De regrets (Alfred Edward Housman)

https://arbrealettres.wordpress.com/2026/06/18/de-regrets-alfred-edward-housman/

Heavy Cavalry Versus Infantry – Charging the Lines

Heavy cavalry charging the lines of infantry is an awesome sight in historical fiction and fantasy alike. It is difficult to forget Eomer’s charge at Helm’s Deep or the charge of the Rohirrim at Pelennor.

Yet revisionist historiography exists which holds that the impact of charge of heavy cavalry was based solely on morale. Argument is that horses cannot be trained to charge through, or even at, the solid wall of pointy things. By this explanation, the entire heavy cavalry charge is based solely on morale, a “who blinks the first” game of nerves. If infantry stays in formation, then cavalry will not charge infantry even if said infantry is armed with wet paper and harsh language.

But is that really the case? To determine this, I will look at a number of examples through history.

Greek and Hellenic experiences

Alexander’s successes owed a large part to his Companion cavalry. Companions were heavy cavalry, wearing metal helmet and a breastplate. Their main weapon was sarissa, a spear nine feet long.

In Battle of Gaugamela, Persians charged Macedonian phalanx with scythed chariots and heavy cavalry. Chariots themselves were handled with ease: they were left through the ranks and captured as they slowly turned around. But Persian heavy cavalry put heavy strain on the phalanx despite its pikes. Eventually, Persians managed to open a gap in the center of the phalanx and poured through the gap. This moment could have won the battle for Persians, but rather than wheeling and flanking the phalanx, undisciplined Persian heavy cavalry went straight for the Macedonian baggage train to loot. Because of this, Macedonian infantry was able to reform, allowing Alexander to execute his own move.

This move, which decided the battle, was cavalry charge of Alexander’s Companions. Alexander formed his units – Companions followed by some infantry units – into a giant wedge which smashed straight into Persian infantry at the center, taking out Darius’ royal guard and Greek mercenaries. Darius, in danger of being cut off (or cut down) turned and fled, with the rest of the army following him. But the success was not immediate: Darius’ heavy infantry initially stood their ground against Alexander’s Companions, leading to a melee in which many were struck in the face with cavalry lances. This clearly shows that the horses had charged into thick of their formation, and infantry had continued to fight for a time before breaking.

Roman Empire and Parthia

While battle of Carrhae is often used as an example of success of the horse archers, it is in reality a success of combined arms, with heavy cavalry playing the decisive role. Horse archers were used to suppress the Romans, force them to bunch up and form testudo for defense against missiles. This however made them a perfect target for cataphracts, which would charge the Roman lines, inflicting heavy casualties. Roman cavalry likewise could not be used to drive away the horse archers, as their horses were not armored and Roman equites were inferior in armor and weapons to Parthian cataphracts.

At Battle of Nisibis in 217, Parthian cataphracts directly charged the Roman front. Momentum of their advance however was broken by caltrops laid by Roman light infantry, and as a result, Roman legionaries had advantage in the subsequent hand-to-hand fighting. Parthians launched several more charges, and while they did not break the Romans, they generally had the better of the fighting – Macrinus’ army was at the verge of breaking when truce was agreed.

At the second Battle of Carrhae in 296, Persians drew in Galerius to the exact spot where Crassus had been defeated. This was an area upstream of Balihos, a flat plain surrounded by hills. Such a battlefield was perfect for the Persians, as it led the enemies into the trap from which there was no escape. When the Roman legions reached the end of the plain near Edessa, Persians surrounded them with light cavalry outflanking the Roman columns while infantry, backed by cataphracts, shot arrows at the Roman legions. Galerius, aware of Crassus’ fate, ordered his legions into attack with the aim of breaking through the encirlement of the Persian horse archers, leaving his cavalry to stalemate their Persian counterparts. While he managed to do so, he suddenly found himself confronted by the army of King Narses. In the end, Galerius managed to break through to the Roman garrison in Nicephorium.

Middle Ages – Byzantine Empire

Maurice in Strategikon discusses mostly tactics of cavalry against cavalry. But from his infantry section, some factors may be gleamed. Most importantly, he wants deep infantry formations: “make sure that files of each tagma are always sixteen deep”. These sixteen are all heavy infantry, with further four archers assigned to the file, making formation twenty deep in total.

In the anynomous treatise on strategy, cavalry phalanx is noted to be loose and to fall upon the enemy forcefully, charging at full speed (by contrast, infantry phalanx is closed up very tightly). Unfortunately, that is all information on cavalry tactics present in the book.

Praecepta Militaria (Presentation on Warfare) by Nikephoros Phokas discusses a number of cavalry and anti-cavalry tactics. Infantry units are four hundred heavy infantry and three hundred archers, deployed in a double-faced phalanx seven ranks deep (IIAAAII), with another two hundred light infantry (javeliners and slingers) and one hundred pikemen (menavlotoi), making phalanx eight deep with pikemen in the front. Menavlion or menaulion is a pike that is, in Praecepta, described as one-and-half to two orguiai in length. Orguia varied in length – “common” orguia was 187,4 cm while “Imperial” orguia used for tax assessment was 210,8 cm. I will assume that the measure used here was the “common” orguia since Praecepta Militaria is not in fact a tax document. Thus the menavlion would be 2,8 to 3,75 meters in length at the shaft, with additional 35 – 47 cm for the spearpoint.

The function of menavolotoi was specifically to counter the possibility of the enemy outfitting their cavalrymen with armor “so that the spears of the infantrymen will be smashed to pieces by these men, and by using these horsemen the enemy will shatter the infantry units”. This passage clearly proves false the modern-day misconception that the heavy cavalry will not charge infantry units, and that infantry which does not break ranks is safe against cavalry. If that were true, then infantry spears being smashed will not even have been a concern; yet we are told specifically that kataphraktoi will smash the infantry spears. (Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pg.13 – 19) It should be noted that cataphracts used maces, and therefore have a definite reach disadvantage against infantry; if a solid line of infantry was all that sufficed to stop the cavalry charge, menavlion will have been unnecessary. Also unnecessary will have been the inner ranks of spearmen, who were meant specifically to defend formation should the enemy break into the square.

