GrapheneOS Foundation Calls Out Brazil's Flawed Age Verification Law

https://europe.pub/post/10870542

GrapheneOS Foundation Calls Out Brazil's Flawed Age Verification Law - Europe Pub

> Brazil’s authoritarian age verification law became active this month. It won’t be implemented by GrapheneOS. Complying would require integrating a mandatory process for each user where a third party service checks government identification and confirms a match using the camera. > > It doesn’t stop there. It would require keeping data for auditing and providing a token for connecting age verification checks by apps and websites to the data. The law is a privacy disaster and exposes minors to being exploited by leaking their age bracket to apps and websites. > > GrapheneOS has no team members or operations in Brazil. São Paulo in Brazil is by far the biggest network hub within South America. Miami is also a major network hub for South America and is currently where our update server is for South America since it’s dramatically cheaper. > > We have a tiny VPS in São Paulo for our ns1 anycast DNS and a second for our website/network services. It probably isn’t an issue and those can be removed if necessary. Santiago could be added for both instead but wouldn’t work very well as a replacement for having São Paulo. > > There aren’t yet devices supporting GrapheneOS directly sold in South America. Brazil in particular has unusually high import duties/taxes which add up to around 100%. This has resulted in us not having a lot of users there but our Motorola partnership will start changing this. > > People are going to have their personal info leaked by third party age verification services due to these laws. Children are going to be harmed by apps and websites changing their behavior to exploit them. It isn’t going to stop minors finding pornography if they want to find it.

GrapheneOS Foundation Discusses History Of Phoney Privacy Companies Targeting The Project

https://europe.pub/post/10770850

GrapheneOS Foundation Discusses History Of Phoney Privacy Companies Targeting The Project - Europe Pub

>There are at least a dozen people spending at least several hours attacking GrapheneOS across platforms on a daily basis. It’s a very strange situation. How do these people have so much time and dedication to keep making posts across platforms attacking us? It’s relentless. > >Every day, dozens of new accounts join our chat rooms to spread the same fabrications about GrapheneOS including via direct messages. > >On Hacker News, one of the accounts making personal attacks based on fabrications in most threads about GrapheneOS has been doing it for 8 years. > >Y Combinator has a financial stake in numerous surveillance and exploit development companies. Hacker News is a platform they own and the moderators on it have permitted years of vile harassment towards our team which they’d normally remove if others were targeted. > >Hacker News mods micromanage it enough to repeatedly ask us not to reuse a bit of text across our comments. Meanwhile, they do nothing about disgusting personal attacks and harassment content consistently being spread in threads about GrapheneOS on their heavily moderated site. > >The largest privacy community on Reddit /r/privacy bans any discussion or mentions of GrapheneOS. A bot automatically removes any post mentioning GrapheneOS they’ll very actively ban people who evade their filters. The mods of the subreddit misrepresent this as something we want. > >Many privacy subreddits have mods who are hostile towards GrapheneOS. We were banned from posting on /r/Android for multiple years. The mod who banned us said our official project account on Reddit was ban evading because they once unjustifiably banned one of our team members. > >On Wikipedia, a company attacking GrapheneOS project made years of edits to the site pushing false narratives about us. They cited articles based on their own press releases. Other content was made paraphrasing Wikipedia which ended up being cited by it. It continues to this day. > >Articles about GrapheneOS on most platforms often have comments engaging in baseless personal attacks towards our team, linking to harassment content and making many clearly inaccurate claims about it. We’ve found chat rooms coordinating this including attacks on the X platform. > >Privacy projects are more vulnerable to these attacks because the userbase and supporters largely avoid social media and other platforms where it happens. Many people believe what they read on social media if it isn’t countered and it builds echo chambers hostile to GrapheneOS. > >Many people think these must be state sponsored attacks. However, our experience is these attacks are primarily orchestrated by companies selling dubious products marketed as private and secure. We did get targeted by state sponsored smear campaigns in France and Spain though.

Vanadium version 147.0.7727.24.0 released (Bookmark Import/Export Supported Now)

https://europe.pub/post/10770135

Vanadium version 147.0.7727.24.0 released (Bookmark Import/Export Supported Now) - Europe Pub

>Changes in version 147.0.7727.24.0: > > - update to Chromium 147.0.7727.24 > - add initial support for importing and exporting bookmarks > >A full list of changes from the previous release (version 146.0.7680.164.0) is available through the Git commit log between the releases [https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/compare/146.0.7680.164.0...147.0.7727.24.0]. > >This update is available to GrapheneOS users via our app repository and will also be bundled into the next OS release. Vanadium isn’t yet officially available for users outside GrapheneOS, although we plan to do that eventually. It won’t be able to provide the WebView outside GrapheneOS and will have missing hardening and other features.

