An Exploration of Arguable Routes of Appeal against the Outrageous Filton Trial Sentences & Criminalisation of Direct Action as Terrorism!
A Travesty of Justice: The Filton Trial Sentencing and the Criminalisation of Direct Action
1. Introduction
The sentencing of the “Filton 4” activists at Woolwich Crown Court marks a paradigm shift in British jurisprudence, transforming ordinary property damage during a political protest into a legally classified act of terrorism. By applying a “terrorist connection” enhancement under Section 69 of the Sentencing Act 2020, the judiciary has weaponised counter-terrorism legislation to suppress democratic dissent.
This analysis argues that the Filton trial is a travesty of justice and an existential insult to the right to direct action. It subverts domestic procedural fairness, violates international legal obligations under the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Court (ICC), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and demonstrates the asymmetric capture of state institutions by external geopolitical lobbies. It separates the United Kingdom from historical democratic traditions that rely on civil disobedience to drive moral progress.
The final section explores the options to remedy, redress and appeal the injustice at both domestic and international level and offers suggestions as part of a multi-tiered strategy to correct the balance, it being understood that the defendants designated professional legal team will no doubt already be fully aware, engaged and seized by this major miscarriage of justice.
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2. Domestic Deconstruction: Procedural Injustice and Abuse of Process
The trial featured several procedural missteps that undermine the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR):
* Jury Trial on Criminal Damage
* Jury Ignorance
* Post-Verdict Terror Enhancement
* Defence Prohibited from Motive
* Judicial Silencing
2.1 Bifurcated Fact-Finding:
The jury convicted the defendants of criminal damage without knowing their verdicts would trigger a terrorist designation. This separation of the mens rea evaluated by the jury from the mens rea applied during sentencing creates a dangerous constitutional lacuna.
2.2 Judicial Gagging:
By barring the defence from presenting their motivations—specifically the ongoing genocide in Gaza and the complicity of Elbit Systems—the court stripped the defendants of the common law defence of necessity and lawful excuse.
2.3 Prior Restraint:
The imposition of sweeping reporting restrictions until after the verdicts shielded these radical judicial maneuvers from public and academic scrutiny, violating the principle of open justice.
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3. Statutory Overreach: The Distortion of Section 69
The application of Section 69 of the Sentencing Act 2020 to property damage constitutes a profound misinterpretation of Parliament’s intent. Section 69 compels a judge to treat an offence as statutorily aggravated if it has a “terrorist connection”. However, the definition of a terrorist connection relies entirely on Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This requires that the act involves “serious damage to property” and is designed to “influence a government” to advance a “political, religious, racial or ideological cause”.
* Property Damage to Drones
* Interdictive Sabotage
* Attempt to Enforce International Law
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** Terrorist Intent
The judicial error lies in equating interdictive sabotage—undertaken to physically interrupt a supply chain of components used in mass atrocity crimes—with the coercive intent of terrorism. The defendants did not destroy property to terrorise a population or blackmail a state; they did so to prevent the immediate deployment of weapons.
By interpreting an attempt to enforce compliance with international human rights law as a hostile effort to “influence a government,” the court has contorted counter-terrorism provisions. This turns a mechanism meant to shield the public from mass violence into a shield for weapon manufacturers.
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4. Historical Legitimacy vs. Asymmetric State Capture
In mature, liberal civil societies, illegal direct action has historically served as a critical driver for essential moral and political transformations. Established democratic norms acknowledge that when formal legislative channels are captured by narrow interests, civil disobedience acts as an indispensable corrective:
4.1 The Abolitionist Movement:
Early anti-slavery campaigns routinely engaged in the illegal destruction of property, maritime sabotage, and the active liberation of enslaved individuals, breaking domestic property and property-classification statutes to uphold basic human dignity.
4.2 The Suffragette Movement:
The struggle for women’s suffrage in the UK relied heavily on targeted property destruction, arson, and industrial disruption, forcing a recalcitrant state to widen its democratic franchise.
4.3 The Anti-Apartheid Movement:
Resistance against the apartheid regime in South Africa—supported globally by direct actions targeting corporate enablers—frequently required breaking domestic laws to enforce compliance with the fundamental principles of international human rights and racial equality.