But utilization of pikemen was not the only measure Phokas takes to counter the enemy kataphraktoi. In addition to having menavlotoi deployed in the front, he also states that one of the rear lines of heavy infantry (spearmen) is to be sent to the front. In this way, one will have one line of menavlotoi and three lines of heavy infantry facing the enemy cavalry, plus three lines of archers.

In terms of discussing the Byzantine kataphraktoi, Phokas recognizes that attacking the enemy heavy infantry is a daunting task. Yet while Phokas did expect (and hope for) the enemy infantry to panic in face of the cataphract charge, he also expected and made provisions for situations where that would not happen. In such cases, he explained that due to the heavy armor of the kataphraktoi “the spears of the enemy infantry in the front lines will be smashed by the kataphraktoi, while their arrows will be ineffective, as will the menavla of their javeliners. Then, with the help of God, they will turn to flight. When they do turn to flight, it is not the kataphraktoi who should undertake the pursuit but their two accompanying units trailing behind them.”. (Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pg. 29) It is thus clear that the heavy armor of the cataphracts renders not just arrows and javelins but also the spears of the infantry ineffective, and that cataphracts would in fact physically smash the spearshafts of the enemy infantry, presumably with their armor. Overall, this gives a definite lie to the notion that cavalry will never charge a unit of formed infantry, and that infantry only needs to stand firm and in formation to turn away the cavalry charge. Horse armor was crucial for fighting in close quarters, since death of an (unarmored) horse was the greatest danger for a heavy cavalryman fighting enemy cavalry or infantry. But to kill an armored rider and a horse at close quarters was a daunting task

Cataphracts were deployed in a trapezoid formation, where each line added four more horsemen to the previous one. The weapons of the cataphracts specifically were iron maces or sabers, and swords. Only from the fifth line on the cataphracts positioned on the flanks carried lances, making it clear that purpose of lancers was not to attack the enemy infantry but rather to protect the flanks of the formation from potential enemy cavalry attack. Impact weapons were swords and maces. (Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pg.35 – 39) Cataphracts were, if possible, aimed directly at the position of the enemy commander with purpose of taking him out. They would smash into the enemy infantry at a trotting pace (to preserve the order of the formation), and if the enemy routed, escorting units of lighter cavalry would give pursuit while cataphracts remained in formation. Enemy horse archers were not to be chased, but rather repelled by return fire from cavalry and if possible infantry archers. Some 40% of the cavalrymen were mounted archers; their bows however were smaller and less tightly strung than those of the infantrymen, being thus “much reduced in force”. Cavalrymen thus had to rely on their armor to get within the effective range of their bows. During approach, archers would be used to attempt and open up the gaps in the enemy infantry lines before heavily armored cataphracts smashed into them. Phokas would declare that the commander “with five or six thousand mounted warriors and the aid of God would stand in need of nothing more”.

Third text is the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos, which is basically an update of Nikephoros Phokas’ text. He recommends that infantrymen should have spears “thick and solid, from twenty-five to thirty spithamai in length”. This would make spears some 5,9 to 7,1 meters in length. An army would have six to eight thousand of these infantrymen, as well as four thousand archers. Infantry was to be deployed in a square formation, seven men deep. This depth would be made of two lines of heavy infantry, three of archers, and another two lines of heavy infantry. A chilliarchy would thus have four hundred heavy infantry and three hundred archers. What Ouranos did not mention before but does at this point is that in addition to heavy infantrymen and archers, there would also be two hundred skirmishers (javeliners, slingers and archers) and a hundred pikemen. Pikemen or menavlotioi “must have thick menavlia with a length of one and a half or two ourguiai while their points must have a length of one and a half or two spithamai”. This would make menavlion some 2,8 to 3,75 meters long, same as in Phokas, while points would be 35 to 47 centimeters long. Menavlotoi were positioned in the first row, so as to receive enemy cavalry charge.

The presence of the menavlotoi was absolutely necessary, because “If the enemy has learned of our infantry units and they prepare kataphraktoi so as to protect themselves and their horses with armor, these kataphraktoi will shatter the spears of the infantrymen and break up our units, so, in that event, the menavlatoi must be at the ready in the back and on whichever side they see the enemy kataphraktoi attacking, these menavlatoi must immediately move out through the aforementioned intervals and take their places in front of the infantry formation.”. This passage can be confusing due to wording, but considering the context it seems clear that the former Byzantine experience has shown that the cataphracts will charge enemy infantry and shatter their spears. In order to prevent that, menavlotoi must be positioned behind the infantry. They would then move out and position themselves at the front of the side that enemy cataphracts were about to attack. Text proceeds to state that “They must certainly not be at any great distance from them, however, but must instead be closely attached to these infantrymen. It is then necessary to combine two files of infantry and make them into one file, meaning that one file must move over into the next so that the seven men will become fourteen and thicken the formation. The menavolotoi must stand their ground and bravely meet the charge of the kataphraktoi and turn them away.”. (Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth, pg.89 – 97)

To put it in short, infantry facing the heavy cavalry charge would deploy so that the pikemen were at the front, with two ranks of heavy infantry behind them, followed by three ranks of archers and another two ranks of heavy infantry. They would then double the depth of the line, making it sixteen deep in total with two ranks of pikemen in the front. Assuming the pikemen and spearmen crouched to anchor their spears, archers would – at full target range of 150 meters – have less than a minute to get off volleys, allowing perhaps four volleys. But against armored cavalry, this will not have been enough to stop the charge. Archers in fact were expected to have hand-to-hand weapons that they would use once the enemy reached Byzantine lines.

