan #China #Geopolitics #MaritimeSecurity #SubmarineCables #CriticalInfrastructure #GrayZone #IndoPacific #InternetInfrastructure #Security
WEBINAR 6 MAY 16:00 UTC – Columbia Global Reports Book Talk: The Fragile Undersea Cables that Power Our World
REGISTER | ADD TO CALENDAR | PERMALINK
On Wednesday, May 6 at 12:00 EDT (15:00 UTC) Columbia Global Reports hosts a book talk webinar 'The Fragile Undersea Cables that Power Our World '. In the book 'The Web Beneath the Waves', author Samanth Subramanian travels from remote Pacific islands to secreti
Publiquei hoje na @TeletimeNews um ensaio onde analiso como o país virou epicentro em conectividade, a partir da guerra de expansão de cabos submarinos e satélites LEO entre China e EUA sobre nosso território.
https://teletime.com.br/16/04/2026/o-brasil-no-centro-do-tabuleiro-digital/
SpyTech: The Underwater Wire Tap
https://fed.brid.gy/r/https://hackaday.com/2026/03/05/spytech-the-underwater-wire-tap/
Nicola Fabiano
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