The Filton judgment ignores this historical lineage. The swift escalation to a terrorism classification cannot be decoupled from the disproportionate influence of state-aligned geopolitical networks, frequently described as the Zionist lobby or “ziolobby”. The alignment of the UK state’s prosecutorial apparatus with the commercial interests of foreign defence contractors (such as Elbit Systems) indicates a capture of judicial structures.
By defining the disruption of weapons systems—flagged by global tribunals for complicity in war crimes—as “terrorism,” the court subordinates public conscience to commercial interests and foreign policies. This subverts the democratic expectation that laws must serve the domestic public interest and universal human rights rather than protecting external cartels from civilian scrutiny.
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5. International Law and the Duty to Prevent:
ICJ Provisional Measures Deconstructed
The Filton sentencing creates a direct conflict between domestic statutory interpretation and settled international law, ignoring global mandates on state responsibility:
Legal Authority
Core Obligation / Principle
Conflict with Filton Judgment
5.1 ICJ Genocide Convention Obligations
State parties must take proactive measures to prevent and punish acts of genocide.
The court criminalised citizens fulfilling the state’s neglected duty to prevent arms transfers to an occupying power.
5.2 ICC Rome Statute
Prohibits aiding, abetting, or otherwise assisting in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Direct action targeting military infrastructure producing unlawful weapons systems is a legitimate disruption of a criminal enterprise.
5.3 UNSC Resolution 2334
Reaffirms the illegality of settlements and calls on states to distinguish in their relevant dealings between Israel and the occupied territories. The judiciary penalized interventions aimed directly at halting the supply of technologies deployed in these illegal zones.
5.4 UNGA Resolution ES-10/24
Demands state compliance with the ICJ Advisory Opinion, requiring states to cease weapons transfers maintaining the unlawful occupation. The court treated actions enforcing the cessation of prohibited state complicity as acts of terror.
5.5 Customary International Law
The doctrine of state responsibility and the supremacy of international peremptory norms (jus cogens). Domestic property laws were prioritised over the prevention of mass atrocity crimes, reversing the legal hierarchy of norms.
5.6 Deconstruction of ICJ Provisional Measures (South Africa v. Israel)
The specific binding orders issued by the ICJ mandate that state parties actively enforce the prevention of genocby-related acts. Ground 1 of the Appellants’ case directly rests on the interaction between these measures and domestic criminal responsibility:
1. Preventing Article II Acts:
The ICJ ordered the immediate cessation and prevention of killing, causing bodily harm, or inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction.
2. The Erga Omnes Duty to Prevent:
Under Article I of the Genocide Convention, the duty to prevent genocide is binding on all signatory states, creating a planetary obligation that supersedes local commercial or domestic property regimes.
3. Citizen Intervention as a Legal Duty:
When a domestic government continues to permit the export of drone components and weapon systems in flagrant violation of ICJ provisional findings, a severe legal contradiction occurs. The state enters a condition of structural non-compliance. Direct action undertaken by citizens to physically disrupt the supply chain of these components is an attempt to enforce the state’s mandatory international obligations. By designating this protective enforcement as “terrorism,” the domestic court effectively criminalises compliance with international law.
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6. The Necessity Defence: Historical Foundations and Eradication
The common law defence of necessity historically allowed individuals to break the letter of the law to prevent a greater, imminent evil. From classical precedents safeguarding property during fires to modern developments, English law historically left room for a jury’s moral common sense.
* Common Law Necessity Defence
* Judicial Exclusion of Motive
* Exclusively Technical Conviction
In recent years, the High Court has progressively eroded this principle in political cases. The Filton judgment represents the culmination of this trend. By rendering the moral and legal motives of anti-war protesters completely inadmissible, the court has separated criminal culpability from moral culpability. This forces juries to act as unthinking rubber stamps for technical property damage. This systematic removal of the necessity defence removes the vital constitutional buffer that allows ordinary citizens to check state complicity in foreign atrocities.
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7. Comprehensive Corporate History of Elbit Systems’ UK Court Disputes
Elbit Systems UK, a subsidiary of Israel’s largest private defence contractor, has engaged in a protracted legal strategy within the UK courts to insulate its manufacturing footprint from civilian resistance:
* Structural Jury Acquittals (2021-2024)
* Corporate Pivot to Civil Injunctions
* Section 69 Terror Enhancements
7.1 The Era of Jury Acquittals (2021–2024):
Initially, efforts to prosecute direct-action groups like Palestine Action resulted in consistent, high-profile defeats for the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Juries repeatedly delivered “Not Guilty” verdicts—such as the acquittal of the “Elbit 8”, the London HQ paint action, and the milestone May 2024 Leicester Crown Court acquittal regarding the rooftop occupation of Elbit’s UAV Tactical Systems facility. In these cases, juries accepted that property damage was legally justified to save lives in Palestine under Section 5(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.