Ouranos also brings up cavalry shattering spears in the discussion of cataphract tactics: “On the assumption that the enemy infantry force is of heavy infantrymen, if they are standing in front of their cavalry units, out kataphraktoi must not be afraid but should instead proceed very calmly and aim the front of the triangular formation directly at the spot where the enemy leader is standing. Then the spears of the enemy infantrymen standing in front of their cavalry will be smashed by our kataphraktoi, while their arrows and the menavla of their javeliners will be ineffective because of the armor of our kataphraktoi. And so, with the help of God, the enemy will be routed.”. We again see that the Byzantine cataphracts are expected to physically smash enemy infantrymen’s spears, breaking them; fleeing enemies would then be pursued by light cavalry.

Heavy cavalry formation, meanwhile, was to be comprised of a mix of melee and missile units. A formation of 504 cataphracts will have had 150 archers with rest being armed with maces and lances. A formation of 384 cataphracts would have 80 archers. Horses were to be powerful and bolt, and both riders and horses covered in armor. First three lines of formation would be melee only, with archers deployed from fourth line onward. First four line of cataphracts would have only maces and sabres, while the remaining lines of cataphracts would have a mix of lances and sabres. This formation would be escorted by two outflanking units, made up of a combination of lancers and mounted archers. Escorting cavalry was deployed in depth of five lines, two of lancers, two of archers and one of lancers. Formation of the kataphraktoi would be aimed at the place where the enemy commander is standing. Archers within the formation would shoot arrows against the enemy infantry as the formation approached. Formation of cataphracts would destroy the enemy “for the spears and menavlia of the enemy will be broken to pieces by the kataphraktoi and their arrows will be ineffective”.

Very few battles are recorded where Byzantine cataphracts are described in action, but those few that are show how effective they could be. During siege of Tarsos in 965, Tarsiots left their city to confront the besiegers in the open. Yet their infantry was very quickly overwhelmed by the frontal charge of the Byzantine heavy cavalry, and thus they fled back into their city and shut themselves in. At Preslav in 971, Russians fought in a disciplined shield wall and stood fast against the Byzantine infantry, until they were outflanked and overwhelmed by the cataphracts. Terror instilled by the cataphracts was so great that the Russian leaders advised Svyatoslav they will not be able to stand against the “ironclad horsemen” and that they should return home.

Middle Ages – Near East

At Battle of Raj in 811, Al-Amin and Al-Ma’mun’s armies faced each other. Amin’s army, led by Ali ibn Isa ibn Mahan, numbered some 50 000, but these were exclusively infantry. Mamun’s army was led by Tahir ibn Husayn and numbered some 5 000 troops, mostly cavalry. Battle was decided at the outset, when 700 Khwarazmian heavy cavalry, backed by archers, crashed into center of Amin’s forces and killed Ali. This battle marked the end of large infantry forces in Islamic warfare of the period, which had been proven clearly inferior to smaller forces comprised of heavy cavalry.

At Battle of Ramla in 1101, Crusader army under Balwin had only 260 heavy cavalry and 900 infantry against some 3 000 – 5 000 Egyptian soldiers. Crusader infantry was nearly wiped out, but when Egyptians were pursuing the third division, Baldwin ordered a counter-attack. Egyptian forces were broken up by cavalry charge and dispersed. At the Second Battle of Ramla, Crusader knights – 200 of them – were slaughtered by a ~5 000 strong Egyptian force due to faulty reconnaissance and lack of infantry support. At the third battle of Ramla in 1105, Crusaders again won a victory, but this time the presence of Turkish horse archers prevented them from pursuing the enemy.

At Battle of Jaffa in 1192, Saladin’s cavalry repeatedly charged Richard’s spearmen, but never once came to blows with them. This on the face of it might seem to support the idea that cavalry will not charge steadfast infantry. In reality however, Saladin did not have any heavy cavalry in this battle. All cavalry he had were light cavalry, of Turkish, Egyptian and Bedouin provenance. These horsemen had neither the training, the horses nor the equipment for mounting a charge. Horse archers are skirmishing troops, whose entire purpose is avoiding direct engagement – they will not have trained, at all, to mount a charge against infantry in defensive formation. Horses used by horse archers were usually mares, because they are of a calmer temperament and more easily controlled than stallions. Yet these qualities which made mares so prized among the horse archers would make them a very bad fit for heavy cavalry, which needs strong and aggressive horses. And lastly, horse archers had neither the long lances nor the heavy armor required to survive close combat with enemy infantry. Since Saladin’s horsemen were neither stupid nor suicidal, they will have been aware of these factors and thus done everything they could to avoid close combat. Any “charges” mounted by Saladin’s cavalry in this battle will have been for the purpose of coming to close range where their bows had a chance of penetrating heavy mail armor worn by Richard’s infantry.

Early Middle Ages – Western and Central Europe

Unlike Byzantine cataphracts, heavy cavalry in Western Europe generally did not use heavy horse armor. This made them far more vulnerable to archers and pikemen.

At Battle of Tours in 732, some 20 000 – 25 000 Umayyad cavalry (a combination of Berber light and Arab heavy cavalry) faced 15 000 – 20 000 Frankish infantry under Charles Martel. Earlier, Umayyad heavy cavalry had easily broken the Aquitaine infantry at Battle of Bordeaux (Garonne), with Eudes’ army being virtually annihilated with minor losses to Umayyad forces. Eudes fled north, seeking help from the Franks in exchange for submission.

At Tours, several factors combined to place Arabs at disadvantage. Martel countered the Muslim cavalry advantage by choosing the high, wooded plain that would force the Umayyad cavalry to charge uphill through unfavorable terrain. He deliberately placed his battle line behind first trees in the forest, counting on trees to help break up Umayyad cavalry. According to some historians, Umayyad army was exclusively light cavalry “carrying lances and swords, largely without shields, wearing very little armor”, though this is questionable considering importance of heavy cavalry at success at Garonne. Abdul Rahman attacked the Franks head-on. Following the several attacks the Umayyads managed to break through Frankish line despite being at massive disadvantage, but just as that was happening the Frankish scouts were infiltrating the Umayyad camp. Much of the Umayyad cavalry broke off their attack to defend the camp, triggering a rout all the way back to Iberia.

