Palestine Action State Proscription, Direct-Action Protest, & Proportionality of Counter-Terrorism Sanctions with Specimen Appeal Draft!
1. Introduction and Procedural History
This analysis evaluates the constitutional boundaries of executive power where the state uses counter-terrorism proscription to suppress domestic political protest groups focused on property damage. The litigation arises from the Home Secretary’s decision on 30 June 2025 to lay the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, which formally proscribed the political direct-action group Palestine Action. The Order came into force on 5 July 2025, operating under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which permits proscription if the Executive believes an organization is “concerned in terrorism” and that such an intervention is appropriate.
In the Divisional Court, Dame Victoria Sharp P, Swift J, and Steyn J quashed the proscription order. The court held that the Home Secretary failed to follow her own internal policy guidelines and that a total ban was disproportionate under Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Divisional Court observed that while a small subset of the group’s actions fell within the statutory definition of terrorism, the scale and persistence of that conduct did not justify collective proscription. It concluded that ordinary criminal law remained fully sufficient to manage targeted property offences.
The Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the Divisional Court’s decision and restored the proscription order. It adopted an expansive interpretation of the statutory definition of terrorism and applied a highly deferential standard of review to the Home Secretary’s assessment of national security. The Appellant, Huda Ammori, has appealed to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. This study evaluates the Appellant’s case to challenge the Court of Appeal’s judgment per our understanding.
2. Critical Evaluation of the Appellant’s Case
The Appellant’s case presents a compelling critique of how counter-terrorism legislation can be expanded to suppress domestic political dissent. The core strength of the argument lies in its warning against the erosion of the statutory boundary separating ordinary criminal damage from actual terrorism.
A. The Separation of Criminal Damage from Terrorism
Under Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, “terrorism” includes serious damage to property designed to influence a government or intimidate the public for an ideological cause. Treating all ideologically motivated property damage as terrorism collapses an important legal distinction. Under the principle of legality, clear parliamentary authorisation is required before a statutory scheme can be interpreted to allow such intrusive state reach. The Court of Appeal’s over-broad construction risks transforming counter-terrorism law into a general tool for suppressing disruptive public protest.
B. The Problem of “Near-Determinative” Deference
The Appellant’s case identifies a significant weakness in the Court of Appeal’s approach to judicial review. By treating the Home Secretary’s national security assessment as entitled to near-determinative weight, the Court of Appeal replaced independent judicial scrutiny with executive deference. While the Executive holds institutional competence over national security facts, the courts retain the constitutional duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 to determine the legality and proportionality of measures that criminalize political speech and association.
C. Over-Inclusivity and the Collateral Impact on Expression
The Appellant’s case should focus on the rights of non-violent supporters. Proscription is an indiscriminate measure. It does not merely penalise individuals who commit serious property damage; it triggers a strict criminal regime that penalises membership, supportive speech, and associative meetings.
[ Palestine Action Organization ]
│
┌─────────────────────────┴─────────────────────────┐
▼ ▼
[ Small Core: Violent/Serious Damage ] [ Broad Base: Non-violent Supporters ]
(Target of Section 1 Act) (Swept into Criminal Liability)
By focusing entirely on the organization’s unlawful conduct, the Court of Appeal failed to account for how proscription criminalizes peaceful expressive activity and encourages political self-censorship.
D. Correcting the Misapplication of R v Jones
The Appellant’s case should effectively clarify the proper application of R v Jones [2006] UKHL 16. The Respondent sought to rely on Jones to argue that because the state maintains a monopoly on force, property-damaging direct action is unlawful and its suppression is inherently proportionate.
Critical to Appeal is the fact that Jones is relevant only by analogy. Jones established that an individual defendant cannot assert a domestic criminal defence of “reasonable force” by pointing to a violation of unincorporated customary international law. It does not hold that the state may use counter-terrorism powers to pre-preemptively proscribe an entire political organisation merely because some members engage in disruptive property damage. The Court of Appeal’s attempt to use Jones to establish a judicial moral taxonomy of “restraint” constitutes a clear error of law.