7.2 The Pivot to Civil Injunctions and Contempt:
Faced with the reality that British juries refused to convict anti-war activists, Elbit Systems, represented by elite corporate law firms, pivoted to the civil courts. They secured wide-ranging High Court injunctions targeting “persons unknown” across their facilities. This strategy allowed them to bypass criminal juries entirely, using summary contempt of court procedures to imprison activists for violating civil orders, effectively creating a privatised system of political imprisonment.
7.3 The Proscription and Terror Stratagem (2025–2026):
Following an escalation in disruption, intensive lobbying from state-aligned networks culminated in the Home Secretary issuing an executive order proscribing Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000 in July 2025. Although the High Court subsequently ruled this proscription unlawful, the CPS deployed the Section 69 sentencing enhancement in the Filton trial. This represents the final stage of Elbit’s corporate-judicial strategy: transforming routine property damage into a state-security emergency to achieve the long-term custodial sentences that ordinary criminal law had failed to secure.
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8. Corporate Capture of the Policing and Prosecutorial Infrastructure
The prosecution of the Filton 4 exposes an underlying institutional vulnerability: the structural capture of domestic police forces and the CPS by transnational defense firms. This integration manifests through shared intelligence protocols, private security arrangements, and dedicated police deployments protecting private facilities:
* Transnational Defence Contractors
* Privately Funded Policing
* CPS Counter-Terrorism Division
* Insulation from Public Scrutiny
* Broad Reporting Restriction
8.1 Financial and Logistics Interlocking:
Local constabularies operate in close cooperation with corporate private security firms, creating a joint security apparatus where public resources are deployed to insulate foreign defense operations from domestic protest.
8.2 Prosecutorial Specialisation:
The involvement of specialized counter-terrorism divisions to manage property damage cases shows an institutional reorientation. Law enforcement priority shifts from maintaining local public order to actively suppressing anti-war advocacy that threatens corporate operations.
8.3 Erosion of Public Accountability:
This dynamic redefines the police’s mandate, shifting their role from protecting the domestic public to shielding multi-million pound manufacturing supply chains from political dissent, utilizing counter-terrorism laws to secure corporate operational continuity.
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9. Comparative European Jurisprudence:
Necessity Defences in Arms Factory Protests
The UK’s classification of anti-arms direct action as “terrorism” stands in stark contrast to broader European democratic norms, where judiciaries routinely grapple with the “state of necessity” (état de nécessité) without resorting to the architecture of counter-terrorism:
9.1 The Swiss Precedent:
Swiss courts reviewing direct actions against financial institutions and arms logistics have repeatedly engaged with the defense of necessity under Article 17 of the Swiss Criminal Code. While appellate courts often restore technical convictions, sentences remain minimal, explicitly rejecting the notion that disrupting infrastructure to protest human rights abuses equates to subverting the state.
9.2 The French Doctrine:
In France, the état de nécessité (Article 122-7 of the Penal Code) has been deployed by activists targeting state-aligned or military entities. French courts have occasionally acquitted activists under this doctrine when actions were deemed proportionate to the imminent global or humanitarian harm threatened.
9.3 The Belgian Approach:
Belgian tribunals addressing the disruption of military logistics or arms transports have consistently balanced domestic property violations against Article 10 and 11 ECHR protections. Rather than isolating the property damage from its geopolitical context, Belgian courts analyze the protest within the continuum of democratic expression, treating it as a misdemeanor rather than an existential terrorist threat.
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10. Evaluation of ECHR Article 11 Violations across G7 Nations
The weaponisation of statutory criminal laws to suppress the right to freedom of peaceful assembly under Article 11 ECHR (and parallel constitutional protections) has escalated across G7 states, demonstrating a systemic retreat from democratic norms:
| G7 Nation | Primary Legislative / Judicial Mechanism | Type of Protest Target | Severity of Sanctions & Terror Parallels | Impact on Democratic Norms |
10.1 United Kingdom:
Public Order Act 2023;
Sentencing Act 2020 s 69.