At Legnano in 1176, Lombard municipal infantry managed to resist heavy cavalry charges for eight to nine hours. As usual, however, the devil is in the details. Infantry was arranged into several defensive lines. Imperial cavalry meanwhile only conducted single charges, with long pauses in between allowing them – and their enemies – to reorganize for the next charge. Nevertheless, first two – or first four, depending on the source – lines of municipal infantry had collapsed before being relieved by the Lombard army moving towards Legnano. Imperial forces, caught between the hammer and the anvil, were defeated. As with Tours, while this definitely represents a defensive success by infantry, it is hardly a proof that disciplined infantry was invulnerable against heavy cavalry – indeed, municipal infantry was at the verge of collapse when they were relieved.

At Battle of Falkirk in 1298, Scottish infantry successfully repelled English heavy cavalry. Several factors helped Scots here: they used long pikes, longer than English lances. Schiltrons themselves were made up of a combination of pikemen and archers. Terrain itself was marshy, significantly hampering English cavalry, and Wallace’s army was positioned on a hillside. While Scottish bowmen and cavalry were quickly driven off by English cavalry, the pike schiltrons stood firm, English losing 111 horses in the attempts to penetrate Scottish formations. But without support from their own archers, poorly-armored pikemen were then subjected to sustained missile bombardment from English longbowmen, crossbowmen and slingers. Once schiltrons were disordered by the missiles, English cavalry charged home, breaking and scattering the schiltrons.

At Bannockburn in 1314, mostly the same factors also held. English heavy cavalry advanced against the pikes with no preparatory missile bombardment, and without even pausing to organize. Whole English army was in fact disorganized while attempting to cross the river. English army was hemmed in by the Bannock Burn itself and the tidal waters to left and right. Scottish schiltrons held the higher ground, and so English had to advance uphill while Scots advanced downhill to meet them while English were still crossing the river. As the Scots advanced, English heavy cavalry was hemmed up against Bannockburn. English longbowmen were unable to assist as they were dispersed by Scottish men-at-arms.

On the second day of the battle, English crossed at a different point. But after crossing they were hemmed in between Bannockburn and Pelstream, unable to deploy properly. English knights charged Edward de Bruce’s schiltron without support from archers, while second line of knights was outflanked and engaged by Randolph’s and Douglas’ schiltrons. English archers attempting to support the knights were dispersed by Scottish light cavalry. English cavalry was pushed back by schiltrons and forced over the Bannockburn with heavy casualties, retreat having turned into rout upon appearance of Scottish camp followers that were mistaked for another Scottish force. With Bannockburn now at full tide, thousands of English troops drowned.

Late Middle Ages – 14th and 15th centuries

By the 15th century, heavy cavalry has become far more effective thanks to improvements in armor, experiencing something of a resurgence. Heavy cavalry had in fact become unusually effective in the decades after 1430. Proof of this lies in the fact that professional forces coming into vogue during the 15th century consisted predominantly of heavy cavalry. Black Army of Hungary was, by 1480., some 20 000 cavalry but only 8 000 infantry. Venetian lanze spezzate and French and Burgundian compagnies d’ordonnance were likewise predominantly or exclusively cavalry.

Pikes were thus crucial for defense. Plate armor was too strong to be penetrated by one-handed weapons such as spears, axes and swords, and even made maces largely ineffective because it distributed the force of impact. Bills and halberds were insufficient as they were outreached by lance (as Barett testified, “Against horse … farre better is the Pike, then either Bill, or Halbard.”). A pike outreached the lance, and unarmored horse struck into chest would invariably die. And great length of pike allowed pikemen to place not one but five or six rows of pike points between the speeding mass of the horse and fragile human bodies. While a skilled rider could make the horse charge even a wall of pike points, great reach of the pike made it difficult for cavalry to cause damage as pikes would prevent horsemen from closing to the striking distance of their lances. Pikemen were even better against the footmen armed with shorter weapons, however. As Montecuccoli observed in the 17th century, “It may be taken as axiomatic that no battalion of pikemen can ever be ruptured in a head-on attack.”.

Of course, pikemen required protection from ranged units which could weaken their cohesion over time enough to be penetrated by heavy cavalry. Pike blocks had no effective response to enemy shot, be it infantry arquebusiers or cavalry pistoleers. For this reason, pikemen were paired first with crossbowmen, and then with shot, particularly the arquebusiers, in the classical “pike and shot” setup. It was likely the increasing effectiveness and prominence of gunpowder weaponry that allowed pike formations to become as dominant in Europe as they did, providing them with desperately needed protection from ranged weapons (even the famed Swiss pikemen employed crossbowmen and later arquebusiers for protection).

Battle of Castillon in 1453 was decided by French heavy cavalry charge into Talbot’s flank, after English had already been decimated by French artillery.

At Battle of Nancy in 1477, Charles the Bold drew up a strong defensive position, but failed to properly protect his flanks. He was also heavily outnumbered, fielding only 2 000 – 8 000 men against some 18 000 – 22 000 Union and Swiss troops, and his men were in poor physical condition. In the main battle, it was Swiss cavalry which engaged Burgundian cavalry, while Swiss pikemen overwhelmed the heavily outnumbered Burgundian counterparts. Swiss center had marched through the forest and ouflanked the Burgundian positions, attacking them from the rear and down the slope. While Burgundian cavalry managed to drive off their opposites, Burgundian infantry was caught in a pincer and overwhelmed. Burgundian left was driven back by Rene’s vanguard, made easier by Charles transferring troops to try and help his outmatched center. Burgundian army collapsed and Charles was killed. During the battle however, Burgundian heavy cavalry charged home against the Swiss pikes, penetrating as far as the banners.