3. Structured Proportionality Analysis
To determine whether the proscription of Palestine Action complies with Articles 10 and 11 of the ECHR, the Supreme Court must apply the four-stage proportionality framework established in Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ BANK MELLAT (NO 2) PROPORTIONALITY TEST │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 1. Legitimate Aim ──► Prevention of Terrorism & Public Safety │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 2. Rational Conn. ──► Partial (Over-inclusive collective ban) │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 3. Necessity ──► Failed (Ordinary criminal law sufficed) │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 4. Fair Balance ──► Failed (Disproportionate rights burden) │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ Limb 1: Is the Objective Sufficiently Important to Justify Limiting a Right?
The Respondent asserts that the proscription order pursues the prevention of terrorism, the reduction of public disorder, and the protection of public safety. The Appellant concedes that these are legitimate aims in principle. Therefore, the first limb of the Bank Mellat test is satisfied.
Limb 2: Is the Measure Rationally Connected to the Objective?
The requirement of rational connection dictates that the chosen measure must be a targeted means of achieving the stated purpose. The Divisional Court found that only a very small number of Palestine Action’s activities fell within the statutory definition of terrorism under Section 1.
Because proscription suppresses all associative activity, it is an over-inclusive response to a narrow subset of unlawful conduct. Banning an entire political movement to stop a fraction of its members from committing property damage lacks a precise rational connection. It penalizes political expression rather than targeting the specific threat to public safety.
Limb 3: Could a Less Intrusive Measure Have Been Used?
The necessity limb serves as a critical safeguard in this appeal. The state must demonstrate that no less restrictive alternative could have adequately addressed the threat.
As the Divisional Court noted, the state possesses an extensive array of targeted legal measures:
- Individualized criminal prosecutions under the Criminal Damage Act 1971;
- Public order enforcement and targeted injunctions; and
- Specific criminal charges against individuals under Sections 11 to 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
The availability of these alternative mechanisms proves that a blanket proscription was not the least intrusive response. The state failed to show why individual prosecutions were insufficient to manage the property damage, making a collective ban unnecessary.
Limb 4: Has a Fair Balance Been Struck Between Individual Rights and Community Interests?
The final limb requires balancing the severity of the rights restriction against the public benefits of the measure. In DPP v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, the Supreme Court confirmed that deliberate, disruptive, and obstructive protest can engage Articles 10 and 11, requiring a fact-sensitive assessment rather than an abstract or categorical response.
In this case, the balance is lopsided. The state has imposed a total criminal ban that restricts peaceful political expression and association across the country to address a partial public-safety concern. This blanket approach fails to strike a fair balance, resulting in an unconstitutional restriction on democratic dissent.
4. Conclusion
The Court of Appeal’s judgment represents a significant expansion of the state’s counter-terrorism machinery into the regulation of domestic political protest. By treating organized property damage as terrorism and granting excessive deference to the Executive, the Court of Appeal weakened the judicial protections established by the Human Rights Act 1998.
The Appellant’s case provides a necessary correction. It re-establishes the distinction between criminal damage and terrorism, reasserts the court’s constitutional duty to conduct independent proportionality reviews, and protects the rights of peaceful political advocates. The Supreme Court should allow the appeal and restore the Divisional Court’s order quashing the proscription.
Footnotes
[^1]: R v Jones (Margaret) and others [2006] UKHL 16, [2007] 1 AC 136; on appeal from R v Jones (Margaret) [2004] EWCA Crim 1981 and Ayliffe v DPP [2005] EWHC 684 (Admin). Full judgment transcript available at: UK Parliament Historical Judgments Archive.
[^2]: R (Ammori & Anor) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 742 (Judgment delivered 15 June 2026). Full open judgment text available via the HM Courts & Tribunals Judiciary Database: Judiciary UK – Ammori Open Judgment PDF.