Defence infrastructure, logistics, climate targets.
Up to 9 years imprisonment; 15-year terrorist notification requirements.
Deep chilling effect; complete criminalisation of interdictive direct action.
10.2 Germany:
Criminal Code s 129 (Criminal Organisations); preventive detention laws.
Climate assembly (Letzte Generation); pro-Palestinian solidarity.
Pre-emptive detention up to 30 days without charge; asset seizures; raiding of activist networks.
Disproportionate use of anti-mafia and counter-terrorism structures against speech.
10.3 France:
Internal Security Code (Administrative Dissolutions); Code of Criminal Procedure.
Environmental mega-basins (Les Soulèvements de la Terre); anti-war blockades.
Executive decrees dissolving activist organisations; use of military-grade crowd control.
Over-reliance on prefectural bans; bypass of judicial oversight via executive dissolution.
10.4 Italy:
“DDL Sicurezza” (Security Decree 2024); anti-blockade laws.
Infrastructure protests; transport and logistics blockades.
Up to 6 years imprisonment for passive resistance or rail/road blockades.
Criminalisation of historically protected forms of labor and civil disobedience.
10.5 United States:
State-level Critical Infrastructure Protection Acts; Federal RICO statutes.
Pipeline construction; police training facilities (“Stop Cop City”).
Domestic terrorism enhancements; sweeping conspiracy charges with 20-year maximums.
Asymmetric corporate capture of state codes; labels civil dissent as corporate subversion.
10.6 Canada:
Emergencies Act invocation; critical infrastructure injunctions.
Indigenous land defense; extraction projects; border transport blockades.
Freezing of personal and organisational banking infrastructure without judicial warrants.
Normalisation of emergency financial surveillance powers against civilian dissidence.
10.7 Japan:
Act on the Punishment of Organized Crimes (Conspiracy Law).
Anti-military base expansions (Okinawa); nuclear energy protests.
Pervasive intelligence surveillance; multi-year pre-trial detentions for minor trespasses.
High structural barriers to public assembly; systemic marginalisation of minority resistance.
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11. Routes for Redress, Remedy, and Appeal:
To correct this judicial error, appellate defence teams and civil liberty organisations should pursue a multi-tiered strategy including each element below:
11.1 Domestic Appellate Remedies
11.1.1 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on Section 69 Interpretation:
Challenge the application of Section 69 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The defence must argue that a “terrorist connection” requires proof of terrorist intent—specifically, an intent to coerce a government through intimidation or terror—rather than a campaign of economic disruption designed to preserve human lives.
11.1.2 Appeal the Blanket Exclusion of Defences:
File an appeal on the grounds that the trial judge’s complete exclusion of the defendants’ political, humanitarian, and moral context constituted an abuse of process and denied them a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.
11.1.3. Constitutional Challenge on Jury Usurpation:
Argue that reserving the determination of a “terrorist connection” entirely to a post-verdict judicial hearing breaches the constitutional right to a trial by jury. It effectively allows a judge to enhance an offence into a terrorism-level sentence based on facts never tested before or evaluated by the jury.
11.2 International Redress
11.2.1. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR):
File an application alleging violations of Article 6 (Right to a Fair Trial), Article 7 (No Punishment Without Law) due to the retroactive and unforeseeable expansion of terror enhancements, and Articles 10 and 11 (Freedom of Expression and Assembly).
11.2.2. UN Special Procedures:
Engage the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights while Countering Terrorism to declare the UK’s expanded use of terror enhancements a breach of international treaty obligations.
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12. Grounds of Appeal Specimen/Draft Document for Submission to the Criminal Appeal Office
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE ROYAL COURTS OF JUSTICE / WOOLWICH CROWN COURT
IN THE MATTER OF:
THE KING v. (1) SAMUEL CORNER, (2) CHARLOTTE HEAD, (3) LEONA KAMIO, (4) FATEMA ZAINAB RAJWANI
APPELLANTS’ GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE AND CONVICTION
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GROUND 1:
MISDIRECTION AND MISAPPLICATION OF SECTION 69 OF THE SENTENCING ACT 2020 (THE “TERRORIST CONNECTION” ENHANCEMENT)
1. Particulars of Error
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law by finding that the offences of criminal damage carried a “terrorist connection” pursuant to Section 69 of the Sentencing Act 2020. The court’s construction of Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was overbroad, failing to distinguish between targeted property destruction aimed at interdicting international law violations and actions designed to coerce or terrorise civil society.
