Mastodawn

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords demands client-side scanning of content to check for “viewing of CSAM” https://alecmuffett.com/article/134940 #AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #OnlineSafety #OnlineSafetyAct #censorship #surveillance #vpn

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords...

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords demands client-side scanning of content to check for “viewing of CSAM”

There’s a kind of Orwellian inevitability to this: “Action to promote the wellbeing of children by combating child sexual abuse material (CSAM) … (2) The “CSAM requirement” is that any …

Dropsafe

Alec Muffett 2d ago

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords demands client-side scanning of content to check for “viewing of CSAM”
https://alecmuffett.com/article/134940
#AgeVerification #ClientSideScanning #OnlineSafety #OnlineSafetyAct #censorship #surveillance #vpn

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords demands client-side scanning of content to check for “viewing of CSAM”

There’s a kind of Orwellian inevitability to this: “Action to promote the wellbeing of children by combating child sexual abuse material (CSAM) … (2) The “CSAM requirement” is that any …

Dropsafe

alecm 2d ago

AND FINALLY: UK House of Lords demands client-side scanning of content to check for “viewing of CSAM”

There’s a kind of Orwellian inevitability to this:

“Action to promote the wellbeing of children by combating child sexual abuse material (CSAM) … (2) The “CSAM requirement” is that any relevant device supplied for use in the UK must have installed tamper-proof system software which is highly effective at preventing the recording, transmitting (by any means, including livestreaming) and viewing of CSAM using that device.”

All you have to do is search for Baroness Benjamin in the document and up comes her goal of looking through the square window into your device.

Also, India recently tried “mandatory tamperproof software”; it didn’t fly, and it would not have worked anyway.

#ageVerification #censorship #clientSideScanning #onlineSafety #onlineSafetyAct #surveillance #VPN

BRIGADA🚩Dec 1

Privacy is Dead: How AI Surveillance Tracks You in 2025

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c3PrMj6xems

#Privacy #Surveillance #WindowsRecall #AppleIntelligence #clientsidescanning

Microsoft Recall: The Ultimate Privacy NIGHTMARE of 2025

YouTube

Show thread

Autonomie und Solidarität Nov 27

Die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten einigen sich mit einem toxischen Kompromiss auf die Einführung der Chatkontrolle.

Mit der jetzigen Einigung sollen Anbieter zwar nicht verpflichtet werden sondern "freiwillig" entscheiden können, ob die Kommunikation der Nutzer*innen durchleuchten. Trotzdem will die EU-Kommission in den nächsten Jahren weiterhin prüfen, ob nicht noch eine verpflichtende Einführung beschlossen werden kann. Ähnlich wie bei der #Vorratsdatenspeicherung, an der die EU inzwischen auch wieder arbeitet, wird die autoritäre #EU ab jetzt wohl immer wieder versuchen, die verpflichtende #Chatkontrolle mit #ClientSideScanning einzuführen.

Außerdem sieht der "Kompromiss" weiterhin #Netzsperren zur #Zensur sowie verpflichtende #Alterkontrollen und Registrierungspflichten für Kommunikationsdienste vor, womit die anonyme Kommunikation und Nutzung des Internets weiter zerstört werden soll.

https://netzpolitik.org/2025/eu-rat-einigt-sich-zur-chatkontrolle-schlimmster-giftzahn-gezogen-aber-weiterhin-gefaehrlich/

EU-Rat einigt sich zur Chatkontrolle: Schlimmster Giftzahn gezogen, aber weiterhin gefährlich

Nach langer Blockade hat sich der EU-Rat bei der Chatkontrolle geeinigt. Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen sind erleichtert, dass die verpflichtende Chatkontrolle vom Tisch ist, warnen aber vor anderen problematischen Teilen im Gesetzentwurf.

netzpolitik.org

Alec Muffett Nov 19

Interesting to compare and contrast EU attempts to force chat control, with failed Australian attempt at the same from 2024: https://alecmuffett.com/article/124507 #ChatControl #ClientSideScanning #EndToEndEncryption #EuropeanUnion #australia #censorship #encryption #surveillance

Interesting to compare and con...

Interesting to compare and contrast EU attempts to force chat control, with failed Australian attempt at the same from 2024:

Dropsafe

Alec Muffett Nov 19

Interesting to compare and contrast EU attempts to force chat control, with failed Australian attempt at the same from 2024:
https://alecmuffett.com/article/124507
#ChatControl #ClientSideScanning #EndToEndEncryption #EuropeanUnion #australia #censorship #encryption #surveillance

Interesting to compare and contrast EU attempts to force chat control, with failed Australian attempt at the same from 2024:

Dropsafe

alecm Nov 19

Interesting to compare and contrast EU attempts to force chat control, with failed Australian attempt at the same from 2024:

2024 Australia: In November, the eSafety commissioner announced draft standards that would require the operators of cloud and messaging services to detect and remove known child abuse and pro-terror material “where technically feasible”, as well as disrupt and deter new material of the same nature.

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/article/2024/jun/21/australia-esafety-commissioner-child-abuse-detection-online-safety

Key Concerns Raised by Experts:

1. Flawed ‘voluntary’ AI Chat Control Creates Dangerous False Positives

The experts warn that unlike the previous Council’s proposal, the new text expands scanning of private communications to include automated text analysis, using AI to identify ambiguous “grooming” behaviours. They argue this will create a dragnet that ensnares innocent people. “Current AI technology is far from being precise enough to undertake these tasks with guarantees for the necessary level of accuracy.”

https://www.patrick-breyer.de/en/eu-chat-control-proposal-still-poses-high-risks-despite-removal-of-mandatory-scanning-experts-warn/

#australia #censorship #chatControl #clientSideScanning #encryption #endToEndEncryption #europeanUnion #surveillance

Australia’s eSafety commissioner waters down child abuse detection rules in online safety standards

Tech companies providing end-to-end encryption, including Apple, pushed for the changes, warning of mass government surveillance

The Guardian

Viktoria D. Richards/Uddelhexe Nov 13

Kann mir jemand in einfachen Worten erklären, wie weit der Arm von Client Side Scanning läuft?

Wenn also so eine Hintertür in einer App ist, bis wohin in dem Gerät, auf dem die App installiert ist, die die Tür enthält, kann der Arm rausgreifen?
Nur Daten in der App? Auf alles, worauf die App Zugriff hat? Auf ALLES auf dem Gerät?
Würde das Sandboxen der App irgendwas helfen?

#Chatkontrolle #ClientSideScanning #VikiUnplugged