GmsCompatConfig version 169 released

https://europe.pub/post/10770085

GmsCompatConfig version 169 released - Europe Pub

>Changes in version 169: > > - add BluetoothA2dp.getConnectionPolicy() stub to resolve wireless Android Auto crash > >A full list of changes from the previous release (version 168) is available through the Git commit log between the releases [https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_GmsCompat/compare/config-168...config-169] (only changes to the gmscompat_config text file and config-holder/ directory are part of GmsCompatConfig). > >GmsCompatConfig is the text-based configuration for the GrapheneOS sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer. It provides a large portion of the compatibility shims. > >This update is available to GrapheneOS users via our app repository and will also be bundled into the next OS release.

Why Root Based Attestation Is Not a Good Approach & More

https://europe.pub/post/10769193

Why Root Based Attestation Is Not a Good Approach & More - Europe Pub

>If apps are required to verify the hardware, operating system and their app for regulatory reasons they should use an approach supporting arbitrary roots of trust and operating systems. Android already has a standard hardware attestation system usable for this. > >Android’s documentation and sample libraries are biased towards Google by using them as the only valid root of trust and the API is biased towards stock operating systems but it’s better than a centralized API. > >https://infosec.exchange/@rene_mobile/116286110700616525 [https://infosec.exchange/@rene_mobile/116286110700616525] > >Apps should only resort to this if they’re forced to do it. Root-based attestation provides minimal security and is easy to bypass. It’s inherently insecure due to trusting the weakest security systems. A leaked key from the TEE/SE on any device can be used to spoof attestations for any device. > >Play Integrity permits a device with years of missing security patches. It isn’t a legitimate security feature. It checks for a device in compliance with Google’s Android business model, not security. > >Unified Attestation is another anti-competitive system putting companies selling products in control of which devices and operating systems are allowed to be used. As with the Play Integrity API, it’s a phony security feature existing solely to get their products permitted while disallowing fair market competition. > >Android’s hardware attestation API is problematic for a free and open market because it supports root-based attestation. However, it does at least support choosing arbitrary trusted roots and arbitrary trusted operating systems. It isn’t locked to Google’s roots or stock OSes they certify. > >We made a proposal to Google for pinning-based attestation support for Android hardware attestation and they ended up implementing it. It can be used in combination with root-based attestation or without it. It doesn’t have the anti-competitive properties and provides far more actual security value. > >Root-based attestation trusts the whole hardware attestation ecosystem. Leaked keys from any device can be used to bypass it. Pinning-based attestation starts trust from first use and then provides a high level of security based on the security of the device’s early boot chain and secure element. > >Root-based attestation is mainly used to disallow an arbitary device, OS or modified app for control rather than security. Pinning-based attestation lacks those negatives and can be very secure. It can be bootstrapped by root-based attestation but it works without it and it’s not the only approach

GrapheneOS Foundation Seeking Remote App Developer

https://europe.pub/post/10769092

GrapheneOS Foundation Seeking Remote App Developer - Europe Pub

>Ever seen our AOSP based apps (Phone,Messages,Gallery…) & thought I could make a difference to bring them up? > >We’re seeking a senior Android engineer to take ownership of the default app suite: > >https://grapheneos.org/hiring#android-apps-software-engineer [https://grapheneos.org/hiring#android-apps-software-engineer] > >Code standard is high, vibe coders need not apply.

Vanadium version 146.0.7680.164.0 released

https://europe.pub/post/10756696

Vanadium version 146.0.7680.164.0 released - Europe Pub

>Changes in version 146.0.7680.164.0: > > - update to Chromium 146.0.7680.164 > >A full list of changes from the previous release (version 146.0.7680.153.0) is available through the Git commit log between the releases [https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/compare/146.0.7680.153.0...146.0.7680.164.0]. > >This update is available to GrapheneOS users via our app repository and will also be bundled into the next OS release. Vanadium isn’t yet officially available for users outside GrapheneOS, although we plan to do that eventually. It won’t be able to provide the WebView outside GrapheneOS and will have missing hardening and other features.

Android-Based GrapheneOS Refuses Age Verification, May Exit Regions That Enforce It

https://literature.cafe/post/30135358

Android-Based GrapheneOS Refuses Age Verification, May Exit Regions That Enforce It - literature.cafe

Lemmy

What are the downsides?

https://lemmy.world/post/44617324

What are the downsides? - Lemmy.World

I’ve been thinking about making the switch for a year or two. I installed Graphene on an old phone to get a feel for it, and the only drawback I noticed was that it doesn’t support Firefox. Is there anything else I should consider before switching? You can be honest - I’m mostly sold and just want to know what to expect.

GrapheneOS Foundation To Never Required ID or Other PII To Use GrapheneOS

https://suppo.fi/post/11204611