Ottomans themselves did not, at least during the 15th century, widely use pikemen for defense against cavalry. In order to protect infantry, Ottomans rather dug trenches and built palisades in front of the infantry positions, and also eventually adopted Hungarian wagenburg tactics.

Early Modernity – 16th and 17th Centuries

Swiss pike formations were as close to invincible as infantry formations ever became until the Spanish tercio superseded them some years later. They consisted of pikemen arranged into squares forty or more men deep – in the 16th century, squares with as many as sixty or seventy-five ranks were sometimes seen. But “close to invincible” was still not invincible, and battles of Ravenna in 1512 and Marignano in 1515 would show that a properly handled heavy cavalry is still able to engage pikemen.

At Ravenna, cavalry initially mostly engaged each other. But after the Spanish cavalry was driven off and Spanish infantry largely surrounded, French cavalry descended on Spanish infantry and overwhelmed Spanish formations, inflicting terrible casualties. Cavalrymen themselves were largely unharmed due to plate armor. French cavalry not only charged against the pikes and punched through, but once through they defeated Italian men-at-arms behind the pikes, picked up Italians’ lances, and charged through the pikemen once again.

At Marignano, 21 000 Swiss pikemen advanced with setting sun behind them. Yet despite the sun in their eyes, French cannon and arquebusiers took a deadly toll. Whole files and ranks were shot to pieces, and more than a thousand Swiss fell before making contact with the enemy. Despite this, Swiss “forlorn hope” overran and silenced the French “grand battery” in the center, driving back the German landsknechte defending it. But the advance exposed Swiss left flank to Bourbon’s division, which poured shot into Swiss left flank. This was followed by charge of French heavy cavalry (gendarmes) which pushed the Swiss back. Gendarmes themselves then suffered heavy casualties when their pursuit led them headlong into the Swiss main division. To halt the Swiss, king threw in the Black Band supported by heavy cavalry. French lancers launched some thirty charges against the Swiss before the Swiss attack was stopped.

As the darkness fell, confusion reigned supreme. At one point, king Francis and his household retainers mistook a company of the Swiss for their own landsknecht and found themselves suddenly confronting 600 hostile pikes. Despite the odds, lifetime of training and heavy plate armor told and the king and his gendarmes were able to charge and break their opponents.

Following morning, Swiss pikemen pushed back the German landsknecht despite latter having support fire from artillery. Only French cavalry charge led by Bayard forced the Swiss to give ground. Swiss then focused their attack against Alencon’s left-wing division. While they made some headway, thirty successive charges thrown by the French gendarmerie pushed them back. With the mid-morning arrival of Venetian forces, Swiss formed a giant square and pulled back.

At Battle of Cerignola in 1503., two French heavy cavalry charges against the Spanish centre were repulsed not by pikes, but by intense arquebus and artillery fire. Next assault tried to force the Spanish flank, but cavalrymen ran headlong into a ditch before being repulsed again by arquebus fire. Swiss pikemen never engaged cavalry, but were rather repulsed after engaging the Spanish Landsknecht pikemen and being shot at in the flanks by arquebusiers. Swiss themselves were disordered after crossing the ditch. Spanish heavy cavalry itself charged the disordered French pikemen who were trying to cross the ditch and help the Swiss. French and Gascon pikemen broke and ran, while Swiss managed an orderly retreat while Spanish cavalry was chasing down the retreating French and Gascon infantry.

At Battle of Pavia in 1525., French Gendarmes were in fact destroyed by the Imperial pikemen. This however was not due to a failed charge of Gendarmes – their charge, against Imperial cavalry, was in fact successful. But the advance had taken them into the woods, where their formation was disordered and rendered largely immobile before being surrounded and destroyed by the Imperial arquebusiers and pikemen.

At Battle of Ceresole in 1544., French heavy cavalry charged the landsknecht’s flank, shattering their formation. By contrast, Imperial heavy cavalry recoiled from the pikes and fled to the rear. Yet on the northern end of the battlefield, Enghien’s heavy cavalry penetrated the corner of the Imperial pike formation on the first charge, pushing through to the rear. The Imperial formation reformed however, and Enghien’s second charge was made under the heavy arquebus fire. Both second and third charges also penetrated the formation, but did not achieve a decisive result while suffering heavily from arquebus fire. After battle was lost elsewhere, the Imperial formation attempted to retreat. Notably, Imperial infantry was using arquebus fire to try and keep the French heavy cavalry at arm’s length. They surrendered after French infantry caught up.

At Battle of Dreux in 1562., Hugenot cavalry shattered Catholic left wing, sweeping away first the Catholic horse and then the foot as well. Swiss pikemen managed to hold, the only troops to do so, but even they took heavy casualties from cavalry attacks which rode right through their ranks. Most of the Protestant cavalry proceeded to pursue the fleeing enemies towards the Catholic camp which they proceeded to loot.

During the second phase of the battle, Swiss pikemen were repeatedly attacked by both the Protestant Landsknecht pikemen and the Hugenot gendarmes (heavy cavalry). Swiss routed the Landsknechts and captured the Protestant artillery, but were themselves broken by a final charge of fresh Hugenot gendarmes. Seeing this, most of the remaining Protestant cavalry proceeded to join their compatriots in looting the Catholic camp, leaving their infantry with no support.

Seeing that Protestant infantry was now isolated, Guise and Saint-Andre, who had held back until then, advanced with fresh troops. They swept aside the Hugenot French infantry, and the surviving Hugenot Landsknecht retreated without even attempting to engage.

While battle appeared won, Coligny had rallied about a thousand French and German horse and reemerged to attack again. This could have won the battle for the Protestants as the Catholic heavy cavalry was in no position to engage them, but Hugenots had used up all their lances. Without lances they were unable to break the Catholic pike square which had formed up just south of Blainville, and, suffering under arquebus fire, decided to retreat.