[^3]: R (Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 292 (Admin) (Divisional Court consisting of Dame Victoria Sharp P, Swift J, and Steyn J). Official press summary detailing the quashing order available at: Judiciary UK – Divisional Court Ammori Press Summary PDF.
[^4]: Terrorism Act 2000, c. 11. Full statutory architecture accessible at: Legislation.gov.uk – Terrorism Act 2000 Contents.
[^5]: Terrorism Act 2000, Section 1 (Statutory Definition of Terrorism). Text available at: Legislation.gov.uk – Section 1 Definition.
[^6]: Terrorism Act 2000, Section 3 & Schedule 2 (Proscription). Full legislative text accessible at: Legislation.gov.uk – Section 3 Power to Proscribe.
[^7]: Case filings, history, and lower court records as maintained by the HM Courts & Tribunals Judiciary registry: Judiciary UK – Ammori v SSHD Case Profile.
[^8]: Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, Schedule 1, incorporating Articles 10 (Freedom of Expression) and 11 (Freedom of Assembly and Association) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Layout available at: Legislation.gov.uk – Human Rights Act 1998 Overview.
[^9]: Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] AC 700, establishing the governing four-limb structured proportionality framework under UK public law. Verified judgment summary available at: Swarb Legal Index – Bank Mellat (No 2).
[^10]: Director of Public Prosecutions v Ziegler [2021] UKSC 23, [2022] AC 408, regarding the fact-sensitive proportionality assessment required under Articles 10 and 11 for disruptive political expression. Verified summary available at: ZoomLaw UK SC Index – DPP v Ziegler.
[^11]: R (Mandalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 59, affirming that the Executive must adhere strictly to its own published policy guidance. Available at: UK Supreme Court Judgments Database.
DISCLAIMER & IMPORTANT CLARIFICATION:
The document below is a specimen draft prepared independently for the purposes of academic and public law analysis. It reflects our own interpretation of the critical constitutional issues surrounding the limits of state intervention and domestic direct action.
Please Note:
The specimen case draft below is not the official substantive appeal being lodged with the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by the professional legal counsel representing Huda Ammori and Palestine Action. It is strictly an independent, considered analysis of the broader legal and geopolitical implications of this case.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
BETWEEN:
HUDA AMMORI
Appellant
-and-
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
APPELLANT’S SKELETON ARGUMENT
A. Introduction
This appeal concerns the lawfulness and proportionality of the proscription of Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000, and the proper intensity of review where the Executive invokes counter-terrorism powers to restrict domestic political protest. The Appellant submits that the Court of Appeal erred in law in allowing the Respondent’s appeal and in reversing the Divisional Court’s quashing order.
.The appeal raises issues of general public importance concerning the statutory meaning of “terrorism”, the limits of executive discretion under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, and the correct application of Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998.
.B. Statement of Facts
On 30 June 2025, the Home Secretary laid the Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2025, proscribing Palestine Action. The Order was approved by both Houses of Parliament and came into force on 5 July 2025.
.Under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if she believes it is concerned in terrorism and if proscription is appropriate. “Terrorism” is defined in section 1 of the Act, and includes serious damage to property where the other statutory elements are met.
.The Divisional Court, constituted by Dame Victoria Sharp P, Swift J and Steyn J, allowed the claim on two grounds. In summary, it held that the Home Secretary had failed properly to apply her own policy, and that the decision to proscribe Palestine Action was disproportionate under Articles 10 and 11.
.The Divisional Court’s press summary records that the court considered proscription to be a very significant interference with freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, even discounting Palestine Action’s non-peaceful activities. It also records that the court concluded that the scale and persistence of the conduct falling within section 1 had not yet reached the level warranting proscription.
.The Court of Appeal later allowed the Home Secretary’s appeal and restored the proscription decision. The Appellant contends that the Court of Appeal’s judgment adopts an overbroad reading of the statutory scheme and an unduly deferential approach to the proportionality question.