2. Legal Submissions:
2.2 Statutory Intent:
The long title and legislative history of the Terrorism Act 2000 show Parliament intended the statute to counter existential threats to democratic governance and mass civilian casualties, not non-violent political property damage.
2.3 Absence of Terrorist Objective:
To satisfy Section 1(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000, the action must be executed to “influence the government or intimidate the public”. The Appellants’ objective was purely interdictive—physically preventing components from being shipped to active conflict zones flagged by the ICJ. Halting war crimes does not equal “influencing a government” under counter-terrorism law.
2.4 The Lacuna of Purpose:
If the court treats any act intended to change state policy as terrorism, then historical civil rights campaigns are reclassified as terror. This creates an unconstitutional absurdity that erases the distinction between political expression and warfare.
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GROUND 2:
UNLAWFUL EXCLUSION OF THE DEFENCE OF NECESSITY AND LAWFUL EXCUSE UNDER SECTION 5(2) CRIMINAL DAMAGE ACT 1971
1. Particulars of Error:
The Learned Trial Judge erred by granting the Prosecution’s application in limine to bar the Appellants from introducing evidence regarding the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the findings of the ICJ, and the operations of Elbit Systems. This completely denied the Appellants their right to present a viable defence to the jury, rendering the trial structurally unfair.
2. Legal Submissions
2.1 Eradication of the Moral Element:
Section 5(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 provides a defence if property was damaged to protect other property or lives believed to be in imminent danger. By excluding the factual matrix regarding Gaza, the judge forced the jury to assess the act in a factual vacuum.
2.2 Preemption of Jury Sovereignty:
Whether the Appellants’ beliefs were honestly held and whether their actions were a proportionate response to prevent war crimes are questions of fact exclusively for the jury. The judge usurped this role, transforming the jury into a rubber stamp for the prosecution.
2.3 Conflict with Peremptory Norms:
Under international law, citizens have a duty to avoid complicity in war crimes. By blocking this context, the court prioritised commercial property rights over international obligations under the Genocide Convention.
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GROUND 3:
PROCEDURAL UNFAIRNESS AND JURY USURPATION VIA BIFURCATED FACT-FINDING
1. Particulars of Error
The operation of the trial violated Article 6 ECHR because the critical factual finding that transformed a routine property offence into a terrorism offence was withheld from the jury and decided exclusively by the trial judge post-verdict.
2. Legal Submissions
2.1 Bifurcation Deficit:
The Appellants were tried for criminal damage, but sentenced for terrorism. The jury was kept completely unaware that their verdicts would trigger a terrorist designation. This hid the true stakes of the trial from the constitutional finders of fact.
2.2 Violation of the Right to a Jury:
Any factor that alters the maximum penalty or character of an offence must be charged in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. Reserving the “terrorist connection” to a post-verdict judicial summary hearing bypasses core constitutional protections.
2.3 Remedy Sought:
The Appellants request that the convictions be quashed due to structural unfairness, or alternatively, that the sentences be vacated and replaced with non-custodial options that reflect standard protest penalties.
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13. Draft Appendix:
Formal Application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Regarding Article 7 Violations
APPLICATION UNDER ARTICLE 34 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SAMUEL CORNER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND ALLEGED VIOLATIONS
1. Object of the Application
1.1 This application challenges the retroactive, unpredictable, and overbroad expansion of domestic counter-terrorism sentencing provisions to actions involving political property damage. The Applicants submit that the UK courts have violated Article 7 of the Convention (No Punishment Without Law), alongside Articles 6, 10, and 11.
2. Substantive Violations of Article 7 ECHR
2.1 The Principle of Legality (Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege):
Article 7 requires that criminal offences and their corresponding penalties must be clearly defined in law, ensuring that an individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision what acts and omissions will make them criminally liable.
2.2 Unforeseeable Judicial Expansion:
Prior to the Filton trial, property damage occurring within political demonstrations was routinely prosecuted under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, resulting in standard, non-terrorist sentences. The post-verdict application of a “terrorist connection” under Section 69 of the Sentencing Act 2020 introduces an unprecedented shift that could not have been reasonably foreseen by the Applicants.
