(14/N) Having familiarized ourselves with categories of adversaries, their main goals and their respective, overall "modus operandi", let's look at the types of threats posed by them.

Again, it pays to focus on types of threats: We don't want to become mainly alert-triggered, but proactive. There are several frameworks we can borrow ideas from, most notably the LINDDUN framework that is geared toward threats to privacy, and can be extended a bit to cover more ground.

First, our list of threat types:

• #Linking (spotting connections and relationships)
• #Identifying (mapping to identities)
• Undesirable #NonRepudiation or #repudiation
• #Detecting (absence or presence of indicators)
• Data #disclosure (to the unauthorized)
• Manufacturing cooperation (disguised or imposed bad consequences)
• #Obstructing (access, information, resources)
• #NonCompliance
• #Interfering (with information, resources, processes, interactions)

Our definitions of these, for our context:

Linking

An adversary can figure out connections and relationships between formerly isolated items of interest.

Identifiying

An adversary can link items of interest directly to a natural person.

(to be continued)

Start of this thread:
https://mastodon.de/@tuxwise/113503228291818865

LINDDUN:
https://linddun.org/

#ThreatModeling #4D

It’s not just legal constraints that affect the number and speed of prosecutions,
there are other technical hurdles that the taskforce has to negotiate.
#Identifying #perpetrators who disguise themselves by using foreign internet service providers or burner phones can be a challenge,
and subpoenas seeking the information from companies such as Facebook and Twitter or Verizon and AT&T usually take six to eight weeks.

Against such impediments, the taskforce is hoping to build up resilience against the anti-democratic onslaught by improving communications between the central justice department and the FBI’s 56 field offices and 94 US attorney’s offices around the country.
Each FBI office has an election crime coordinator, working in tandem with the taskforce’s election community liaison officer.
The network has been used to share information about how to deal with growing problems such as swatting – hoax calls to 911 reporting crimes or fires at public officials’ homes.
Lists are being compiled of potential swatting targets in sensitive areas like Maricopa county so that officers are aware that the emergency calls may be false as soon as they come in.

Norden of the Brennan Center said that as the election year hots up, relationships between beleaguered local election workers and the powerful federal hub will become ever more important.
“The taskforce’s presence lets election officials know the federal government has their backs. That’s essential, because a lot of them, particularly in the immediate aftermath, felt kind of abandoned.”

https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/31/new-election-threats-taskforce-trump-subversion?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other