.C. Issues
The issues on this appeal are:
.Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that Palestine Action’s conduct could properly be treated as “terrorism” within section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
.Whether the Court of Appeal erred in principle in the intensity of deference it accorded to the Respondent’s assessment of national security and public order.
.Whether the Court of Appeal failed to apply the correct proportionality analysis under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
.Whether the Court of Appeal wrongly treated the character of Palestine Action as excluding or materially diminishing the Convention rights of persons associated with or supporting the organisation.
.D. Statutory meaning
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism by reference to action or threat of action involving serious violence, serious damage to property, endangering life, serious risk to health or safety, or serious interference with electronic systems, where the action is designed to influence the government or intimidate the public and is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.
.The Appellant does not dispute that serious property damage may, in principle, fall within the statutory definition. The error lies in treating the statutory language as if it created no meaningful boundary between ordinary criminal damage, public disorder, and terrorism. The statutory scheme requires a structured assessment of seriousness, purpose and context.
.The Court of Appeal’s approach risks collapsing that distinction and thereby expanding counter-terrorism law into a general instrument for suppressing disruptive protest. That construction is inconsistent with the rule of legality and with the principle that clear words are required before Parliament is taken to have authorised such an intrusive reach.E. Deference and review
The Court of Appeal erred in treating the Respondent’s assessment as entitled to near-determinative weight. Although the Executive is entitled to respect on matters within its institutional competence, the legality and proportionality of a proscription decision remain matters for the Court.
.The proper question is not whether the Home Secretary acted in good faith, but whether the decision was lawful, rational and proportionate in light of the actual statutory consequences imposed on speech, association and assembly. Where a measure criminalises association with a domestic organisation, the Court must examine with care whether a less restrictive response would have sufficed.
.Proscription is not a neutral administrative label. It activates a criminal regime that reaches membership, support, meetings, public expression and other associative conduct, and it therefore demands especially careful scrutiny of both statutory purpose and rights impact.F. Proportionality
The applicable proportionality framework is the well-established four-stage inquiry articulated by the Supreme Court in Bank Mellat (No 2): whether the objective is sufficiently important to justify the limitation; whether the measure is rationally connected to the objective; whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and whether a fair balance has been struck between the individual rights and the interests of the community.
.That structured analysis is particularly important where the measure restricts political expression and peaceful assembly, because the courts have repeatedly recognised that protest cases require a fact-sensitive application of Articles 10 and 11 rather than an abstract or categorical response. In Ziegler, the Supreme Court confirmed that deliberate obstructive protest may still engage Articles 10 and 11 and that proportionality must be assessed in the circumstances of the particular case.
.Applied here, the first question is whether proscription pursued a legitimate and sufficiently important objective. The Respondent says that the object was the prevention of terrorism and the protection of public safety. Those are legitimate aims in principle, and the Appellant does not suggest otherwise. The real question is whether the evidence justified the extreme step of proscribing an entire organisation and thereby criminalising a very wide range of supportive conduct.
.The second question is rational connection. The Divisional Court press summary records that the court accepted that some of Palestine Action’s activities amounted to terrorism within section 1, but also concluded that only a very small number of activities fell within that category. That matters because a measure directed at a small subset of conduct may not be rationally connected to the broad suppression of all associative activity that proscription produces.
.The third question is necessity. This is the most important safeguard in the present appeal. The court must ask whether ordinary criminal law, targeted prosecution, public order powers, injunctions, and the specific offences created by sections 11 to 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 were sufficient to address the conduct relied on by the Home Secretary. If those tools existed and were capable of dealing with the wrongdoing individually, a blanket proscription is difficult to justify.
.The Divisional Court’s press summary expressly notes that for the activities falling within terrorism, and for the group’s other criminal activities, the general criminal law remained available. That is a strong indicator that proscription was not the least intrusive response. A state may of course choose a more severe measure where justified, but it must show why the less restrictive alternatives were inadequate.