These battles show that even the early modern pike formations, while incredibly resillient, were not invulnerable to heavy cavalry. Moreover, it is shown quite clearly that heavy cavalry could, would and did charge and physically collide with the pike-wielding infantry. Marignano in particular proved that a combination of heavy cavalry and artillery was superior to pike formation in battle. Swiss would suffer further defeats between 1515 and 1525, and after 1525 never again went to war against the external enemy.

Development which would end up bringing the end of the traditional heavy cavalry and begin the era of infantry dominance on the battlefield was not in fact the pike. Rather, it was the development of effective arquebuses and their combination with the pikemen. Unlike the previously employed missile weapons – bows, crossbows and early firearms – 16th century arquebuses were very lethal weapons, able to pierce armor and disorder cavalry formations in a way that arrows could not. This in turn made it nearly impossible for a formation of lancers to penetrate a pike formation under any circumstances, as effectiveness of cavalry charge depended on maintaining formation which will have been destroyed by the arquebus fire. From this combination of arquebus and pike would rise Spanish tercio, the most lethal infantry formation of 16th century.

Early Modernity – 17th and 18th Centuries

In 17th century, further development of the firearms – specifically the musket – would further erode importance of cavalry. Even so, cavalry still remained a dangerous force when properly employed – and sometimes, even when improperly employed.

At Battle of Kircholm in 1605, Polish Winged Hussars at first primarily engaged Swedish cavalry on the wings. At the same time however 300 Hussars charged Swedish pikemen in the center to prevent them from interfering into cavalry fight on the flanks. After Swedish cavalry was pushed back, Swedish infantry was engaged from three sides. While Polish victory was helped by Swedish fleeing cavalry disordering the pike block, this again negates the misconception that cavalry will not charge pikemen.

At Lutzen in 1632., Piccolomini’s arquebusiers cut down a group of 20 Swedish musketeers. This prompted the Gotz cuirassiers to attack the Swedish Blue Brigade. This attack was repelled by concentrated fire of Swedish musketeers; nevertheless, the Blue Brigade was forced to pull back. Later in battle, Blue Brigade was destroyed by a combination of infantry fire from the front and cavalry charge at the flanks.

During the First Battle of Trichinopoly (or Battle of Golden Rock) in 1753, Maratha cavalry was unable to break British infantry square. Repelled by British firepower, Maratha cavalry eventually broke off the attacks. It is not mentioned that Maratha ever actually engaged the British infantry in hand-to-hand combat.

During the Battle of Trichinopoly in 1803, the 74th Infantry Regiment was subjected to artillery fire. Disordered by artillery, they were then charged by enemy cavalry which broke the regiment – out of 569 officers and men, some 400 were killed. The remains of the 74th Infantry Regiment was saved by countercharge of British cavalry under Colonel Maxwell who charged through the enemy left wing under shower of musketry and grapeshot.

During Battle of Kolin in 1757., Prussian 1st Dragoons charged head-on the flank battalion of the Botta Regiment. This charge was repelled by a salvo fired at 10 paces, followed by a charge of several Saxon cavalry squadrons. Later during the battle, Prussian infantry under General Puttkamer advanced towards Brzesau to support attack by cavalry of General Schoinach. They were attacked en route by Hesse-Darmstadt dragoons under D’Ayasas, resulting in complete destruction of IR15 (Infantry Regiment 15) which was in reality the Royal Guard (Leibgarde). Dragoons cut down the Guard and took both of its flags. Battle was decided when arrival of the Andlau Division gave Daun a decisive cavalry advantage. Next cavalry charge of 56 squadrons completely overran the IR22 and proceeded to throw back Prussian dragoons and 7th Cuirasseers.

At Battle of the Pyramids in 1798, divisional squares of Desaix, Reynier and Dugua repelled Mamluk cavalry with point-blank musket and artillery fire.

At Battle of Alexandria in 1801., Republican cavalry was sent into an unsupported charge. Despite this, it managed to penetrate as far as the British camp and Abercromby’s headquarters, inflicting severe losses on the 42nd Regiment of the Foot before being stopped by field fortifications and mauled by British musketry. Later on, French cavalry again managed to come to close quarters with the British reserve.

Not all charges were so successful: 42nd and 58th Regiments repelled two French cavalry charges early in the battle. What is important to note here however is that charges were repelled by musket fire. Later on, the 90th Regiment held fire until the last moment before repelling the French cavalry with a mass volley at point blank range which shattered French ranks.

At Battle of Auerstedt in 1809., cavalry charge failed because riders, not horses, decided that danger was too great and turned around at distance of some 30 meters. After Prussian salvo, the rest of the cavalry rode away despite minimal casualties.

At Battle of Salamanca in 1812., D’Urban’s Portuguese cavalry broke French infantry battalion by simultaneous attack in front and rear. Later in the battle, Le Marchant’s British Heavy Cavalry Brigade annihilated the French 66th of the Line by hitting it in the flank before it could form into the line. The 15th of the Line was able to form a square, but was nevertheless overrun, managing to fire off a single volley. The 22nd of the Line was next. While it was not in a square, it was able to meet the British cavalry with a controlled volley. Yet this was insufficient to halt the dragoons’ charge and the 22nd too was overwhelmed.

Boyer’s Dragoons meanwhile attacked Stubbs’ Portuguese Brigade and were driven off with difficulty. Dragoons then went on to charge the 53rd Regiment on the left flank of the British Sixth Division.

At Battle of Garcia Hernandez which was a follow-up of Salamanca, 770 heavy cavalry of King’s German Legion and 1 000 dragoons of the British Light Cavalry Brigade were pursuing eight battalions of French infantry, whose supporting cavalry had fled. French commander, Maximilien Foy, arranged his infantry into a square near Garcihernandez. Bock’s dragoons, the Third Squadron of the 1st Dragoons, charged a square belonging to a battalion of 76th of the Line. The French infantry managed to fire two volleys, but this failed to hold up the 1st Dragoons, who broke into the square and annihilated French infantry.

