@slashdot so let's have approved mandated encryption standards, eh? That worked well...
"For years, NSA had worked with U.S. allies to try to keep the strength of encryption in commercial products at a level where we could break into it if terrorists or foreign adversaries were to use it."
Dr. Clinton C. Brooks, ehemaliger "ziviler Chef" (assitant deputy director) der #NSA und einer der Köpfe hinter dem Clipper Chip.
Clinton Brooks '56, P'83, '84 is a former assistant deputy director of the National Security Agency and expert on cryptology, information technology, and homeland security. His work has been widely recognized, including by national commendations, medals, and several Presidential awards.
Remember that #story last week, where the #US #FBI came out and actually recommended people switch to using #encrypted #communications, because Chinese government hackers had burrowed deeply into the US phone infrastructure ?
Remember the #cognitive #dissonance that announcement caused, after literally decades of the FBI and other #American #intelligence agencies demanding backdoors and key escrow and deliberately weakened #encryption #algorithms?
Ya, well, apparently part of that announcement was missed. They're still demanding "responsibly managed encryption":
Remember: "responsible encryption" is neither. It's their demand for a back-door. And every back door can be used by the "bad guys" just as easily as it can be used by the "good guys". Anyone who tells you different is #lying to your face; encryption is math, and there is no such thing as math which the "good guys" can do but which the "bad guys" cannot.
The #USA intelligence agencies' demand for backdoors to be built into all parts of the #phone system years ago are exactly what let the #Chinese government #hackers to penetrate and control the phone system now, and which they aren't going to be able to fix for many years, if at all, because it would require replacing a *lot* of equipment with versions that don't have back doors (and which would then not be eavesdrop-able at will).
#CognitiveDissonance #BackDoor #KeyEscrow #ClipperChip #network
@dangillmor those who don't remember history, und so ...:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escrowed_Encryption_Standard
(Der englische Artikel geht weit tiefer ins Detail.)
Das haben sogar die USA verworfen, weil es die Verschlüsselung prinzipiell unsicher und damit weitgehend nutzlos gemacht hätte. Die EU-Vorschläge gehen deutlich weiter.
@markusreuter
Ich bin dafür, dass diese Leute ihre Kommunikation mit ihrer Bank per #Clipperchip oder #RC4 „schützen“. #CryptoWarsPartN
Ansonsten #Buchtipp, der alte Klassiker:
„Disappearing Cryptography“
https://www.amazon.de/Disappearing-Cryptography-Information-Steganography-Watermarking/dp/0123744792
#USA #Encryption #Cybersecurity #ClipperChip #CivilLiberties: "The Clipper emerged at a time when technological advancements were forcing the government to confront unsettling new realities. At the time, the internet was starting to take off and cryptosystems were evolving with it.
From the ciphers of ancient Rome to the code makers and breakers of WWII, encryption—the process of scrambling readable language into unintelligible signs and symbols—had almost always been the purview of governments, useful as it was for the concealment of sensitive state secrets. In the modern era, electronic encryption—which leveraged increasingly sophisticated machines to help create powerful encryption ciphers—was exclusively leveraged by secretive government agencies, like the NSA.
But by the 1990s, the government’s monopoly on this kind of information security had begun to slip."
https://gizmodo.com/life-and-death-of-clipper-chip-encryption-backdoors-att-1850177832
Nate Cochrane
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