.The fourth question is fair balance. The Divisional Court’s summary states that, even discounting Palestine Action’s non-peaceful activities, proscription caused a very significant interference with freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. That interference extends to people wishing to express lawful political support under the Palestine Action banner and to those who would self-censor or avoid lawful participation because of the criminal consequences.
.The balance is therefore not between terrorism and speech in the abstract; it is between a serious but partial public-safety concern and a broad criminal restraint on peaceful expression, association and assembly. In that setting, the Court must scrutinise whether the State has shown enough to justify the breadth of the restriction.
.The Court of Appeal’s approach gave substantial weight to the Home Secretary’s institutional role, which is proper so far as it goes, but it did not follow that the court could treat the balance as essentially one for the Executive. Under the Human Rights Act 1998, the court remains responsible for deciding whether the interference is prescribed by law and proportionate in a democratic society.
.The Appellant therefore submits that the Court of Appeal erred by collapsing the proportionality inquiry into deference to executive assessment. The Convention demands more. It requires a court to examine the actual scope of the interference, the availability of less restrictive alternatives, and the justification for a criminal regime that captures peaceful expressive conduct.G. Articles 10 and 11
Proscription engages Article 10 and Article 11 rights of persons who wish to express support for, associate with, or participate in lawful political activity connected with the organisation. The burden on those rights is not incidental; it is the direct legal consequence of proscription.
.The Court of Appeal failed to give sufficient weight to the rights of non-violent supporters, sympathisers and participants whose conduct may be expressive but not criminal. The Convention requires a focused proportionality analysis, not a categorical assumption that all association with a proscribed group is outside meaningful protection.
.The Divisional Court press summary indicates that the court considered the restrictions imposed by criminal offences consequent on proscription, as well as the extent to which people would exercise self-restraint in conducting lawful activities. That is the correct way to identify the rights burden.
.The Appellant submits that the Court of Appeal diluted that inquiry by focusing too heavily on the organisation’s unlawful conduct and too little on the effect of proscription on peaceful expressive activity under the same banner.H. Jones
In R v Jones, the House of Lords held that the appellants could not rely on domestic criminal law to justify conduct said to prevent the crime of aggression, and that unincorporated international law could not be used to create a domestic defence. Jones does not, however, authorise the recasting of direct action as terrorism merely because it is politically motivated or disruptive.
.Jones is therefore relevant only by analogy. It confirms that courts should be cautious about importing unincorporated international norms into domestic criminal law, but it does not support the proposition that proscription is automatically proportionate whenever an organisation engages in property damage.
.The Court of Appeal’s reliance on an elevated concept of restraint risks substituting a judicial moral taxonomy for the statutory test laid down by Parliament. That is an error of law.I. Relief sought
For those reasons, the Appellant respectfully invites the Court to allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, and restore the order of the Divisional Court quashing the Respondent’s proscription decision.Authorities
R (Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department EWCA Civ 742, open judgment PDF, Judiciary of England and Wales, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Final-open-judgment-Ammori-v-SSHD.pdf.R (Huda Ammori) v Secretary of State for the Home Department EWHC 292 (Admin), press summary, Judiciary of England and Wales, https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Press-summary-Ammori-130226-002.pdf.R v Jones (Margaret) and others UKHL 16, 1 AC 136, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329/jones-1.htm.Terrorism Act 2000, c 11, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents.Terrorism Act 2000, s 1, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1.Terrorism Act 2000, s 3, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/3/enacted?view=plain.Human Rights Act 1998, c 42, sch 1, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/contents.Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No 2) UKSC 39, AC 700. Verified summary of the four-limb test: https://swarb.co.uk/bank-mellat-v-her-majestys-treasury-no-2-sc-19-jun-2013/.Director of Public Prosecutions v Ziegler UKSC 21, verified summary: https://zoomlaw.co.uk/2021UKSC23.html.
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