The Second Squadron of the 1st Dragoons, emerging from the road, followed the Third Squadron and attacked the French infantry. Its target was the 6th Light, which was marching in column up the hill to a more advantageous position. The German dragoons immediately charged. French infantry managed to halt the two rear companies and face them about to face the German cavalry. A volley caused some casualties before the Germans enveloped the French regiment.

Survivors from various French infantry and cavalry regiments gathered at the top of the hill where they were attacked by the Second KGL Dragoons, and dispersed or captured.

At Battle of Lutzen in 1813., French infantry drove off Prussian cavalry attack while crossing the Saale, withstanding several successive charges. Lauriston used his artillery to drive off Prussian cavalry. Girard at Starsiedel was attacked by the Prussian Reserve Cavalry, but fought them off with the help of Compans and Bonet from Marmont’s corps. His defense was helped by the fact that Blucher had no idea how strong Girard’s force was – Blucher believed he was about to attack two weak battalions (2 000 soldiers), yet unexpectedly found himself facing a full division in good defensive positions. Allied cavalry pulled back, leaving it to artillery to bombard the villages. Russian and Prussian cavalry however failed to penetrate French infantry squares later in the battle, each time driven back by firepower of French infantry squares. Late in the battle, Marmont himself was nearly killed when nine Prussian cavalry squadrons attacked and badly mauled Bonnet’s infantry while Marmont was with them. Marmont was pursuing the fleeing enemies in the darkness when the enemy cavalry turned about and descended upon Bonnet’s division, mauling and destroying the the 37th Light Infantry despite it having formed an infantry square. Prussian cavalry then retired, allowing Marmont to reorganize his infantry. When Prussians attacked again, their attack was shattered by heavy firepower of interlocking infantry squares, close-ranged volleys killing five or six hundred Prussian cavalrymen.

At the following Battle of Haynau, with French pursuing the “defeated” enemy, Blucher with some twenty squadrons of Landswehr cavalry rode over and nearly destroyed Maison’s division of six battalions.

During Battle of Mockern, itself an element of a Battle of Leipzig in 1813., Prussian cavalry broke several French infantry squares. Yorck’s cavalry attacked Marmont’s infantry en masse, outright destroying two infantry battalions and forcing Normann’s and Lorge’s cavalry away. On remainder of the battlefield, two sides’ cavalry mostly neutralized each other.

At the Battle of Hanau (which followed Battle of Leipzig, not to be confused with the Battle of Haynau that followed the Battle of Lutzen), French used their cavalry to break open the Bavarian formation, so that the French infantry would encounter less resistance. Sebastiani’s cavalry charge broke Bavarian left flank before mauling rest of the Bavarian infantry. It is however unclear if Bavarians had been able to form squares, or were simply outflanked.

At Waterloo in 1815., Ney’s massive cavalry charge failed. Several factors combined to help this failure: Ney sent his cavalry uphill, climbing a muddy slope, to confront enemy infantry that was properly formed and well supported by artillery, in a space that couldn’t be expected to hold half their number.

Overall, while Napoleonic infantry often easily saw off cavalry charges, this was always done with the use of firepower. Without infantry fire, even a saber cavalry had a good chance of penetrating infantry square, and lancers were nearly guaranteed to do so as their lances had much greater reach than infantry bayonets.

Modernity – 19th and 20th Century

At Battle of Omdurman, 400-strong 21st Lancers regiment attacked what they believed was few hundred dervishes, but really were 2 700 infantry hidden behind a depression. The 21st Lancers advanced at the walk, in mass, towards the spot indicated by Grenfell. They faced about 100 Dervishes in their path. The 21st wheeled to pass them on the left, suffering several casualties from Dervish rifle fire. Seeing what was behind the skirmishing line, Martin ordered a wheel into line to the right and the regiment immediately broke into a charge at the gallop.

The Dervish skirmishing line was 250 yards away, but as the 21st had covered half the distance, a wide khor opened in front of them and out of it leapt a dense mass of spear and sword wielding Dervishes. The line of Dervishes was about twelve deep and appeared in no way intimidated by the charging British cavalrymen.

The two forces met in a collision which Churchill described as “prodigious”. The officers and troopers of the 21st galloped down into the khor, spearing the Dervishes, who cut at the horses and riders, attempting to bring them down. Those cavalrymen who fell from their horses were cut to pieces, with slashes from the heavy razor-sharp Dervish swords, or speared. Surviving cavalrymen then proceeded to rally on the rest of the regiment some 200 yards beyond the khor. Dervishes then melted away as the 21st subjected them to rifle fire.

Later attack by 400 Dervish horsemen was also destroyed by rifle fire.

Probably one of last successful heavy cavalry charges was “von Bredow’s Death Ride”. At the Battle of Mars-La-Tour on 16 August 1870, badly outnumbered Prussian III Corps of 30 000 men attacked a French Army of the Rhine numbering 160 000, in order to cut off the army’s retreat and prevent it from linking up with reinforcements. Despite being outnumbered more than four to one, the III Corps successfully routed the French and captured Vionville. French cavalry charges were defeated by massed rifle fire.

Prussian general von Alvensleben was harassed by French artillery. Fearing that French cavalry will attack his weak flank, he requested von Bredow’s 12th Cavalry Brigade to silence French artillery and preempt French cavalry charge with one of his own. Bredow took his brigade, consisting of 7th Cuirassiers, 19th Dragoons, and 16th Uhlans, from Prussian lines at 14:00. Using terrain and gun smoke to mask his advance, von Bredow took his cavalry to about 100 – 200 meters from French lines. Bursting into view, Prussian cavalry charged and broke through the French gun and infantry lines. Two brigades of French cavalry attempted to countercharge but were dispersed by Canrobert’s infantry, who gunned down any French cavalryman that came into view. Only 420 out of 800 Prussian cavalrymen returned to their lines.

Conclusion

Above should conclusively prove that yes, heavy cavalry did charge infantry in formation, and yes, horse will charge into spear or even a pike wall. Merely having infantry willing to stand up to cavalry is not enough to neutralize heavy cavalry.

