Nevertheless, ground operations are largely concentrated in #Kordofan s “triangle of death”, meaning El Obeid (capital of North Kordofan), Dilling and Kadugli (capital of South Kordofan). #RSF s alliance with SPLM-N Al-Hilu and control of West Kordofan makes the #SAF positions there precarious, and any relief brough by the recent siege breaking of those last two towns temporary.

#Sudan #war

All eyes are now on South #Kordofan, and the remaining SAF-held towns of Dilling and Kadugli. The announcement of SAF breaking the siege of Dilling (26 January 2026), presented as a major victory, is at best of temporary relief to the local population.

#Sudan

Despite SAF’s progress in the region of Khartoum and White Nile, the situation in North #Kordofan remains — as it has been since the onset — hotly contested. Towns and villages change hands on a regular basis, and while the RSF siege of capital El Obeid has been broken by the SAF in February, a renewed siege is an ever present perspective, as recently underlined by the Yale School of Public Health’s Humanitarian Research Lab.

#Sudan

War operations in #Kordofan

The RSF further managed to drive SAF remnants from the entire West Kordofan, by taking control of Al Nuhud (2 May), Babanusa (1 December) and the highly strategic Heglig oilfield (8 December). Given the central role of Heglig to the processing and transit of South Sudanese oil, a — fragile — tripartite agreement has led to neutralization of the Heglig oil infrastructure and deployment of the SSPDF (South Sudanese army) (10–11 December).

#Sudan #SouthSudan

This Tasis alliance thus now controls much of South #Kordofan. Plans to introduce their own currency have been announced, but not yet implemented. Disregard for the SAF’s monetary policy has had dire consequences for the Sudanese economy however.

#Sudan