yudukikun5120Rothschild, Daniel (forthcoming). Language and thought: The view from LLMs. In David Sosa & Ernie Lepore (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 3. https://philpapers.org/rec/ROTLAT-4
因果性や主体性、民俗物理学が言語に大きく依存するという主張が主である。
> DL ‘relates the data to the results and comes up with rules that become part of the system. When new data is introduced, it can come up with new results that were not part of the training set’ (Paluszek & Thomas 2020, p. 1).
これは規則性主義からの逸脱だよね。
> the decisive prerequisite for understanding, namely intentional (and for that matter, phenomenal) consciousness（訳：意図的もしくは現象的意識を決定的な必要条件とする〈理解〉）
〈理解〉を独我論に引き摺り込む危うい定義だと思う。
> The basic condition for understanding turns out to be the sharing of a common form of life（訳：〈理解〉の必要条件は共通の生活形式の共有であることが分かる）
Fuchs は生活形式の共有テーゼにコミットしており、ここから人工システムの〈理解〉不可能性を導く。
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11097-022-09848-0#Sec5
Understanding Sophia? On human interaction with artificial agents - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) create an increasing similarity between the performance of AI systems or AI-based robots and human communication. They raise the questions: (1) whether it is possible to communicate with, understand, and even empathically perceive artificial agents; (2) whether we should ascribe actual subjectivity and thus quasi-personal status to them beyond a certain level of simulation; (3) what will be the impact of an increasing dissolution of the distinction between simulated and real encounters. (1) To answer these questions, the paper argues that the precondition for actually understanding others consists in the implicit assumption of the subjectivity of our counterpart, which makes shared feelings and a „we-intentionality” possible. This assumption is ultimately based on the presupposition of a shared form of life, conceived here as „conviviality.”(2) The possibility that future artificial agents could meet these preconditions is refuted on the basis of embodied and enactive cognition, which links subjectivity and consciousness to the aliveness of an organism.(3) Even if subjectivity is in principle impossible for artificial agents, the distinction between simulated and real subjectivity might nevertheless become increasingly blurred. Here, possible consequences are discussed, especially using the example of virtual psychotherapy. Finally, the paper makes case for a mindful appproach to the language we use to talk about artificial systems and pleads for preventing a systematic pretense of subjectivity.
「king - man + woman = queen」は Fodor のいう合成性に適っているのかな。Fodor and Lepore (1991) の黄色い牛の例を見ると、言えそうなんだよな。つまり合成性の原理は Mikolov の単語ベクトルまでは若干保たれていると言えて、Transformer 以後は言えないということなのかもしれない。
画像を入力データに与えることができるChatGPT o1やマルチモーダル共同埋め込みを見れば、視覚等に依存する因果説的指示がポスト意味論的であることが分かる。
Grice の語用論をベイズ的枠組みに結び付けた Rational Speech Act Framework という研究があるらしい。大規模言語モデルとはあまり関わりがなさそう。
Witgenstein's influence on artificial intelligence
We examine how much of the contemporary progress in artificial intelligence (and, specifically, in natural language processing), can be, more or less directly, traced back to the seminal work and ideas of the Austrian-British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, with particular focus on his late views. Discussing Wittgenstein's original theses will give us the chance to survey the state of artificial intelligence, and comment on both its strengths and weaknesses. A similar text appeared first in Spanish as a chapter of CENTENARIO DEL SILENCIO (2021), a book celebrating 100 years since the publication of the Tractatus.
概念役割意味論を下敷きに、Wittgenstein や Quine が述べるようなラディカルな反表象主義ではなく、外界との接続をオプショナルなものとして捉える道を提唱する。ただ、Takens の埋め込み定理が、文から心的状態を推論する難しさを示すという譬喩（？）はよく分からない。
Meaning without reference in large language models
The widespread success of large language models (LLMs) has been met with skepticism that they possess anything like human concepts or meanings. Contrary to claims that LLMs possess no meaning whatsoever, we argue that they likely capture important aspects of meaning, and moreover work in a way that approximates a compelling account of human cognition in which meaning arises from conceptual role. Because conceptual role is defined by the relationships between internal representational states, meaning cannot be determined from a model's architecture, training data, or objective function, but only by examination of how its internal states relate to each other. This approach may clarify why and how LLMs are so successful and suggest how they can be made more human-like.
外在主義な因果説を取ることで、言語モデルに指示は可能であるという結論を導くことできる。因果説によれば、意思などの意識に依存してしまう心的存在に関する問題を回避できるためである。
[Do Language Models’ Words Refer?](https://aclanthology.org/2024.cl-3.12) (Mandelkern & Linzen, CL 2024)
Frankfurtの『ウンコな議論』が元ネタの言語哲学論文。〈幻覚（hallucination）〉という語は、大規模言語モデルが現実の対象を知覚不可能であることに反したり、現実を誤表象しうるという印象を与えるため、〈でたらめ（bullshit）〉という語を用いるべきと主張する。著者らは、大規模言語モデルが意図を持っているかについて確信していない（p. 6）。また、大規模言語モデルが生成する文が意味をもつことについては、広く合意されている（p. 6）。脚注 6 では、ChatGPT が実際に命題を表出しているかどうかについても触れられている。
Hicks, Michael Townsen ; Humphries, James & Slater, Joe (2024). ChatGPT is bullshit. Ethics and Information Technology 26 (2):1-10.
https://philpapers.org/rec/HICCIB
統語論がsoftmax関数の温度パラメータの関数に過ぎないとすれば？ 言語の創造性が温度パラメータ（分布の尖度）に過ぎないとしたら？