2.3 Perversion of Statutory Definitiveness:
By interpreting “influencing a government” to include actions aimed at halting violations of international law, the domestic judiciary has expanded the statutory boundary of “terrorism”. This judicial extension penalizes activities aimed at preventing state complicity in war crimes, creating an unpredictable framework where any sufficiently disruptive protest can be reclassified as a terrorist action.
3. Conclusion and Relief Sought
3.1 The Applicants request that the Court declare the United Kingdom in violation of Article 7 ECHR, find that the application of terrorism enhancements to political property damage is unconstitutional, and direct the respondent State to provide an effective domestic remedy by vacating the terrorist classifications.
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Footnotes
1. R v Corner and Others EWCA Crim (Unreported, Woolwich Crown Court).
2. Sentencing Act 2020, s 69.
3. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) art 6.
4. Terrorism Act 2000, s 1; see also C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation (4th edn, OUP 2022) 45.
5. Criminal Damage Act 1971, s 5(2); cf. R v Jones (Margaret) UKHL 16.
6. Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 4(2).
7. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (South Africa v. Israel), Provisional Measures, ICJ Order.
8. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 25(3)(c).
9. UNSC Res 2334 (23 December 2016) UN Doc S/RES/2334.
10. UNGA Res ES-10/24 (18 September 2024) UN Doc A/RES/ES-10/24.
11. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) art 41.
12. On the historical use of direct action by the abolitionist movement, see Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of Slavery and Antislavery (CUP 2009) 210-245.
13. Sophia A. van Wingerden, The Women’s Suffrage Movement in Britain, 1866-1928 (Palgrave Macmillan 1999) 112-140.
14. Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Cornell University Press 1995) 78-102.
15. On state capture, asymmetric lobbying, and arms trading dynamics, see Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade (Penguin 2012) 289-310.
16. DPP v Ziegler UKSC 23.
17. Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021.
18. On the structural alignment of policing networks with corporate arms logistics, see Corporate Watch, The Policing of Anti-Arms Direct Action (2024) 45 J. Crit. Crim. 112.
19. Code pénal suisse [Swiss Criminal Code] Dec 21, 1937 (as amended), art 17 (État de nécessité).
20. Code pénal [French Penal Code], art 122-7.
21. Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [German Criminal Code], s 129.
22. Code de la sécurité intérieure [French Internal Security Code], art L212-1.
23. Camera dei Deputati [Italian Chamber of Deputies], Disegno di Legge: “Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica” (DDL 1660, 2024).
24. For an analysis of US infrastructure protection tracking, see Center for Human Rights, The Criminalization of Environmental Dissent (2023) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1402.
25. Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp); see also Federal Court of Canada review benchmarks (2024) FC 42.
26. Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes and Control of Crime Revenues (Act No. 136 of 1999, Japan).
27. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism (A/HRC/55/48, 2024).
28. ECHR, art 7.
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ADDENDUM
The objective of the campaign run by Defend Our Juries is clear: to secure the de-proscription of Palestine Action and restore the distinction between political direct action and terrorism within UK law.
Supporters argue that proscription represents a disproportionate interference with the rights to freedom of expression, association and protest protected under the European Convention on Human Rights.¹ They contend that direct action against military supply chains, however controversial, belongs within the long democratic tradition of abolitionist, suffragette and anti-apartheid resistance movements that sought to challenge perceived injustice through civil disobedience and disruption.²
The wider aim is also to end UK complicity in alleged violations of international humanitarian law. Campaigners point to ongoing proceedings before the International Court of Justice, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, and investigations by international legal institutions as demonstrating the urgent need for transparency, accountability and compliance with international law.³
Ultimately, the campaign asks whether a democratic society committed to human rights should criminalise political dissent through terrorism legislation, or whether it should protect the space for conscientious resistance while upholding the rule of law. The call is therefore for Palestine Action to be de-proscribed, for protest rights to be robustly protected, and for UK policy to align fully with its obligations under international law.⁴
Footnotes
European Convention on Human Rights, arts 10 and 11.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (rev edn, Harvard University Press 1999) 319–368; June Purvis, Emmeline Pankhurst (Routledge 2002); Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (Little, Brown 1994).International Court of Justice, South Africa v Israel (Provisional Measures Orders, 2024); relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions concerning Gaza.Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention on Human Rights; UN Charter. https://twitter.com/i/status/2065493571818406226
https://twitter.com/GeoRosenberg/status/2065768645037260991
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