Pure AcetoneUkrainian military analyst Michael Kofman has published an essay following his latest visit to Ukraine, reporting on the situation at the front.
There is little new information, except yet another confirmation that many frontline positions are now held by just two or three Ukrainian soldiers, with large gaps between them.
The “large gaps” Kofman describes are stretches of the frontline measured in kilometres.
Ukrainians are well aware of this, but another outside observer’s testimony still adds weight to the overall picture.
These empty kilometres are where Russian soldiers slip through — sometimes in ones or twos.
Drop by drop: you can’t kill everyone, someone gets through, and then they accumulate.
The result is a situation where two or three Ukrainian soldiers might be holding a position, while behind them, further in the rear, a few dozen Russian soldiers have already accumulated.
This is what people mean when they report that “50 soldiers infiltrated” somewhere.
It’s not that all 50 slipped through at once — they seeped in drop by drop.
Ukrainian forces try to monitor these vast empty spaces with drones, but technology can never fully replace human eyes. There will always be blind spots, and weather — fog, rain, and so on — plays its part.
And then there is the issue of scale: just as a modern tank-barn is no longer destroyed by two or three drones but instead by thirty to fifty (yet still destroyed), an empty gap kilometres long is not infiltrated by two or three soldiers, or twenty or thirty, or even a hundred, but perhaps by three hundred creeping in drop by drop.
Most of those three hundred will eventually be taken out by drones, but dozens will accumulate and gain a foothold.
The ideas of an “impenetrable drone wall,” an “unbreachable front,” or an “absolutely lethal kill-zone” are myths that have nothing to do with reality.
There is an old military axiom, drilled into cadets from their first training days: every defensive line can be breached — and drones do not change that.
Here is one real-world example from summer 2022, which I know personally: seven Territorial Defense soldiers (essentially light infantry) holding a stretch of the line.
To their left, 1.5 kilometres away, was a fortified position with about 30 troops. To their right, 700–800 metres away, another position with around 15 soldiers.
The mission of those seven men — almost a full squad — was to observe the river (and on their own initiative, they heavily mined the riverbanks as well).
And this was not even a major sector — far from the hottest part of the front.
Over the years the situation has worsened, and now even on the hottest sectors there simply aren’t enough troops — not because Ukraine has run out of people (as Russian psyops claim), but because one part of society was never mobilised, and another part deserted.
We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people — and that’s only men.
It’s not my place to judge why this happened, but the battlefield does not tolerate emptiness: if there are no friendly soldiers somewhere, enemy soldiers will inevitably come.
No drones or robots can fix that — they can raise the cost for the enemy, but as long as the enemy is willing to pay that cost and trade lives for territory, they will keep advancing.
The way out is mobilisation and combating desertion. History provides many examples — often in far worse conditions — and the solutions are well known.
This is not a matter of choice. There is no alternative. The alternative is defeat, loss of sovereignty, and loss of statehood.
Moscow understands this perfectly, which is why it invests enormous resources into sabotaging mobilisation and increasing desertion in Ukraine.
@yigal_levin
#hashtags
#UkraineWar #MilitaryAnalysis #Frontline #Kofman #Defense #Infantry #DroneWarfare #RussiaUkraineWar #Security #Geopolitics #ModernWarfare #Mobilization #Desertion #BattlefieldReality #EasternFront
There is little new information, except yet another confirmation that many frontline positions are now held by just two or three Ukrainian soldiers, with large gaps between them.
The “large gaps” Kofman describes are stretches of the frontline measured in kilometres.
Ukrainians are well aware of this, but another outside observer’s testimony still adds weight to the overall picture.
These empty kilometres are where Russian soldiers slip through — sometimes in ones or twos.
Drop by drop: you can’t kill everyone, someone gets through, and then they accumulate.
The result is a situation where two or three Ukrainian soldiers might be holding a position, while behind them, further in the rear, a few dozen Russian soldiers have already accumulated.
This is what people mean when they report that “50 soldiers infiltrated” somewhere.
It’s not that all 50 slipped through at once — they seeped in drop by drop.
Ukrainian forces try to monitor these vast empty spaces with drones, but technology can never fully replace human eyes. There will always be blind spots, and weather — fog, rain, and so on — plays its part.
And then there is the issue of scale: just as a modern tank-barn is no longer destroyed by two or three drones but instead by thirty to fifty (yet still destroyed), an empty gap kilometres long is not infiltrated by two or three soldiers, or twenty or thirty, or even a hundred, but perhaps by three hundred creeping in drop by drop.
Most of those three hundred will eventually be taken out by drones, but dozens will accumulate and gain a foothold.
The ideas of an “impenetrable drone wall,” an “unbreachable front,” or an “absolutely lethal kill-zone” are myths that have nothing to do with reality.
There is an old military axiom, drilled into cadets from their first training days: every defensive line can be breached — and drones do not change that.
Here is one real-world example from summer 2022, which I know personally: seven Territorial Defense soldiers (essentially light infantry) holding a stretch of the line.
To their left, 1.5 kilometres away, was a fortified position with about 30 troops. To their right, 700–800 metres away, another position with around 15 soldiers.
The mission of those seven men — almost a full squad — was to observe the river (and on their own initiative, they heavily mined the riverbanks as well).
And this was not even a major sector — far from the hottest part of the front.
Over the years the situation has worsened, and now even on the hottest sectors there simply aren’t enough troops — not because Ukraine has run out of people (as Russian psyops claim), but because one part of society was never mobilised, and another part deserted.
We are talking about hundreds of thousands of people — and that’s only men.
It’s not my place to judge why this happened, but the battlefield does not tolerate emptiness: if there are no friendly soldiers somewhere, enemy soldiers will inevitably come.
No drones or robots can fix that — they can raise the cost for the enemy, but as long as the enemy is willing to pay that cost and trade lives for territory, they will keep advancing.
The way out is mobilisation and combating desertion. History provides many examples — often in far worse conditions — and the solutions are well known.
This is not a matter of choice. There is no alternative. The alternative is defeat, loss of sovereignty, and loss of statehood.
Moscow understands this perfectly, which is why it invests enormous resources into sabotaging mobilisation and increasing desertion in Ukraine.
@yigal_levin
#hashtags
#UkraineWar #MilitaryAnalysis #Frontline #Kofman #Defense #Infantry #DroneWarfare #RussiaUkraineWar #Security #Geopolitics #ModernWarfare #Mobilization #Desertion #BattlefieldReality #EasternFront
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