Equipment also mattered. For a cavalry on unarmored horses, charging a pike or even a spear formation was basically suicide – though it should be noted that even an unarmored horse is very difficult to kill from the front, as there are a lot of muscles and large bones in the front. But heavy cavalry equipped with plate horse barding could charge pike formation and prevail. A force of lancers could charge a spear formation even without barding as lances outranged spears, but cataphracts using maces absolutely required armor to reach infantry and engage them. Armor itself could be used as a weapon, breaking infantry spears or even pikes on impact.

But most important factor was terrain and preparation. Heavy cavalry facing pikemen was at a disadvantage unless it could attack the corner of the pike formation. But if archers were present, they could soften the pike unit and allow the cavalry to charge in. Cavalry also had advantage on open, level ground, whereas infantry held advantage if it could force a fight in a forest or on broken terrain.

In any case, devil is in the details. When one hears of successful cavalry charges, many details are left out: flat terrain, and presence of archers or other missile units that had forced the enemy to bunch up and had demorilized the opposition. Likewise, when hearing of failed cavalry charges, many details are also omitted: when one hears of famous infantry victories, he usually does not hear that infantry was dug in, had missile troops of their own, and/or that the ground was a nightmare (boggy, broken up and/or forrested) which destroyed cavalry’s cohesion before even reaching the infantry lines.

Likewise, one must not underestimate impact of moral factors. Swiss pikemen overran heavy cavalry in numerous occasions, but that was simply because they were Swiss pikemen. At other occasions, they also walked all over the English (including the famous longbowmen), Neapolitanian and French infantry and artillery. In fact, up until the appearance of the Landsknechte, heavy cavalry was the only thing which caused the Swiss any trouble at all.

As noted earlier, it is often said that horses will simply not charge a solid mass of men, or a line of spears, but will rather break apart before them like waves on a rock so long as the men stand firm; that disciplined infantry will repel cavalry charge simply by virtue of remaining steadfast in formation. Evidence and examples provided in the article until now should be enough to conclusively prove that notion false; yet it should also be understood how the notion came to being and why it is false.

The reason for this belief likely lies in the fact that horses are very nervous animals that can be frightened easily. But more than anything else, horses are herd animals. They will follow the leader; and so long as the leader – the rider – remains steadfast, horse will follow him to hell and back. Herd psychology of horses – and riders, for humans are herd animals as well – was in fact utilized by military planners. By forming the heavy cavalry into a wedge (or rather, a trapezoid) formation, not only is the formation itself more agile and easier to maneuver, but it is also more steadfast in a charge. With each successive rank being wider than previous one, and riders riding knee-to-knee, there is simply no room for the leading horses to escape and abandon the charge. And so long as they do not do so, the rest of the herd will follow. Once in a tight cavalry formation, horse has nowhere to go but forward – no going to the side, and no escaping. Momentum alone will ensure that horses will hit infantry. Further, stallions used by heavy cavalry, and European knights in particular, were incredibly aggressive and were trained to bite and kick in close combat.

Yet basic logic should suffice to prove the notion of “no impact” false. If cavalry cannot do anything to infantry in a square, if horses will have simply refused to charge, that fact will have been well known to infantry in question – meaning that the “morale impact” that heavy cavalry allegedly relied on to break infantry will have been nonexistent, especially against professional infantry employed in 16th century onwards. But in reality, steady square formations were not enough to defeat a cavalry charge. Rather, proper employment of firepower in combination with long bladed weapons was essential to defeating a cavalry charge.

By the time of modern wars however cavalry charges were a relic of the past. While occasional successful charges happened in colonial wars, the breech-loading rifles and machine guns made cavalry charges in European warfare largely unviable. From there, it was too easy to project backwards and assume that disciplined infantry will always defeat cavalry. This assumption was also promoted by cultural context: modern democratic worldview hardly leaves space for admiration of the mounted elite, and the romantic appeal of a lowly peasant overcoming his social superior has unfortunately made its way into historiography. This in turn has significantly distorted both our view of premodern warfare and the role and value of heavy shock cavalry in it.

In the end, one must be careful when reading histories both contemporary and present. Medieval historians, often themselves a nobility, tended to glorify cavalry while leaving infantry aside. Modern historians however – especially in the Anglo-Saxon world – tend to glorify infantry comprised of commoners while treating cavalry as overrated. Both approaches are incorrect. If cavalry was completely dominant, then nobody will have used infantry. On the flip side, if heavy cavalry was only useful against undisciplined infantry, then no army facing disciplined infantry will have used heavy cavalry at all. Explanation is often proferred that heavy cavalry is used because it was comprised of nobility, but reality is that status of the nobility was based on the need for heavy cavalry. Heavy cavalry was not a preeminent force because it was comprised of nobility, but rather nobility existed because of the overriding need for heavy cavalry. If heavy cavalry could be countered merely by having disciplined infantry with spears, then nobody will have ever used it. Yet heavy shock cavalry was used for literal millenia, from first appearance of cataphracts in 13th century BC until widespread adoption of gunpowder weapons in 16th to 18th centuries.

It was in fact only the gunpowder weapons that spelled the end of the traditional shock cavalry on the battlefield, and even that not immediately. While pikes and bayonets were not capable of reliably repelling cavalry charges, massed musketry caused far greater casualties among the horses and did so at sufficient distance for causalties to disorder the cavalry enough to cause the charge to fail. In some cases impact of fire was such that cavalry could not even be properly assembled for the attack. Neither the traditional ranged weapons (longbows and crossbows) nor the early firearms were capable of causing such damage, especially against the cavalry armored in plate. Both Tercios of Spanish Empire and infantry squares of Napoleonic era heavily depended on firepower to defeat any cavalry attacks, and solution to threat of cavalry was to increase the firepower of infantry formations rather than increasing the number of pikemen.

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