"... Separatist movements abroad are encouraged and amplified when they help weaken countries Russia sees as rivals. Inside Russia, even mild expressions of regional identity or political autonomy are treated as serious threats to the state. This contrast is deliberate and consistent. ..."
#EUvsdisinfo #independencemovements #disinformation #Russia #secession
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/secession-for-you-prison-in-russia-moscows-selective-love-for-self-determination/
The scale of information warfare targeting the #EU and its partners in 2025:
- 540 incidents
- 10,500 channels
- 90 targeted countries
- 35% of detected incidents linked to #Russia and #China
The EU is set to disrupt these activities with:
- sanctions
- law enforcement
- digital regulation
- resilience-building.
#FIMI #EEAS #hybridWarfare #informationspace #EUvsDisinfo
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-4th-fimi-threat-report-march-2026/
Dismantling the FIMI House of Cards March 2026 FOREWORD BY HIGH REPRESENTATIVE/VICE PRESIDENT KAJA KALLAS Today’s wars are not only fought with tanks and drones but with lies and algorithms too. The information space is a frontline in the fight for democracy. The greatest threats are statesponsored operations that seek to confuse and manipulate […]
"Some of the most basic safeguards against russian information manipulation are still missing."
Keir Giles for EUvsDisinfo
The myth that won’t die: blaming #NATO for #Russia’s war
In the murky landscape of #disinformation, few narratives have proven as stubbornly persistent as the claim that NATO expansion provoked Russia into invading #Ukraine.
This myth, recycled and rebranded by Kremlin apologists, shifts blame for Russia’s aggression onto the West – ignoring history and facts.
📊 Scientific challenges of FIMI:
🔹 The lack of a falsity requirement complicates traditional fact-checking approaches.
🔹 The exclusion of domestic disinfo makes comparative studies difficult.
🔹 Intent & coordination are hard to measure objectively, leading to subjectivity in classification.
For policymakers, these ambiguities provide flexibility. For researchers, they create inconsistencies in empirical analysis.
Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference #FIMI is central to the EU’s approach to #disinformation. But what kind of concept is it? And why is it useful for EU policy but less so for scientific research?
Unlike traditional disinfo frameworks, FIMI focuses on manipulative behavior rather than just falsehoods. This makes it an effective policy tool—but creates challenges for researchers.
🔗 Read more: https://tdhj.org/blog/post/disinformation-cognitive-warfare-hybrid/
#HybridThreats #EUvsDisinfo #politicalscience
@politicalscience
@krycztof yeah, I discovered their work while making a presentation about the @leavex campaign. They have some interesting work, but it was disappointing to see some of its members with their profiles still with X as their main social media. And their official social media didn't create yet an account in the Fediverse, while they did on Bluesky and kept their X account.
🛠️ The #euvsdisinfo #dataset is a fantastic resource—well-structured, highly useful, and a great example of proactive #data sharing in the #research of #disinformation. I’ll be using it in an upcoming research project!
🔍 That said, the data collection #methodology remains a bit opaque. If anyone has insights on how the data is gathered, I’d love to hear more!
#Disinformation #OSINT #DataTransparency #InfoOps #Research #politicalscience #polsci #eeas
EUvsDisinfo is the flagship project of the European External Action Service’s East StratCom Task Force.It was established in 2015 to better forecast, address, and respond to the Russian Federation’s ongoing disinformation campaigns affecting the European Union, its Member States, and countries in the shared neighbourhood.
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